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Foreword
By Ciarán Cannon, Minister of State for the Diaspora and 
International Development, Ireland, June 2017– 2020
The COVID- 19 pandemic is much more than a health crisis, as 
the diverse contributions to this timely book make abundantly 
clear. Dr Michael J Ryan, Director General of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Programme, has 
observed that “Nobody on this planet is safe until everyone is 
safe”. An unprecedented spirit of global solidarity is required 
to overcome the multiple threats COVID- 19 poses to our 
health, economies and societies, particularly in resource- poor 
settings.
In Ireland, we have a strong sense of community – meitheal 
– coming together to work collectively for a better future. 
This clear sense of global citizenship underpins Ireland’s 
development cooperation, as outlined in our international 
development policy, A Better World. Ireland is playing its 
part in building and contributing to a coherent, effective and 
integrated global response to COVID- 19. Our overarching 
priority is to reduce the incidence and mitigate the impact of 
the pandemic among vulnerable populations, in line with our 
commitment to reaching the furthest behind first.
As the contributors to this book outline from a range 
of different perspectives, these efforts are unfolding in a 
highly dynamic, interconnected and changing world. Pre- 
COVID- 19, we were already facing unprecedented levels of 
humanitarian crises, with over 134 million people in need 
of assistance and protection. Protracted crises are becoming 
the new normal. New threats are emerging to peace, and 
geopolitics is becoming increasingly complex and volatile. 
To overcome these challenges and achieve the UN (United 
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Nations) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), poverty 
needs to be addressed from a multidimensional perspective. 
This includes the way the international community approaches 
and applies research, evidence, knowledge and learning.
‘Research and Learning’ is identified as one of the five key 
criteria for action in A Better World, acknowledging the need to 
prioritize learning and to situate research and evidence centrally 
within Ireland’s development cooperation programme. We 
recognize the intrinsic value of research as a global public 
good, but also its role in better understanding approaches 
that work most effectively to reduce poverty. Together with 
learning from experience, reviews and evaluations, research 
is the basis on which we build knowledge and evidence for 
our work in international development – and nowhere is this 
more important than when working in conflict and fragility, 
where the context can and does change rapidly.
Our work with research partners is an essential part of our 
efforts to achieve the ambition of A Better World. We have 
supported the work of the Development Studies Association 
of Ireland since 2012, with good reason. The DSAI occupies 
a unique position in Ireland: it provides a national platform 
to harness knowledge from higher education and civil society, 
and bridges the gap between development research, policy 
and practice. Its members are key contributors to Ireland’s 
development knowledge base.
Since the outbreak of COVID- 19, the DSAI has provided 
a dedicated online space for pooling experience and expertise 
about the impact of the pandemic on the developing world. 
It has enabled knowledge sharing through an easily accessible 
blog format, hosting opinion pieces from independent 
authors covering a wide range of thematic and geographic 
perspectives. I am delighted to see these expanded into 
book chapters and, along with other contributions, brought 
together in this new publication. It makes an important 
contribution in helping us to better understand COVID- 19 
and offset its impacts, drawing on work across disciplines and 
silos. It also underscores a core principle of Ireland’s foreign 
policy and development cooperation – that it is only through 
collective action with others that the great challenges of our 
time can be addressed.
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The development and rollout of a safe and effective vaccine 
to reach 7 billion people worldwide is one such challenge. As 
we work towards this goal, Ireland’s priority is to mitigate the 
widespread effects of COVID- 19 in line with our key policy 
priorities. We will protect peacebuilding efforts. We will 
work to ensure the ongoing delivery of critical humanitarian, 
livelihood and nutrition assistance. We will advocate for scaling 
up social protection to protect the most vulnerable. We will 
support the protection and promotion of the rights of women 
and girls and prioritize gender- based violence risk mitigation 
in our response. We will encourage ongoing engagement 
with civil society in line with international human rights 
norms and standards. We will learn from experience and link 
recovery from COVID- 19 to building greater resilience to 
future hazards.
As the contributions to this book articulate so clearly, 
building back better post- COVID- 19 does not just mean 
returning to the status quo. We must work together to 
accelerate transformative action to achieve the SDGs, putting 
the furthest behind first and utilizing robust evidence 
to address and mitigate the deeper, underlying causes of 
vulnerability and marginalization.
In the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) Development Cooperation Peer 
Review published in May of this year, Ireland is praised 
as a trusted partner to civil society, and a strong voice for 
sustainable development, leading and supporting policy 
dialogue at both local and international levels. By working in 
that spirit of meitheal, we must continue to share evidence, 
expertise and experiences to strengthen our collective efforts 
in tackling the impacts of COVID- 19. I thank the DSAI for 
their contribution to this endeavour, and for creating a space 





The world has been convulsed by the COVID- 19 (coronavirus 
disease 2019) pandemic. The virus has caused untold misery 
both directly and indirectly to people around the world 
and its effect on societies and economies globally has been 
catastrophic. International travel has ground to a near halt, 
the global economy has stalled and many countries around the 
world are in government- enforced ‘lockdowns’. Numerous 
countries have entered deep recessions and many global 
value chains have experienced massive disruption as a result 
of both demand, and in some cases, supply shocks, sending 
reverberations through the value chains of suppliers with 
negative multiplier and accelerator effects. Such economic 
shocks are largely an outcome of government policy responses 
to the pandemic and will have cascading effects both socially 
and economically for many years to come (OECD, 2020). 
Notwithstanding the billions of lives that have been adversely 
affected and the hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting 
from it, the pandemic has also exposed further serious flaws 
in the architecture of international development.
In the Global North, the purpose of lockdowns has been to 
slow the spread of the disease and prevent healthcare systems 
from being overwhelmed. The countries of the Global South 
appear to be affected differently, although this is changing as 
the geographic epicentres of the disease shift. In the developing 
world, lockdowns were put in place quickly, with often severe 
livelihood consequences given high levels of dependence on 
the informal sector for survival, and the general absence of 
widespread health, social security and public policy assistance 
measures. Thus, the ‘secondary effects’ of the crisis are more 
evident in the Global South, although many countries, as of 
mid- 2020, have now lifted their lockdowns. These countries 
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are also particularly vulnerable to systemic, structural effects 
(Hulme and Horner, 2020) and their amplification through 
interaction with wider contradictions and tendencies.
Proponents of unregulated global economic integration 
argue that this model is universally beneficial for all market 
participants. However, COVID- 19, along with the previous 
‘global’ financial crisis and the coming climate one exposes 
the contradictions and vulnerabilities of unmanaged 
interconnection. In a sense we can view connection as 
contradictory, temporally, as it generated economic growth, 
but is now associated with synchronized worldwide economic 
downturn – the most severe since the Great Depression. 
The contagion of COVID- 19 was mirrored by the financial 
contagion in the first decade of the 21st century. This in 
turn has been layered upon more regionally specific crises, 
such as the persistent developing world debt crisis and 
adverse effects of the International Monetary Fund/ World 
Bank structural adjustment programmes, which eviscerated 
healthcare and education systems in the countries in which 
they were imposed. A widely applied model of austerity in the 
aftermath of the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008 further 
undermined many attempts at socioeconomic development 
around the world.
The so- called ‘secondary impacts’ of the pandemic in 
the Global South then are all the more severe as a result of 
the layering of cumulative crises, like a palimpsest, in Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). This is most visible in the 
predominant economic form that exists in LDCs, the informal 
economy. Indeed, if we include subsistence agriculture as 
part of this, more than 85 per cent of the labour force in 
Africa, for example, are found in that sector. This is partly a 
result of the hollowing out of the formal sector (both public 
and private) arising from the aforementioned processes of 
globalization (debt, enforced adjustment and austerity). 
The marginal productivity of labour in the informal sector is 
low and so people who work in it tend not to have much in 
the way of savings, leaving them vulnerable to shocks such 
as COVID- 19 and the inability to earn a living in life under 
state lockdown. At the same time, the dominance of the 
informal sector makes for low tax returns across the Global 
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South and the consequent under- funding of health and 
social care systems. For example, China’s donation of four 
ventilators to South Sudan during the pandemic reportedly 
trebled the number available in that country and ten African 
countries were reported to have no ventilators at all (McLean 
and Marks, 2020). Thus, crisis compounds crisis and systemic 
vulnerability is accentuated by exposure to and incorporation 
into a global system characterized by combined and uneven 
development.
This collection explores a number of the issues that arise 
for the Global South in the grip of a global pandemic. 
Contributors have been drawn from various sectors and 
contexts and have specialist knowledge of a range of issues 
relevant to the impact of this pandemic on the Global South. 
Contributors focus on the medical impacts, gender equality, 
migration, economic inequality and (among other issues) 
the accentuated risks faced by vulnerable populations, such 
as those in prison or working in the ‘gig’ economy. The 
contributors also consider appropriate responses across scales 
and time. In the first phase of the pandemic – and thanks 
largely to warnings from Chinese doctor Li Wenliang and 
staff at the World Health Organization (WHO) – the public 
health response was properly recognized as being the most 
immediate challenge. In subsequent phases, economic effects 
and interactions with public health and care systems assumed 
greater prominence. Both phases require appropriate responses 
and changes in governance, public policy (both locally and 
globally) and shifts in the culture of public responsibility. It is 
these issues and the responses that this book analyses.
The pandemic is rapidly evolving and its multiple impacts 
across geographies and societies are, as yet, not fully clear. In 
the Global South, the impact is set to reshape life experiences in 
the long term, with more profound and complex implications, 
and with a depth and scale of disruption that demands 
unprecedented solidarity and international cooperation. If we 
are to build a more just and resilient world post- COVID- 19, 
we need to understand, debate and chart the issues involved 
and what effective responses are.
Pádraig Carmody and Gerard McCann, 14 August 2020
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Part I





COVID- 19 Pandemic 
Ignorance and the ‘Worlds’ 
of Development
Su- ming Khoo
This contribution reflects critically on what it means to ‘learn’ 
from the Global South. The starting point is why the ‘Global 
North’ appears to have learnt so little about pandemic 
response from the ‘Global South’, despite relevant knowl-
edge being in plain sight. The ongoing global COVID- 19 
pandemic is an opportunity to learn because it disrupts the 
labels dividing different ‘worlds’ of development and places 
a magnifying glass on critical issues of local and global equity 
and justice. As COVID- 19 is a novel disease, it is unsurprising 
that not enough is known about it. Yet a surprising igno-
rance has emerged in its wake about how governments should 
respond, and who is most vulnerable and likely to suffer or 
die. This ignorance about differential impacts and vulnera-
bilities cannot exactly be said to be an absence of knowledge. 
Rather, it is a problem of un- knowing that maps interestingly 
onto central debates in critical development studies about the 
proper focal objects, subjects and purposes (the whats, the 
whos and the whys) of ‘development’.
How and why have issues of local and global inequity 
and injustice become actively (rather than just accidentally) 
under- emphasized and ignored? Cognitive frames that 
present ‘development’ as a question of ‘Northern’ knowledge 
and competence versus ‘Southern’ lack of knowledge or 
competence are deeply complicit in the active production of 
global ignorance, with serious effects.
The worldwide COVID- 19 pandemic has surfaced a 
renewed appreciation of the value of public health systems 
as national and global public goods. It has laid bare the 
problems accompanying the promotion of ‘development’ 
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policies and practices complicit in marketization, which 
erodes and fragments the capacities of public health systems 
(McCoy, 2020). Countervailing struggles to maintain and 
reestablish systemic health capacity and equity have become 
entangled with difficult questions about how to best manage 
major socioeconomic disruption and economic contraction. A 
trajectory shift for global ‘development’ has become suddenly 
thinkable, an opportunity and lesson for development studies 
itself. It is time for the field of development studies to give 
up embedded, uncritical frames of separate, ranked ‘worlds’ 
of ‘development’ in favour of a shared transformative vision. 
Such a vision entails the responsibility to address widening 
inequities and injustices that have been hiding in plain 
sight, beginning with efforts to stop unseeing the gaps and 
deprivations facing the ‘South within the North’, as well as 
the obligations of the ‘North within the South’ to support 
and resource equitable health systems, and not wreck or 
plunder them.
What the ‘Global North’ already ‘knew’ – equity deficits in 
pandemic preparedness
Previous global pandemics, such as H1N1, Ebola and SARS, 
have led to heightened awareness about the need for global 
pandemic preparedness. Just before the current outbreak, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) had issued dire warnings:
a very real threat of a rapidly moving, highly lethal pandemic 
of a respiratory pathogen killing 50 to 80 million people 
and wiping out nearly 5 per cent of the world’s economy. 
A global pandemic on that scale would be catastrophic, 
creating widespread havoc, instability and insecurity. The 
world is not prepared.
(WHO, 2019: 6)
This frightening prediction mobilized major efforts to devise 
a global pandemic preparedness index and league table 
ranking countries by levels of preparedness. The Global 
Health Security Index ranked the United States (US) and 
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United Kingdom (UK) at the top, being ‘best prepared’, 
Asian and Latin American countries around the middle and 
African countries at the bottom. The reality, to date, has been 
quite the opposite as the UK and US have experienced some 
of the highest levels of infection and mortality. The index’s 
unintended effect was to create the impression that drastic 
measures taken by China to control the outbreak in January 
2020 were due to its lack of preparedness, while countries 
with high preparedness rankings, such as the US or UK, did 
not need to act with the same thoroughness, with resulting 
higher infection and mortality rates costing possibly many 
thousands of lives (Bissio, 2020; LePan, 2020).
Prior reviews of US pandemic preparedness found that 
a lack of concern with health disparities led to predictable, 
preventable and socially unjust illness and deaths. They 
recommended reducing health disparities and lowering 
barriers to healthcare access as pandemic preparedness 
priorities (Kayman and Ablorh- Odjidja, 2006; Lurie et al, 
2008; DeBruin et al, 2012). This recommendation coincided 
with the rise of the social determinants approach to health 
in the 2000s (Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health, 2008). Although the UK was a leading force in the 
social determinants approach, the appalling impact of social 
gradients, for example on Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
communities in the ongoing COVID- 19 pandemic (PHE, 
2020), seemed to take the UK government by surprise. Out 
of the many potential differences and inequities in population 
groups, only age and comorbidities were considered. 
The UK government showed a surprising inattention to 
social gradients and vulnerabilities, focusing instead on 
individualistic behavioural psychology (to predict individual 
behavioural non- adherence to public health restrictions) 
as the only additionally relevant social factor. Other social 
gradients were ignored in this highly resourced country with 
an iconically unified public health system and world- leading, 
nuanced knowledge base about social gradients in health.
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Critical development thinking
Critical development thinking has always concerned itself with 
questions about the right referent object of ‘development’. Is 
it the economy or the people that we should care about and 
who or what counts for more or less in a given accounting or 
ranking exercise? The current pandemic has brought these 
perennial debates starkly to the fore. Governments that seem 
too slow to impose public health movement restrictions or 
are too quick to relax them have been accused of callousness, 
‘playing roulette with the public’s lives’ (Horton, 2020). 
Utilitarian reasoning is seriously questioned (Burke, 2020), as 
vulnerable people point out that trade- off modelling between 
economic recovery and population infection looks a lot like 
‘social eugenics’ (Williams, 2020).
Similar questioning around the limits of economic 
rationality and potential inhumanity sparked the rise of 
development ethics and the human development paradigm 
(Ul Haq, 1995), enabling development studies to think more 
fruitfully about human vulnerabilities and wellbeing and to 
consider the socially, economically and politically marginalized, 
discriminated and disadvantaged. The COVID- 19 pandemic 
has resurfaced these questions about populations- within- 
a- population such as older people, migrants, people with 
disabilities and workers in low- paid, but essential, service and 
personal care sectors. It has highlighted the vulnerability of 
the institutionalized, who are stuck behind doors – such as 
prisons, care homes and migrant and refugee detention centres 
– as well as those who lack secure doors and shelter, such 
as informal housing residents, migrant workers and people 
experiencing homelessness. All these groups have fared worse 
in being protected, counted, diagnosed, treated, becoming 
ill and dying. The root of these injustices is a lack of social- 
democratic equality, dignity and rights and the centrality of 
economic thinking premised upon structurally valuing some 
types of persons, labour and lives as lesser, requiring less 
protection and less deserving of consideration, respect and 
recompense.
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Agnotology of development
Critical development studies point to fundamental problems 
surrounding schemas for thinking that are not just accidentally 
ignorant but seem to actively produce ignorance. A social 
constructionist approach highlights that all knowledge is 
power. The power to un- know is as important as the power to 
know (Santos, 2007; McGoey, 2019). Agnotology addresses 
general and systemic ignorance as something that is socially, 
politically and culturally produced. Lack of knowledge is a 
social construct that emerges either through selective choice 
and cultivation, or through neglect and intentional acts of 
deception. Proctor (2008) has documented the deliberate, 
organized production of health- harming non- knowledge and 
fake knowledge by the tobacco, asbestos, and pharmaceuticals 
industries. Proctor particularly problematizes the impact 
of commercialization on scientific research, while McGoey 
(2019) criticizes the broader impact of ‘strategic ignorance’ 
and ‘regulatory anti- strategies’ in pharmaceutical regulation, 
philanthropy and economic thought. This history resurfaces 
in the current debates over individualized ‘tech fixes’ versus 
community prevention measures to address COVID- 19 
(Meek, 2020).
We come to the current pandemic in a state of complex, 
broad- based epistemic crisis and disruption of the global social 
organization of knowledge and science attributed to political 
polarization, declining trust in institutions, and asymmetric 
media ecosystems (see Dahlgren, 2018; Miller and Kirwan, 
2019). Amid such crisis, incoherent authoritarian- populist 
leadership and public health denialism combine with deadly 
effect, as earlier warnings about inequity and social injustice 
are ignored. South Africa battled with AIDS denialism in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (O’Reilly, 2016), yet few 
lessons have been drawn from this experience. Few efforts 
been made to learn from Asian and African experiences 
with SARS, Ebola and MERS (MacCormaic, 2020; Sirleaf, 
2020). Health professionals in the UK seem baffled by 
governmental reluctance to seriously consider China’s advice 
to act decisively (The Lancet, 2020). The US government’s 
attempts to shift the blame onto China (Geall, 2020), or 
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the UK’s resort to claims about ‘the best science’ (Adam, 
2020) substitute discursive deflection for action based on 
actual global experience. Excess deaths and suffering and 
deepened vulnerabilities and discrimination stand as deadly 
exemplifications of pandemic agnotology.
Neoliberalism and public ignorance
The ideology, policies and effects that cluster around 
neoliberalism include right- wing authoritarian- populist 
government, narrowing of knowledge and scepticism towards 
expert and professional knowledge. President Donald 
Trump and other right- wing leaders’ rejection of expertise 
(Müller, 2020) merely continues agnotological trajectories 
laid down by neoliberal policy entrepreneurs and think- 
tanks, who have been concertedly engineering the public out 
of political common sense since the 1920s. Public interest, 
public science and public education have been presented as 
corrupt, lazy, irrelevant, failing and wasteful of taxpayers’ 
money, while private, for- profit companies with political 
connections have been promoted as heroic, effective, efficient 
and entrepreneurial replacements for public services. The 
very concepts of the social and the public were disowned by 
neoliberal ideologues, who sought to make them un- known.
In the social sciences, public and welfare economics, 
comparative and institutional studies that learn from different 
experiences and explore different political and social choices 
have become marginalized under a stigmatized label of 
‘heterodoxy’. These were replaced by an orthodoxy of abstract 
models, including behavioural approaches combining and 
conflating depoliticizing methodological individualism and 
politicizing methodological nationalism. Social democratic 
models balancing individual and collective welfare have 
been replaced by anti- collectivist, anti- redistributionist 
understandings of ‘Social Choice’ (List, 2013), and ‘Public 
Choice’, representing oxymoronic, bad- faith, morally blind 
(Caplan, 2005) and anti- democratic (MacLean, 2018) ways 
to un- think the meaning of publicness. The neoconservative 
redefinition of ‘relevance’ has enabled research funding to 
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be radically narrowed to favour politically influential large 
businesses and military interests. The purpose of education 
has been similarly redefined to make competitive individuals 
fit for selected markets and countries fit for tax- competitive 
globalization.
Returning to the Third World
The question of categories and rankings, implicit or explicit, 
sits at the heart of the development imaginary and thus its 
theories, policies and practices. The Cold War classifications 
of ‘First’, ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ Worlds have never become 
completely defunct. Their replacement with the geographically 
improbable ‘North versus South’ division remains similarly 
unsatisfactory – old labels for ‘development’ remain sticky as 
the desire for analytical simplification trumps the willingness 
to see existing internal and global inequities and address the 
politics of inequality and polarization.
The decolonization critique in development studies 
focuses mainly on issues of epistemic dominance and the 
imposition of dominating forms of knowledge. This critique 
is central to understanding how domination leans on the will 
to ignore. The ranked, stagist theory of development is sticky 
because the desire to assume that the First World must be 
earlier, more and better developed persists. The progression 
theory implies that knowledge and experience lie with the 
first ‘world’ and congratulates it for having already arrived 
while simultaneously ignoring the historical precedence of 
indigenous First Nations, who continue to be stigmatized as 
a kind of internal ‘Third World’ within the ‘First’.
However, the ‘Second World’ did not exactly rank second 
since ‘second’ was a negative category signifying the political 
‘Other’, against which the positive category of the ‘First 
World’ could assert itself. To be ‘Third’ in the Third World 
was never a question of ordinal ranking, but a claim on history. 
Catching up was not a question of steps to be hurriedly 
followed, but an accounting for power and resources taken 
and a demand for reparations for past misappropriations and 
for structural reform, rights and justice. Alfred Sauvy, who 
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coined the term ‘tiers monde’, saw it as analogous to the Third 
Estate of the 1789 French Revolution. ‘Third’ denoted a 
mass of population beginning to recognize itself as a coming 
political force and demanding to be reckoned- with as such. 
Being ‘Third’ was about an opening space of political self- 
determination, and a rejection of hegemonic domination by 
the ‘First’ or competing ‘Second’ world superpower (while 
that lasted). Beyond securing political independence from 
the colonizing power, the next moment of political self- 
determination begged the question of what might come next.
This returns the critical reflection on pandemic 
circumstances to broader questions of how to survive, modify 
or replace capitalism, as a system with long taproots in five 
centuries of imperialism, colonization, Eurocentrism and 
racism, which structurally negates the possibility for the 
world’s majority, wherever they are, to participate equally, and 
benefit from, social democracy. How might this moment be 
used to articulate new political, economic, social and cultural 
expectations and how might people and countries plan to fulfil 
such expectations? These questions have always been the real 
stakes defining the subject matter of ‘development’ and they 
arose in the context of negotiating a new world order where 
historical inequalities now demanded to be accounted for.
The writer, Arundhati Roy (2020) suggested that ‘the 
pandemic is a portal’. Its appalling vital inequalities of health 
and life are simply the newest crisis manifestation of the 
demand for reckoning opened by the ‘Third World’ struggle. 
A historical thread connects anti- imperial and anti- colonial 
struggles, demands for a New International Economic Order 
and Right to Development and social democratic struggles 
everywhere. This thread connects questions about ignorances 
with questions about justice – what remains unasked and 
unknown about the experiences of Africa or China, about 
the relationship between capitalism, socialism and democracy, 
and about what might be done about the Third ‘World’ 
within the ‘First’. These critical development questions are 
uncomfortable and difficult, but they are also good and 
necessary trouble, for thinking through the world order today.
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Climate Change and 
Coronavirus
A Confluence of Crises as 
Learning Moment
David Selby and Fumiyo Kagawa
A tale of two crises
2019 was the year of climate emergency declarations. Around 
the world, 1,750 jurisdictions in 30 countries declared states of 
emergency in response to a rapidly changing and increasingly 
volatile global climate so that, today, 820 million people, or 
one in ten people on the planet, live in places covered by 
climate emergency decrees (Climate Emergency Declaration, 
2020). 2020 has brought the COVID- 19 emergency. Declared 
a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
March 2020, COVID- 19 has spread rapidly around the world 
with devastating impacts on human life patterns, livelihoods, 
everyday expectations and public health systems. The global 
economy has been brought to its knees.
The level of attention afforded to the coronavirus contagion 
has made it easy to overlook that, not so long ago, WHO 
(2015) identified climate change as the ‘greatest threat to 
global health in the 21st century’. On that account, some have 
adversely compared the ‘lacklustre’ or ‘faltering’ pursuance 
of climate change adaptation and mitigation with the intense 
and robust response to coronavirus across most jurisdictions 
(Paoletti and Vinke, 2020; The Lancet, 2020). The generally 
low visibility of climate change during the coronavirus crisis 
notwithstanding, the authors argue that the two crises share 
much by way of provenance and that, in their intersection, they 
are in many respects mutually exacerbating. The authors also 
argue that measures taken to allay either crisis can positively 
but also negatively impact on efforts to alleviate the other. 
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In short, there is not only confluence but also collision. In 
studying current and emerging proposals and initiatives, the 
confluence of pandemic and climate breakdown is examined 
as presenting a potentially significant learning moment on the 
road to resilience.
Common provenance
Both crises are widely perceived as having their origins in 
human violation of nature (Kolinjivadi, 2020). Encroachment 
upon the natural world in the name of development is seen 
as escalating climate breakdown while opening the door to a 
succession of diseases with the potential to assume pandemic 
proportions. Unrelenting urbanization, mining, logging, 
development of transport infrastructure and ‘slash and burn’ 
agricultural expansion all degrade and shrink natural habitats 
and further reduce biodiversity. They intensify carbon release 
while reducing the global carbon sink, the consequent stoking 
of global surface temperatures further eroding the resilience 
and health of the shrinking natural world. Such activities also 
have the effect of corralling wildlife in ever- closer proximity 
to human communities. Human expansion into wild spaces 
in consequence facilitates the transmission of pathogens from 
wildlife. It is estimated that 75 per cent of new infectious 
diseases detected in the last 30 years have had zoonotic origins; 
that is, they resulted from the spread of bacteria, viruses, 
fungi or parasites from wild or domestic animals to humans 
(Anderson, 2020; Walzer, 2020). The recent procession of 
zoonotic contagions includes SARS, MERS, Ebola, Avian 
Influenza and, latterly and most devastatingly, COVID- 19, 
which has been described as ‘an entirely predictable result of 
humanity’s destruction of nature’ (Anderson, 2020). Many 
zoonoses are likely to flourish in a warming climate (UNEP, 
2020a). Exacerbating the threat of zoonotic pandemic is the 
continuing international trade in wildlife and ‘wet market’ 
trade in wild meat, a factor of poverty and food insecurity 
but also in many cases of longstanding food acculturation 
(Carrington, 2020; Price, 2020). It is from a wet market that 
COVID- 19 is believed to have emerged.
Climate Change and Coronavirus 19
The two emergencies are also widely identified as inevitable 
outcroppings of the prevailing global economic growth 
model. For Kolinjivadi (2020), both crises are rooted in 
neoliberal pursuit of ‘infinite growth at the expense of the 
environment on which our survival depends’. In Chang’s 
view (2020), the crises call for a ‘fundamental reconsideration 
of our development model’ based on an understanding of 
‘how global capitalism has operated in the last decade’. The 
coronavirus crisis, he explains, amounts to a continuum of the 
2007– 2008 crisis of global capitalism when it was bailed out 
by state injections of funding before once more continuing 
to expand by wreaking further growth- focused havoc on the 
environment (Chang, 2020). The question then arises as to 
whether, post- coronavirus, there will be a headlong rush to 
shore up the capitalist system and so restore ‘business as usual’ 
or, alternatively, a push for a green, resilient and inclusive 
future.
An overlaying of crises
Across the Global South, COVID- 19 is overlaying and 
exacerbating climate- induced crises, thereby attenuating 
coping capacity. As Phillips et al (2020:  586) have 
predicted: climate- attributed risks ‘are likely to intersect with 
the COVID- 19 crisis all around the world, with many already 
causing disruptions or likely to do so over the next 12 to 
18 months’. In the countries of West Africa, climate change 
in the form of drought is depleting agricultural yields. Pre- 
coronavirus, the World Food Program had anticipated a rise in 
food insecurity that would affect 21 million people. With the 
COVID- 19 outbreak it now anticipates a further 22 million 
people becoming reliant on food aid. A climate change- 
fuelled crisis, already overlain by jihadi conflict, has thus 
become a three- pronged crisis. Efforts to counter COVID- 19 
such as lockdowns and travel restrictions are hampering the 
distribution of food aid to drought- affected areas (Akinwotu, 
2020). In Sierra Leone, disaster management faces a ‘perfect 
storm’. Recurring manifestations of a changing climate 
include worsening dry seasons with increased wildfire and 
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drought followed by unpredictable and often torrential rainy 
seasons marked by flash flooding and landslides that threaten 
to overcome poverty- stricken communities and make tackling 
COVID- 19 decidedly more challenging. Not only are poor 
communities more disease vulnerable to coronavirus but 
the usual way of protecting flood- engulfed communities, 
that is, moving the affected to designated shelter, flies in the 
face of measures such as social distancing, needed to contain 
the virus (Miles, 2020). In East Africa, the appearance of 
plagues of locusts of biblical proportions, widely attributed 
to warmer seas generating the exceptionally wet weather on 
which locusts thrive, is threatening food security and pushing 
very poor communities deeper into poverty. Hampering what 
needs to be a mobile response to combatting locust swarms 
are governmental restrictions on movement targeted at 
containing coronavirus. Put baldly, the region faces a choice 
between stopping the spread of the locust and stopping the 
spread of the virus (Oxfam, 2020). Among the islands of the 
Pacific, the confluence of coronavirus and climate change as 
manifested by an April 2020 category five cyclone has led to 
a ‘moment of reckoning’ that has thrown open the fragility of 
Pacific economies and exposed the shortcomings of current 
economic structures (Samuwai, 2020). Taken together, the 
two crises have hit tourism hard and laid bare the vulnerability 
of tourism dependency.
Climate- induced migration in the Global South is 
interfacing with COVID- 19 in multiple and complex ways. 
At least 15 million people per year are being displaced by 
climate- related disaster. They tend not to move far and often 
to the nearest city where they are typically housed in what 
can quickly become a crammed temporary evacuation space; 
a solution that with COVID- 19 presents a dangerous public 
health risk. ‘The measures needed to cope with a sudden 
episode of displacement are exactly the opposite of those 
required to contain the spread of COVID- 19’ (Randall, 
2020). Those who wish to migrate from hazard- prone rural 
areas may be forced to remain where they are because of 
lockdown in urban areas. Alternatively, as in India, lockdown 
can force thousands of out- of- work migrant workers to leave 
cities and trek to their villages where they are likely to face 
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high exposure to drought and food insecurity (Paoletti and 
Vinke, 2020). During the recent super- cyclone affecting 
Bangladesh, displaced people faced an ‘impossible choice’ 
between ‘braving the cyclone by staying put, or risking 
infection in a shelter’ (Ellis- Petersen and Ratcliffe, 2020).
Crises as opportunity
Many are suffering from the conjunction of the two crises. 
But many are seeing the COVID- 19 experience as offering 
an insight into, first, what a retreat from potential climate 
breakdown would look like and, second, what governments, 
steeled to respond to emergency, can achieve. Reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions and pollution levels with shutdowns 
in industrial activity, few flights, reductions in road traffic and 
noticeably bluer skies have given many intimations of a different 
world (Clark, 2020). ‘Amid tragedy we have had a sniff of a 
cleaner, safer future’ (Clark, 2020). Hand in glove with this 
perception, it has dawned on many that the radical and urgent 
response to COVID- 19 on the part of government sells the 
lie to past climate change prevarication and foot dragging in 
the name of maintaining business as usual. The coronavirus 
outbreak, writes Pantuliano (2020), has demonstrated that 
‘what was previously deemed impossible seems attainable’. 
‘Last year’, writes Powell (2020), ‘governments around the 
world declared a “climate emergency” and did pretty much 
nothing to act as if it is one. Now here’s COVID- 19 and this 
is what an emergency response looks like’.
Although early days, it is possible to discern a range of 
proposals and initiatives arising out of what Anderson (2020) 
calls the ‘creative confusion’ marking ‘this shared time of 
pestilence’. Explicitly or implicitly, each walks the interface 
between the two crises. Taken together, the proposals 
and initiatives amount to a significant learning moment in 
pursuance of a more resilient future. These are looked at under 
three headings:  nature- based responses; resetting economic 
and social systems; and a deeper cross- sectorial approach for 
a multi- hazard world.
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Nature- based responses
‘It is time for nature’ was the recurring theme running 
through the wide- ranging Environment Day 2020 speech 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Executive Director (Anderson, 2020) as he advocated nature- 
based solutions to biodiversity loss, climate change and 
zoonotic pandemics, solutions that include preservation of 
remaining wild spaces, an end to deforestation, reforestation, 
ecosystem restoration of degraded land and habitat- sensitive 
agriculture. A vehicle for such nature- based responses is the 
2021– 2030 UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration designed 
to help in the race against climate change and biodiversity 
loss by reversing the degradation of ecosystems (UNEP, 
2020b). Anticipating the decade, in East Africa, UNEP, 
alongside partner organizations, has adopted a ‘pay to grow’ 
tree- planting scheme employing workers from the most 
disadvantaged communities on the frontline of the climate 
crisis and out of work because of COVID- 19. Green recovery 
is also the hallmark of the ‘Ten Billion Tree Tsunami Project’ 
in Pakistan, a five- year tree- planting program begun in 2018 
and now employing labourers who have lost their jobs because 
of coronavirus lockdown to plant millions of saplings in an 
effort to roll back the climate change threat (Khan, 2020).
Resetting economic and social systems
Wishing otherwise, philosopher Slavoj Zizek fears that, 
post- coronavirus ‘barbarian capitalism will prevail’ (Horton, 
2020); that, for instance, the excesses of the marketplace will 
be redoubled with zombie investment in cheap fossil fuels 
and unsustainable ‘shovel ready’ projects being resorted 
to as an accelerant of growth and means of putting people 
back to work. Pantuliano (2020) is more upbeat, detecting 
the potential emergence post- COVID- 19 of a new order, 
a ‘more sustainable and equal path’. ‘We won’t go back to 
normal because normal was the problem’, she asserts while 
pointing to three critical areas where there is ‘no option 
but change’:  reducing emissions in rich economies while 
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ensuring just transitions to low carbon economies in lower- 
income countries; addressing the ubiquitous plague of 
deep inequalities; enhancing human rights protections as 
the antidote to draconian pandemic action on the part of 
government. The World Economic Forum calls for a ‘great 
reset’ of the global economic and social foundations of 
capitalism in response to coronavirus and to the likelihood 
that climate and social crises will be exacerbated. It identifies 
three key components:  steering the market to fairer and 
more equitable outcomes; investment in shared goals such 
as equality and sustainability; harnessing innovation to best 
address the global public good (Schwab, 2020). In the 
Global North, talk of a post- coronavirus ‘Green New Deal’ 
or ‘green recovery’ to address environmental degradation and 
the climate crisis is becoming commonplace. According to 
Perry (2020), most ‘Green New Deal’ proposals overlook the 
irreparable harm caused by colonizer, industrialized nations 
in the Global South and the respective position of the Global 
North and Global South as greenhouse effect perpetrator and 
frontline victim. Perry considers that for a globally equitable 
‘Green New Deal’, the international community must give 
serious consideration to reparations, taking into account 
the social and economic impacts of historic colonialism, the 
environmental destruction that has been wrought by climate 
change, and the consequent level of vulnerability to the 
ravages of COVID- 19.
A deeper cross- sectorial approach for a multi- hazard world
Evidence is emerging that COVID- 19 is causing a rethink of 
cross- sectorial policy and practice in addressing multi- hazards, 
especially at the United Nations (UN) level. Take the field of 
disaster risk reduction, for instance. The Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015– 2030 (UN, 2015) includes 
reference to biological, epidemic and pandemic threats but 
this has not generally been reflected at national and regional 
operational levels. There are the first indications that the 
COVID- 19 experience is leading to policy reformulation: the 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
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(UNDRR) Africa (2020) called for the mainstreaming of 
health pandemics in disaster planning and for prioritization of 
long- term, climate smart solutions ‘as climate change impacts 
combine with COVID- 19 to affect the poor and most 
vulnerable’. COVID- 19 is presented as providing both the 
opportunity for strengthening collaboration and partnerships 
for integrated cross- sectorial action and for ‘transformational 
and green recovery’ (UNDRR Africa, 2020). The same holds 
true for UN climate change developments. At the heart of the 
agreement forged in Paris at Conference of the Parties (COP) 
21 in 2015 was the commitment of each signatory country 
to present a review of its actions, future action plans and 
commitments as its Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs). NDCs were due to be presented at COP 26 in late- 
2020 only for the conference to be postponed until 2021 
on account of the coronavirus emergency. Countries are 
now being urged more than before by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to integrate coronavirus- 
related and environmental health threats into their 2021 NDC 
submissions. UNEP is also partnering with UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme) in a Climate Promise 
initiative to assist with ‘country- level engagement on climate 
change and climate action in the context of COVID- 19’ 
(UNEP, 2020c). Other evidence of deeper cross- sectoriality 
is furnished by the developing One Health, EcoHealth and 
Planetary Health approaches that in their different ways 
coalesce, inter alia, human, ecological and climate health 
(Lerner and Berg, 2017).
Conclusion
Nature- based initiatives, a resetting of economic and social 
structures and a deepening and more thoroughgoing cross- 
sectorial framing of issues are all called for if the world, 
as Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz puts it, is to avoid 
leaping ‘from the COVID frying pan into the climate fire’ 
(Beament, 2020).
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International Human Rights 
and Global Welfare in the 
Midst of the COVID- 19 
Pandemic
Gerard McCann and Féilim  
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The notion of universal human rights, applicable to all and 
promoted as an answer to future global peace, security and 
sustainability after World War Two, continues to be a work in 
progress in a deeply divided and unequal world. Attempts to 
establish international human rights standards and enforce-
ment mechanisms by the UN and then other regional bod-
ies such as the Council of Europe (CoE) have been beset by 
a range of different obstacles. Different cultures, ideologies 
and socioeconomic contexts, geopolitical rivalries and the 
unequal distribution of power and wealth globally all influ-
ence the establishment of ‘rights’ and their realisability. In the 
Global South, the legacy of colonialism and ongoing neoco-
lonialism have often contributed to weak states, dictatorial 
rulers and gross inequalities, exacerbated by a dominating 
global market system. In such circumstances, even the most 
basic human rights – such as the rights to life, health and 
education – have been denied to large sections of the pop-
ulation. Massive global inequalities exist in access to rights 
– whether civil and political, but especially social and eco-
nomic. It is therefore not surprising that as states have strug-
gled to cope with the COVID- 19 pandemic, human rights 
concerns have emerged in terms of what governments have 
and have not done, and how global institutions have fared in 
ensuring human rights protections in the global community. 
This chapter explores some of the impacts of the COVID- 19 
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pandemic on international human rights globally and on the 
whole notion of the universality of human rights.
Human rights protection and COVID- 19
When COVID- 19 was declared a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (PHEIC) by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) on 30 January 2020, governments 
reacted differently and at varying paces in response. Measures 
taken, or not, were informed by a mixture of political, 
economic and ideological influences weighed against 
sometimes conflicting advice from national and international 
scientific advisers. Concerns for the impact on the economy, 
education, mental health and normal life had to be weighed 
against the need to contain the spread of a deadly new virus 
about which the world knew very little and for which there 
was no cure or vaccine. Lockdown of the economy, education, 
childcare, leisure facilities, as well as restrictions on movement, 
social distancing and quarantine, challenged individual rights’ 
protections in the name of the right to life and health of the 
society, and particularly of those most susceptible to the virus.
Concerns for the rights of citizens at nation state level 
overrode ideas about international solidarity. Narrow 
national responses led to the unilateral closure of borders in 
many states to prevent the inflow of people from elsewhere, 
including the cancellation of the European Union’s (EU) 
programme to resettle refugees from Syria. The notion of 
‘free’ trade was shelved as governments prevented the export 
of or used their economic power to corner the market for 
respirators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and drugs. 
In July 2020, the US cornered almost all the global supply 
of Remdisivir – the most promising drug to emerge at the 
time in the fight against the virus. At the same time, the 
EU Commission announced that it was in discussions with 
the drug’s producers, the US company Gilead, ‘to reserve 
doses of Remdisiver for EU member states’ (Irish Times, 
6 July 2020:  12). This of course led to concerns by those 
states, particularly in the Global South, who may not have the 
economic clout to challenge rich states in the marketplace for 
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the necessary drugs and equipment to fight the virus. It also 
raised questions about who would have access (and when, 
and to what extent) to any vaccine that might be produced 
at a future date. US President Trump, for example, made it 
clear that he intended to ensure that Americans would get 
access to any potential new vaccine before anyone else in 
the world. Such pharmaceutical protectionism would have 
a catastrophic effect on many countries in the Global South 
unable to prepare for this pandemic without appropriate 
medical resources.
Globally, concerns were also raised about the potential use 
of the pandemic as an excuse by some states to curtail hard- 
won freedoms. Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, 
listed 111 countries where it said that governments had used 
the crisis to introduce media suppression, controls on civil 
society, or legislation that was intended to silence oppositional 
voices. Lockdown became an excuse in some countries to 
adopt emergency powers or martial law decrees, or to monitor 
populations under the guise of limiting contagion. It also 
opened the window for the suppression of ethnic minorities 
and permitted political persecution to thrive on a wide scale 
(HRW, 2020).
Although restrictive regulations are undoubtedly necessary 
at times of public health emergencies, some governments 
used the opportunity to circumvent or change human rights 
legislation. While states are allowed under international 
human rights law to derogate from many of the rights in a 
time of emergency, the extent of restrictions to rights should 
be appropriate to the particular circumstances at that time 
and should be lifted when the emergency dissipates. There 
are always concerns though that once restrictions on rights 
are in place it may be difficult to get them removed in the 
future as states become comfortable with this ‘new normal’. 
The 2015 imposition of emergency decree laws in Turkey, for 
example, showed that:  ‘…the longer the emergency regime 
lasts, … the lesser justification there is for treating a situation 
as exceptional in nature with the consequence that it cannot 
be addressed by application of normal legal tools’ (Venice 
Commission, 2016: 41).
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Rights violations have become widespread in the Global 
South since the announcement of the pandemic. President 
Duterte of the Philippines, for example, threatened to shoot 
anyone violating his pandemic restrictions and public animal 
cages were erected for public humiliation; in South Africa, the 
police enforced violations of restrictions with beatings, water 
cannons, rubber bullets and mass imprisonment; in India, 
migrant workers were lined up and sprayed with disinfectant; 
others had ‘keep away from me’ forcibly written on their 
foreheads; 15 people were shot dead by police enforcing the 
curfew in Kenya; in Iran, Amnesty International reported 
36 killings of prisoners protesting about health concerns 
around the virus (Delvac, 2020:  1). Fundamentally, what 
has been challenged in many countries has been the right to 
liberty. Under the restrictions imposed during the pandemic, 
restraints have been placed on whole populations in terms of 
what they can and cannot do, where they can travel, shop or 
spend leisure time, who they can be in contact with and how 
closely and for how long. In particular, restrictions have been 
placed on the most vulnerable: the elderly, the ill, those with 
underlying health issues and those in need of institutional 
care. Health protection and public safety have been the 
primary concerns, but proportionality is important, as is the 
rebuilding of rights- focused approaches post- COVID- 19.
A thin line exists between the need to protect communities 
from the spread of the virus and the right to freedom of 
movement and behaviour. In some countries, such as the 
US where the primacy of individual freedom and limited 
government regulation is promoted, the conflict between 
individual rights and the collective rights of communities 
to good health has precipitated the spread of the virus. As a 
result, the deleterious effects of the pandemic have been most 
severe on the rights to healthcare, education, freedom from 
hunger, and so on.
The welfare states which emerged after World War Two in 
many European countries, with comprehensive public health 
services, free education systems, income and other social 
protections, were not replicated in most of the Global South 
or indeed even in rich countries such as the US. When the 
pandemic emerged, while some health services (such as in 
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Germany) appeared better prepared than others, many, even 
among those with comprehensive welfare systems, struggled 
to cope. Lack of adequate supplies of PPE, respirators, medical 
staff, drugs, hospital facilities and testing capabilities were 
experienced throughout Europe with some health facilities 
overwhelmed with the numbers infected. That so many 
healthcare workers and elderly residents of care homes were 
to die was an indictment of both the lack of preparedness of 
some states and the virulence of the virus. In the US, the lack 
of a comprehensive public health service and a reluctance to 
interfere in the market or individual rights for the collective 
good, alongside poor political leadership, meant that one of 
the richest countries in the world suffered the most in terms 
of total deaths throughout much of 2020. In particular, it was 
the poor, the disadvantaged, the elderly and ethnic minorities 
that bore the brunt of this.
It emerged early in the pandemic that large numbers 
of workers in specific employment sectors, such as the 
meatpacking industry, were contracting the virus. Dependent 
on mostly migrant labour, on poor wages and living and 
working under congested conditions, this raised questions 
about work practices and conditions in such industries. It 
also raised questions about the effectiveness of travel controls 
supposedly established to prevent the spread of the virus 
from state to state. Bus drivers, care workers and taxi drivers 
were also groups especially affected by the virus. When states 
began to lockdown to try and curtail the spread of the virus, 
those first to lose their jobs were often those who were in 
low- income employment or with precarious contracts – those 
with little or no labour rights. As the lockdown restrictions 
start to be lifted and economies begin to function again, it is 
those same workers that will most likely suffer the most in the 
accompanying global recession.
In the Global South, the impact of disruption to global 
trade has added to economic precarity. Prior to the pandemic 
there were already more than 820 million people who went 
to bed hungry in the world. Quarantine regulations, partial 
port closures, border closures and travel restrictions causing 
disruption to the global food market will exacerbate this. 
‘Well- nourished citizens in wealthy countries may weather a 
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couple of months without some fresh or imported produce, 
but in the developing world, a child malnourished at a young 
age will be stunted for life’ (Dongyu Qu, 2020).
Most states were quick to close schools and colleges 
early on in the pandemic, believing that young people were 
possible ‘super- spreaders’ of the virus. Education went online, 
to a greater or lesser degree. This in turn reinforced already 
existing educational inequalities for those on lower incomes 
or with learning difficulties. Lack of access to computers, the 
web, reliable broadband, dedicated technology for personal 
educational purposes, space, educational support, and the 
general environment in which education takes place, are all 
issues. The closure of schools also meant there were no school 
meals for millions of children across the world – 85 million 
in Latin America and the Caribbean alone (Dongyu Qu, 
2020). The right to education has been put into question on 
a global scale.
The response of international organizations
One may well ask, where have the international institutions 
been during this pandemic, and to what extent have they been 
able to marshal a global response which protects the rights of 
all? The WHO, set up as an agency of the UN in 1948 with the 
task of promoting global health and organizing international 
responses to global health emergencies, announced the 
pandemic on 11 March 2020. At the time there were already 
118,000 cases of the coronavirus illness in over 110 countries 
and territories around the world, and in retrospect it admitted 
that it had been too slow on the announcement since the 
first cases were identified in the Chinese city of Wuhan on 31 
December 2019. One major problem had been the lack of 
information about and understanding of the new virus, which 
led to slow and confused reporting from countries affected. 
The WHO set in motion a global COVID- 19 Strategic 
Preparedness and Response Plan which identified the major 
actions countries needed to take and the resources needed 
to carry them out. This continues to be updated in line with 
scientific evidence from around the world. Although not a 
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human rights oversight body, the WHO has been heavily 
involved, prior to the pandemic, in the promotion of the right 
to health globally and the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), especially Goal 3 relating to attempts to promote 
health. In more recent times, it has attempted to provide 
a coordination role in the dissemination of information 
which may help prevent the spread of the virus, and in the 
promotion of the development of treatments and vaccines to 
combat it. Ironically, in the middle of the crisis, US President 
Trump launched several public attacks on the WHO for what 
appeared to be domestic political reasons, announcing that 
the US was withdrawing from the WHO – the only UN state 
ever to do so – and removing its funding by 2021.
In terms of international human rights law during the 
pandemic, there are a number of oversight bodies in existence 
in relation to various civil and political rights, as well as the 
social, economic and cultural rights contained in the various 
UN rights treaties. The most obvious oversight role is that 
held by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and the monitoring committees associated 
with each of the human rights covenants and conventions. 
Their role is mainly to report on rights abuses and progress 
towards both the protection and promotion of rights in 
each state which has ratified these treaties. Their oversight 
role is mainly one of persuasion rather than enforcement. 
There is also the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the 
Hague, whose role it is to give judicial opinions on aspects 
of international law, but again it has no enforcement powers. 
The only UN body with the ability to enforce human rights 
is the UN Security Council. It can potentially invoke UN 
economic sanctions and even war; however, historically, such 
decisions have usually been more influenced by the national 
and geopolitical interests of the big powers rather than 
concerns about universal human rights protections.
The UN did introduce a US$2 billion COVID- 19 Global 
Humanitarian Response Plan across 51 countries in the 
Global South to strengthen health services and combat the 
spread of the virus. It also highlighted a number of specific 
groups as being vulnerable to political interference in human 
rights standards, including persons in detention; women; 
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lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons; and 
migrants, all groups that – in light of widespread derogation 
of human rights conventions – were being harassed or abused 
in many states across the Global North and South (OHCHR, 
2020: 3). Nevertheless, the UN also recognized that some 
rights, such as the right to movement, needed to be curtailed 
in order to protect other more fundamental rights, the right 
to life and the right to health.
Conclusion
The COVID- 19 pandemic has resulted in exceptional 
circumstances for populations around the globe. The imposition 
of emergency powers and curfews have placed immense 
pressures on the architecture of human rights protection, 
which coupled with recent derogations and reversals globally 
has complicated the drive for human rights- based approaches 
to international development. The urgency of rebuilding is 
critical for the lives of billions of people, but particularly the 
most susceptible to human rights abuses:  minority ethnic 
groups, women, LGBT communities, the elderly and sick. 
International coordination and cooperation need to remain 
central for reestablishing the consensus on the importance 
of human rights across all societies. The Council of Europe 
offers some internationalized conscience to easing out of this 
emergency situation, with forward thinking that is globally 
applicable:
Even after the acute phase of the crisis, our societies will 
have to find the means to repair the social and economic 
damage and further enhance trust in our democratic 
institutions. Among other things, a broad reflection will 
need to be initiated on the protection of the most vulnerable 
individuals and groups in our societies and about the means 
to safeguard their rights in a more sustainable and solidary 
governance model.
(Council of Europe, 7 April 2020: 9)
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The pandemic has raised questions about a range of other 
rights, such as the right to health, education, income, freedom 
from hunger. Indeed, some of the actions and inactions of 
states may well have contributed to disproportionate levels 
of deaths and severe illness among some sections of society. 
For example, why was it that many older people in care 
homes, frontline healthcare staff and unequal numbers from 
ethnic minorities died in societies with comprehensive public 
healthcare systems? Why was public healthcare withdrawn 
in many regions of the Global South? Decisions by some 
states also potentially targeted certain minorities as ‘problem’ 
groups. Questions also remain as to whether it was appropriate 
or humane to force elderly people or those with underlying 
health problems to self- isolate and restrict their freedom to 
associate, even when they were very ill or dying, often while 
others in the general population were free to move around.
With the rush of nation states to protect their own interests, 
their establishments and that of their own citizens, concepts of 
human rights, which are supposed to be universal to all humans 
and provided globally, have often been lost. However, at the 
least, the continuing existence of international bodies, such 
as the WHO and the OHCHR, provide some level of hope 
that in a world less afraid and recovering from the pandemic, 
concepts and actions of global solidarity will return.
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COVID- 19 and 
Neoliberalism
Stephen McCloskey
Development education (DE) is a sub- sector of international 
development which aims to tackle the underlying causes of 
poverty, inequality and injustice in the Global North and 
South with an interactive learning methodology that supports 
active global citizenship. Based on the radical pedagogy of 
the Brazilian activist, educator and philosopher, Paulo Freire 
(1996), DE has its roots in the Global South but has inspired 
educational practice across the world (Bourn, 2012: 25– 26). 
Development education is defined by the Irish Development 
Education Association as ‘an educational process which ena-
bles people to understand the world around them and to act 
to transform it. It works to tackle the root causes of injustice 
and inequality, globally and locally to create a more just and 
sustainable future for everyone’ (IDEA, 2020).
Central to this definition of DE practice and Freire’s 
methodology is the concept of praxis – a combination of 
reflection and action. As Freire argued, ‘to surmount the 
situation of oppression people must critically recognize its 
causes, so that through transforming action they can create a 
new situation, one that makes possible the pursuit of a fuller 
humanity’ (Freire, 1996: 29).
What appears to be lacking in the response of the 
international development sector to the COVID- 19 pandemic 
to date has been an analysis of its root causes. There has been a 
similar studied omission with regard to the climate emergency, 
despite suggestions that both crises – COVID- 19 and climate 
change – are ‘inevitable outcroppings of the prevailing global 
economic growth model’ (Selby and Kagawa, 2020:  106). 
This chapter argues that in order to respond effectively to the 
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coronavirus pandemic, we need to understand its connections 
to the neoliberal growth model that has underpinned 
‘development’ since the 1970s. As Reid- Henry (2012) 
argues: ‘in terms of development policy, neoliberalism often 
boiled down to the belief that an intensified globalization 
was itself development, the two being inseparable sides of 
the same virtuous coin’. The outcome of the alignment of 
development with neoliberalism has been disastrous with 
2,153 billionaires controlling more wealth than 4.6 billion 
people and almost half of the world’s population living on less 
than US$5.50 a day (Oxfam, 2020: 7). With governments 
planning expenditure of US$9tn in stimulus packages to 
‘rescue their economies from the coronavirus crisis’, a 
neoliberal response to a neoliberal- created crisis is likely to 
deepen the climate crisis and inequality (Harvey, 2020). The 
chapter proposes that a reimagination of economic planning 
based on sustainability and human wellbeing is the most 
appropriate response to COVID- 19.
The ‘tyranny of GDP’
Applying DE’s problem- posing methodology to the origins 
of COVID- 19 links its rapid transmission and devastating 
impact to the global trading network and market system 
created under neoliberalism. COVID- 19 is believed to have 
been initially transmitted in the wet market of Wuhan, China 
and the trade in wild meat which has created new pathogens 
or zoonoses that cause viral infections in humans from animal 
origins (Spinney, 2020). As Spinney (2020) argues: ‘Covid- 19 
wouldn’t emerge in food markets if it wasn’t for factory 
farming, globalised industry and rapid urbanisation’. The 
virus has spread so rapidly around the world because of the 
increasingly interdependent, interconnected and deregulated 
trading system that has been spawned by neoliberalism. As 
Lent (2020) suggests, ‘coronavirus is revealing the structural 
faults of a system that have been papered over for decades 
as they’ve been steadily worsening’. Neoliberalism has not 
only created the economic conditions for the spawning of 
COVID- 19 but has also systematically privatized public health 
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services, rendering many of them unequal to the challenge of 
fighting a pandemic (Tansey, 2017; Campbell, 2020).
If the coronavirus pandemic has compellingly demonstrated 
the absolute necessity of a publicly funded health service, it 
also placed a premium on public- facing occupations that 
the market economy’s yardstick of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) under- values and poorly remunerates. The ‘tyranny of 
GDP’ results in a moral vacuum which considers ‘speculation, 
pollution and gambling as being good for the economy’ 
because they turn a profit (Elliott, 2017). In 1968, US 
presidential candidate Bobby Kennedy said this about GDP:
It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our 
wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our 
devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, 
except that which makes life worthwhile.
(cited in Rogers, 2012)
If GDP dictates what our talent deserves, then what price 
now should be put on the labour of a nurse, a carer, a driver, 
a refuse collector, a supermarket worker or a cleaner, all of 
whom have been indispensable to our surviving coronavirus? 
Oxfam estimates the annual monetary value of unpaid care 
work carried out globally by women aged 15 and over 
at US$10.8 trillion (2020:  6). Using the GDP metric, 
this labour holds little or no monetary value and, yet, it is 
priceless to the elderly, sick and people with disabilities across 
the world lacking social care. ‘It is absurd’, suggests Elliott 
(2017), ‘to believe that GDP provides the best – or even an 
accurate – picture of how well the country is really doing’. 
Our experience of COVID- 19 affords us an opportunity 
to finally decouple human development from GDP and the 
neoliberal growth model to prioritize services critical to the 
wellbeing of society and the environment.
The United Nations Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston, has suggested that social justice 
and human rights should become central to the ways in which 
we implement and measure human development (Alston, 
2020). ‘Rather than resolving to address the inadequacy of 
their public health and social protection systems in response 
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to the pandemic’, argues the Rapporteur, ‘many governments 
have seen COVID- 19 as a passing challenge to be endured’ 
(Alston, 2020:  9). The Rapporteur recommends a raft of 
measures that could help address endemic poverty in the 
Global South including:  bringing equitable taxation and 
redistribution front and centre; large- scale debt forgiveness 
for low- income countries; closing tax havens that support 
tax avoidance by multinationals; ensuring universal social 
protection for low- paid, vulnerable workers; and embracing 
participatory governance that listens attentively to the needs 
of the poor (Alston, 2020).
Rethinking ‘development’
The COVID- 19 pandemic should represent a line in the sand 
where we resist and roll back the marketization of services 
that have no business in private hands: healthcare, education, 
utilities and transportation. Wolfgang Sachs suggests that 
‘“Development” is now a plastic word, an empty term with 
no positive meaning’ (2020:  67). ‘Development’, Sachs 
argues, ‘is more often about survival now, not progress’ 
(Sachs, 2020:  68). With that in mind, civil society groups, 
governments and international Non- Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) need to look beyond the short- 
termism of overseas aid, emergency appeals and public 
‘clicktivism’ to focus on the long- term needs of humanity. 
Economies, to function properly, need to be put at the service 
of society’s needs, not the needs of the market. That means 
critically interrogating the concept of ‘development’ in the 
light of coronavirus to debate what it means in a future that 
is likely to be clouded by recession, increased inequality and 
an ever- looming climate crisis. A United Nations’ working 
paper estimates that as a result of COVID- 19 ‘there could 
be increases in poverty of a substantial magnitude – up to 
400 million new poor living under the US$1.90 poverty line, 
over 500 million new poor living under the poverty lines of 
US$3.20 and US$5.50’ (Sumner et al, 2020)
Those at greatest risk of falling under the poverty line 
are workers in the informal economy, with the International 
Development Education, COVID-19 and Neoliberalism 43
Labour Organization (ILO) describing the world’s 1.6 billion 
informal workers as ‘the most vulnerable in the labour market’ 
(2020: 1). As ILO Director- General, Guy Ryder, said:  ‘For 
millions of workers, no income means no food, no security 
and no future’ (cited in Bronswell, 2020). The international 
development sector should draw upon DE’s critical thinking 
skills that support a demystification of the world to challenge 
some of the sickly myths about coronavirus.
Chief among them is the idea that when it comes to 
coronavirus, we’re all in this together. It goes something 
like this:  coronavirus is a great leveller that has plunged 
rich and poor into turmoil, insecurity and isolation. We are 
all equally susceptible to contracting the virus, which does 
not distinguish between its victims in terms of class, race 
and occupation. The reality is a lot different. According to 
the Institute of Fiscal Studies, the better- off may actually 
increase their savings during the crisis as spending on 
forbidden activities falls (Crawford et al, 2020). But poorer 
households spend much more of their limited income on 
necessities, leaving them vulnerable to sudden falls in their 
incomings (Crawford et al, 2020). ‘So save us the platitudes 
of coronavirus as the great leveller’, suggests Jones (2020), 
‘abandon this sickly myth that we are all in this together’. 
In addition to class and income, race and occupation have 
also been found to be important determinants in the number 
of cases of COVID- 19. By April 2020, 119 National Health 
Service (NHS) staff had died as a result of coronavirus in 
the UK, 64 per cent of whom were members of the Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BAME) sector yet only 20 per cent of 
NHS staff are from an ethnic minority background (Bailey 
and West, 2020). But, as The Lancet suggests, ‘essential work 
extends beyond health care’. ‘[M]illions of workers have jobs 
that cannot be done at home … These people leave their 
homes to help maintain a semblance of normality for others, 
at great risk to themselves and their families’ (2020: 1587). 
These are the kind of occupations that are vulnerable in a 
post- COVID- 19 economic recession, but as The Lancet 
argues:  ‘Essential workers are just that – essential – and by 
protecting their health, we protect the health and wellbeing 
of us all’ (The Lancet, 2020).
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Degrowth and a Green New Deal
It may seem absurd to propose degrowing the global 
economy as countries across the world have been forced to 
shut down their economies at some point in 2020 to contain 
the coronavirus pandemic. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has warned that the ‘great lockdown has 
triggered the worst recession since the Great Depression and 
forecasts global output losses of US$12 trillion in 2020– 21’ 
(Gopinath, 2020). Bouncing back to ‘normal’, however, 
with a massive injection of capital stimulus into carbon- 
based industries responsible for over 70 per cent of global 
emissions, will only deepen the climate emergency (Riley, 
2017). Degrowth activists suggest that despite the name, they 
are not seeking the kind of economic contraction attended 
by recession and austerity but ‘a thoughtful, democratic, 
managed and equitable downsizing of the economy’ (Seaton, 
2020). Degrowth advocates suggest that the endless pursuit 
of growth as an objective of the global economy, rather than 
the social wellbeing of citizens, is harvesting the natural 
resources of the planet at an unsustainable level to produce 
consumables, many of which are unnecessary, wasteful and 
designed to satiate the needs of the market rather than 
enhance the quality of our lives.
However, degrowth alone will not ensure the social and 
economic protection of low- paid essential workers who have 
sustained us through the coronavirus pandemic. Green New 
Deal advocates, including Naomi Klein, have argued for the 
introduction of a basic annual income – ‘a wage given to every 
person’ – with the ‘benefit of creating much needed economic 
security in the frontline communities’ (2019: 94). The idea 
of a Green New Deal has been proposed by progressive social 
movements and political actors to decarbonize the global 
economy, invest in renewables, and ensure a just transition 
for workers threatened by ‘the economic and political shift 
from an extractive economy to a regenerative economy’ 
(Climate Justice Alliance, 2020). Inspired by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal response to the Great Depression 
in the United States in the 1930s, which combined public 
investment in services with social welfare, employment rights, 
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banking regulation and supporting the natural environment, 
the Green New Deal needs to be no less ambitious.
Conclusion
UNICEF has warned that the COVID- 19 pandemic could 
cause significant mental health problems for the most 
vulnerable in society, particularly young people. The agency 
has highlighted that ‘the mental health and psychosocial 
impact of restricted movement, school closures and 
subsequent isolation are likely to intensify already high levels 
of stress, especially for vulnerable youth’ (UN, 2020). A 
survey by Barnardo’s of a thousand young people in the UK 
suggests that climate change is already a source of anxiety and 
stress for young people. The survey found that: ‘More than 
half (54 per cent) said climate change was one of the most 
important issues facing the country over the next three to five 
years, with 42 per cent saying older generations don’t seem to 
understand or be interested in this issue’ (Barnardo’s, 2019)
With its capacity for compassionate action, critical thinking 
skills and deeper understanding of global issues, DE can 
provide what the Irish NGO, Children in Crossfire, describes as 
‘an emotional literacy framework for preparing young people 
to participate in the world as compassionate global citizens’ 
(2015: 4). This includes providing teachers and community 
educators the training and resources needed to address the 
complexity of COVID- 19 and the climate emergency in a way 
that offers young people a sense of empowerment and hope 
based on their own capacity and agency for change.
DE’s radical pedagogy with its central concept of praxis, 
combining reflective learning and active citizenship, is ideally 
positioned to support the kind of social and economic change 
demanded by the twin crises of COVID- 19 and climate 
change. It seems unconscionable that society can revert to 
the same high- growth ‘normality’ that created the economic 
conditions which spawned COVID- 19 and precipitated the 
climate crisis. Underpinning these global emergencies and the 
grotesque levels of inequality that have followed the 2008 
global financial crisis is neoliberalism; ‘the ideology’, suggests 
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George Monbiot, ‘at the root of all of our problems’ (2016). 
The identification of international development with the 
high- growth, GDP- measured production and consumerism 
of neoliberalism is no longer tenable if the development 
sector is serious about tackling the root causes of poverty and 
climate change. What is required instead is a just transition to 
degrowth and a Green New Deal with a people and planet- 
centred plan for development (Klein, 2019).
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Prisons in a Pandemic
The Malawi Experience
Kate Gauld
Worldwide, there are currently 11 million people in prisons 
(Walmsley, 2018). In mid- July 2020, the advocacy body Penal 
Reform International released a report indicating that since 
the global outbreak of COVID- 19, over 100,000 prisoners 
had been infected in 88 countries. More than 1,500 prisoners 
in 36 countries had died due to COVID- 19. The day this 
report was released, Malawi confirmed its first case of a prison 
officer testing positive for the virus, and the following day its 
first prisoner tested positive some 600 kilometres away.
In Malawi, one of the world’s poorest countries, over 
14,000 people are in custody, with prisons operating at 260 
per cent capacity (Prison Inspectorate of Malawi, 2019). This 
means prisoners sleeping side by side on the ground. It means 
walking past a small police cell and seeing more bodies than 
the eye can immediately comprehend. Then there is poor 
ventilation, limited access to adequate nutrition and the lack 
of basic hygiene facilities. This means no access to running 
water, no flushing toilets and relying on visitors for meals. 
Before the outbreak of COVID- 19, you would be hard- 
pressed to find a bucket of water and soap available to the 
prisoners. In other words, Malawi’s prisons are the perfect 
incubator for COVID- 19.
As with any prison population, there are people with acute 
and chronic illnesses, pregnant women and elderly prisoners, 
making them especially susceptible to the virus. In the 
context of Malawi, 61 is the average life expectancy for men, 
almost 10 per cent of the adult population have HIV, rates of 
tuberculosis are especially high among people with HIV, and 
these rates are higher in custody than the general population 
(WHO, 2019). Then there is the healthcare system, reported 
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in April 2020 to have only 25 intensive care beds and seven 
ventilators in a country with a population of over 18 million 
people (Vidal, 2020). It is no surprise that Malawi has been 
classified as one of the top ten most vulnerable countries in 
Africa to respond to COVID- 19 (Surgo Foundation, 2020).
The problem of overcrowding in Malawi’s prisons is 
not new. Back in 2004, the Malawi Prison Inspectorate, 
which includes a High Court judge, the Ombudsman, the 
Commissioner of Prisons and a Chief Resident Magistrate, 
released a report noting that congestion was the most serious 
problem facing the prisons. In 2009, Malawi’s Supreme Court 
found it unconstitutional to place inmates in overcrowded 
and poorly ventilated prisons. The court’s language paints a 
vivid picture:
In this case we hold the view that packing inmates in an 
overcrowded cell with poor ventilation with little or no 
room to sit or lie down with dignity but to be arranged 
like sardines violates basic human dignity and amounts 
to inhuman and degrading treatment and therefore 
unconstitutional.
Prior to COVID- 19, despite long- term advocacy efforts by 
human rights and civil society organizations, attempts to turn 
these findings into wholesale institutional reform had not 
been achieved. As the global organization Dignity notes, this 
is part of a wider trend by countries who resort to ‘deprivation 
of liberty as the first response to all sorts of criminal and 
social phenomena, disregarding fundamental human rights 
principles. The COVID- 19 crisis has accentuated these 
shortcomings’ (Dignity, 2020: 13).
And so to COVID- 19. In late March 2020, with the 
virus already changing the global landscape, Irish Rule of 
Law International (IRLI) along with a number of NGOs 
released a press statement noting the deadly risk that the virus 
represented to those in custody, especially for older prisoners 
and those with underlying health conditions (IRLI, 2020). 
We recommended a number of preventative measures:  to 
decongest the prisons by releasing prisoners who met certain 
criteria, relaxing bail conditions to get people out of custody 
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and back into the community, encouraging police to not arrest 
and detain people for ‘petty offences’, and for the Ministry of 
Health to supply prisons with basic handwashing supplies.
The first reported case of COVID- 19 occurred on 2 
April and the then President Mutharika announced various 
measures to mitigate the impact of the virus. He called for a list 
of prisoners that included juveniles and those who had served 
a significant portion of their sentences for ‘moderate crimes’, 
with a view to process their release. We issued another press 
release the next day noting that although this was a welcome 
development, that list also needed to include people serving 
any period of time in custody for petty offences regardless of 
how much time they had served, along with people with a 
terminal illness, tuberculosis and other chronic illnesses.
On 14 April, a three- week lockdown was announced, taking 
effect days later. The day before it was to be implemented, a 
human rights coalition launched a unique, and at first blush 
controversial, injunction and application for judicial review to 
halt the lockdown. Those interim requests were granted in 
the High Court’s chambers hours before the lockdown was 
to start. It was not the concept of a lockdown per se that 
concerned the human rights coalition, but how it was to be 
implemented.
In court, their primary argument was that there were 
procedural irregularities in the lockdown declaration 
amounting to a substantial derogation from fundamental 
rights under the Constitution. In public, they cited various 
statements made by the police threatening violence and 
mass arrests in implementing the lockdown (South African 
Litigation Centre (SALC), 2020). They noted that in 
Nigeria, more people were killed by police implementing the 
lockdown in its first few weeks than by COVID- 19 itself. They 
were also concerned that police would conduct mass arrests 
in enforcing the lockdown, further overcrowding the prisons, 
and further increasing the risk of COVID- 19 spreading 
through the cells. Again, these fears were not unfounded. In 
Angola the police arrested and detained almost 300 people 
in one 24- hour period for violating state of emergency rules, 
and by mid- April in Sri Lanka, over 34,500 people had been 
arrested for violating curfew orders.
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The human rights coalition painted a stark picture of 
the practicalities of a lockdown where the majority of the 
population live below the global poverty line, where 90 per 
cent of households rely on water from outside their homes, 
61 per cent of households do not have toilets in their homes, 
and where there is already a high prevalence of household 
hunger (SALC, 2020). They noted: ‘This does not necessarily 
mean that a lockdown is not the correct approach to address 
the COVID- 19 pandemic, but a one- size- fits- all approach 
which ignores the lived realities of our people might well be’ 
(SALC, 2020)
In late April, the High Court upheld the stay on the 
lockdown. The matter is now with the constitutional arm of 
the High Court, which is yet to hear the matter. There is 
currently no legal basis for enforcing a lockdown in Malawi.
But while COVID- 19 had seized almost the entire news 
agenda in much of the world, the central issue concerning 
the majority of Malawians was the June 2020 presidential 
election. Numbers of confirmed cases remained low 
throughout this period and hopes remained that Malawi had 
somehow escaped the worst of the disease. Public gatherings, 
rallies and protests continued in the lead- up to the election, 
as did the perception that this was a virus only brought in 
by foreigners. By mid- July, this perception was changing as 
COVID- 19 numbers began increasing at an alarming rate. 
At the time of writing, over 4,600 cases have been recorded, 
including 118 prisoners and 21 prison officers. 146 deaths 
have been recorded, including one prisoner.
In response to COVID- 19, IRLI has advocated from before 
the first case as to the urgency of decongesting the prisons. To 
be in any way effective in doing this, it has required an intimate 
knowledge of who is in custody and why. We know that 
roughly 20 per cent of people in custody are on remand: they 
have been charged but are yet to be tried or even convicted 
(World Prison Brief, 2019). Some have been waiting for up 
to ten years for their trial, charged with offences that could 
not possibly result in a sentence, if convicted, of that long. 
We know that close to 8 per cent of people in custody are 
children. About 1 per cent are women, including women 
living with their children in custody, and some charged with 
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infanticide for having miscarriages and stillbirths. We know 
there are too many people in custody with chronic mental 
health conditions, with no access to treatment. This provides 
a useful framework for advocating who should be released.
Effective advocacy has also involved a thorough 
understanding of how the criminal justice system functions in 
Malawi, including why certain seemingly obvious challenges 
have remained unsolved. Law reform in and of itself is a 
useful start, but it is the mechanics of implementation that 
are the real challenge, and where civil society can make a 
meaningful difference. We know that not all magistrates, who 
deal with the vast majority of criminal cases and dispense an 
overwhelming number of custodial sentences, are required 
to have formal legal qualifications. Understandably they can 
encounter difficulties in applying precedent, an essential 
component of their job: judgements are not widely reported, 
while the judiciary lacks the capacity to operate a systemic 
case law resource.
The Legal Aid Bureau and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) both face stark resourcing challenges. 
The Central Region, home to 7.5 million people as well as the 
nation’s capital, has only nine DPP advocates and eight legal 
aid advocates for both civil and criminal cases. As a result, 
most people who appear before the courts are unrepresented, 
without an advocate to persuade the magistrate that there 
are alternatives to a custodial sentence. There are delays and 
infinite adjournments, often with no defence lawyer to call 
the state to account. Worse, it is not uncommon for files to 
go missing, which results in people remaining in custody 
indefinitely without any future court date. Meanwhile it is 
the police prosecutors, often with no legal qualifications, who 
conduct the vast majority of criminal cases, including sexual 
assault matters.
Then there is the police service, who lack the resources to 
transport inmates to court. This in part explains why detainees 
are often held in custody for far longer than the legislated 48- 
hour period, the maximum holding time before they must be 
brought before a magistrate or released on bail (known as the 
‘48- hour rule’). Meanwhile, various development initiatives 
have at times missed the mark, such as written guidelines for 
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police drafted only in English, which is not the first language 
of the significant majority of Malawians.
In response to these challenges, Irish Rule of Law 
International (IRLI facilitates ‘camp courts’, where we 
essentially bring courts to the prisons. This allows magistrates 
to process large numbers of bail applications in a single sitting. 
We have drafted a legal commentary on bail case law to assist 
magistrates and advocates, reinforcing that custody is a last 
resort. We facilitate workshops for the DPP, legal aid and 
police prosecutors, conducted by local advocates, on topics 
that promote access to justice for accused and convicted 
people. We conduct a child justice programme, diverting 
children away from the criminal justice system. We monitor 
police cells to ensure that children are not placed in detention 
and that the ‘48- hour rule’ is upheld. We educate the wider 
community on due process rights and conduct human rights 
education workshops.
How have we responded to COVID- 19? We have 
increased some of our existing work, such as organizing more 
‘camp courts’, assisting those most vulnerable to COVID- 19 
to obtain bail. We continue to monitor the police cells for 
breaches of the ‘48- hour rule’ and children in detention. We 
have worked with the Chief Justice to develop a directive to 
magistrates to strictly enforce pre- trial custody limits and to 
consider bail and non- custodial sentences wherever possible. 
We have also worked in new ways, working with other civil 
society organizations to get soap, buckets and face masks to 
prisons, and have been much more forthright in our advocacy 
efforts.
We have kept track of how many people have been released 
from prison in response to COVID- 19. Following the 
President’s announcement, it appears that over 1,800 people 
have been pardoned, while the numbers of people actually 
released has been difficult to verify. A separate review by the 
Prison Inspectorate in April 2020 saw over 1,400 people 
released whose sentences were close to expiring. Our best 
estimate is that Malawi has reduced its prison population by 
just over 12 per cent. Neighbouring Mozambique has reduced 
its prison population by nearly 26 per cent and Zambia by 
nearly 25 per cent. Not only is Malawi’s overall percentage 
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comparatively low, but as Malawi’s prisons are some of the 
most overcrowded in the world, these releases are entirely 
insufficient to reduce the prison population to capacity. 
Meanwhile, many new people continue to be admitted to 
prisons, including for petty offences.
What more is to be done? As far as we can ascertain, the 
government has only pardoned people with six months or 
less to serve on their sentences – a fraction of the categories 
identified by the World Health Organization for conditional 
release, including the elderly, the sick, pregnant women 
and prisoners at low risk of reoffending. The presidential 
pardoning process must be more transparent so that civil 
society knows what categories of people are being slated 
for release compared with who is being released. While the 
initial call for the prisoner list under the previous government 
was promising, the process from there has been opaque and 
ever- shifting. In mid- July, it was reported that three children 
are living with their mothers in one prison. The children are 
aged four months, 18 months and two years, and the latter 
two have both spent over a year in custody. Indicative of 
how poorly resourced the prisons are, prison authorities are 
reportedly asking ‘well- wishers’ to provide the children with 
food, clothes, nappies, blankets, shoes and more. All these 
women remain bail refused. There is clearly much more to 
be done.
We are also calling for the new President to use his full 
powers under the Constitution and the Prisons Act to remit 
appropriate sentences, taking into account restorative justice 
principles by releasing early those who have significantly 
rehabilitated while in custody. We are urging the prison 
services to take all necessary healthcare precautions to ensure 
the safety of their staff and those in prison. We are asking the 
government to allocate sufficient funds to the criminal justice 
sector to effectively respond to COVID- 19.
The next challenge, given the deteriorating climate, is 
how prisons will navigate a raft of public health and human 
rights issues. In response to the first positive cases in custody, 
the Malawi Police Service made the commendable move of 
designating isolation centres in each region of the country 
for new remandees. However, this came at the expense of 
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moving all female prisoners in one prison up to 350 km away, 
essentially preventing their families from providing them with 
food and basic necessities. Family visits have been banned, 
with no plans announced as to how prisoners will now be 
fed. Meanwhile, there remains a lack of isolation rooms 
for suspected and confirmed cases within the prisons and 
an overall shortage of test kits, so mass testing of prisoners 
and custody officers is impossible. While official numbers of 
prisoners and officials with COVID- 19 continue to climb, in 
reality numbers will be far higher.
Is there a chance of broader, structural reform to the 
criminal justice sector? If we did not think so, we would 
be in the wrong business. Many magistrates and judges 
nationwide have visited police cells to ensure police are 
adhering to legislative provisions regarding detaining accused 
people. With the Chief Magistrate’s directive issued to all 
magistrates, we are hopeful that there will be a decrease in 
custodial sentences, and that that trend will continue in the 
long term. With greater scrutiny on the custodial sentences 
handed down for petty offences, we hope this too may be 
an opportunity to decriminalize these offences, significantly 
reducing the prison population. With more masks and soap 
in prisons than ever before, a heightened awareness of the 
role of handwashing and a greater focus on prison officers as 
default frontline workers, we are hopeful there may be long- 
term improvements to the standard of hygiene, while other 
infectious disease outbreaks, such as tuberculosis, may be 
reduced. Use of video technology in court proceedings was 
not on the radar in any meaningful way in 2019. 2020 has 
shown it to be possible.
Moreover, there is a broader international civil society 
movement calling global attention to prison conditions and 
international human rights law the world over. With 124 
countries reporting overcrowding, it is not an issue confined 
to the Global South (Dignity, 2020). Recommendations to 
reduce pre- trial detention, increase non- custodial sentences 
and decriminalize certain offences are just as appropriate in 
the US as they are Malawi. Calls for countries to adhere to 
international law standards on decreasing the overall use of 
imprisonment are equally pertinent to countries across the 
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globe, as are reminders that custody is always a measure of 
last resort.
It is not just civil society organizations calling for reform. 
In May 2020, the WHO, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) 
and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
released a joint statement on COVID- 19 in prisons and other 
closed settings (WHO et al, 2020). It called for overcrowding 
to be reduced in prisons and urged states to respect the human 
rights of people deprived of their liberty. The UN Assistant 
Secretary- General for Human Rights, Ilze Brands Kehris, has 
argued that the pandemic demonstrates the ‘urgent need for 
institutional reforms and societal transformation where human 
rights must be front and centre’ (Brandze Kehris, 2020).
In response to COVID- 19, there are reminders of the 
reform that is possible the world over. In Nigeria, prisoners 
serving sentences where fines are no more than around 
€100 have been released early (Dignity, 2020:  21). In 
Ethiopia, thousands of prisoners convicted of minor crimes 
serving sentences of up to three years were pardoned by the 
President (Dignity, 2020:  23). In Morocco, prisoners have 
been pardoned on the basis of advanced age, precarious 
health, time served and their conduct in custody (Dignity, 
2020:  24). Bangladesh released over 20,000 adults from 
pre- trial detention in ten working days, and, using virtual 
hearings, 343 children were released in just seven working 
days (Ali, 2020). Unlike most other countries, Afghanistan 
has successfully released a significant percentage of women in 
custody (Rope, 2020).
The change of government amid the COVID- 19 crisis, 
just as the situation deteriorated, makes any predictions about 
long- term systemic reform even more difficult to assess. The 
new government has made strong pronouncements on the 
rule of law and measures to tackle corruption. There is a 
respected and independent judiciary who have more than 
proved their credentials in recent times. Now is the time for 
President Chakwera to decongest Malawi’s prisons.
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The Challenge of 
COVID- 19 in Informal 
Urban Settlements and the 
Need for Co- produced Local 
Responses
Annie Wilkinson
COVID- 19 emerged in China and spread first to high and 
middle- income countries. Many of the initial control recom-
mendations (to wash hands, self- isolate and physically dis-
tance) assumed access to essential services (for example, water, 
space). These protective measures are not equally possible in 
low- and middle- income countries (LMICs), and especially 
not in informal settlements because of limited infrastructure. 
With one billion people living in informal settlements – 30– 
70 per cent of inhabitants in some cities (Satterthwaite et al, 
2020) – there is an urgent need to consider how to appropri-
ately address the pandemic in these areas1.
Urban growth has been increasingly unplanned in many 
countries, with poverty concentrated in informal settlements. 
Cities are often segregated along wealth and social lines 
(including race). Images of ‘slums’ depict them as chaotic, 
dirty and disease ridden, and as a social, environmental and 
developmental threat to the rest of the city. Such views have 
informed attempts to deny residents tenure and carry out 
evictions. A defining challenge of informal settlements and 
‘slums’ is the lack of data about them prior to, and during, 
emergencies. Due to their illegal or informal status there are 
often no reliable data about the number of people who live 
there or their health. This makes it difficult to prepare for 
an outbreak and could lead to inappropriate and harmful 
responses.
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Vulnerability: what is known and what is not known
The first half of this chapter outlines different forms of 
vulnerability and identifies groups that may be more severely 
affected by COVID- 19.
Epidemiological vulnerability
The people most vulnerable to severe disease and death are 
those over 70 years or with cardiovascular disease, diabetes, 
chronic respiratory disease, hypertension or cancer (Jain and 
Yuan, 2020). Men appear almost twice as likely to die from 
COVID- 19 than women (Purdie et al, 2020). Although the 
population of LMICs is young when compared to that in 
high- income countries (HICs), they account for 69 per cent 
of the global population over 60 (Lloyd- Sherlock et al, 2020). 
There is a perception that cities have younger populations 
than rural areas; however, age distributions between urban 
and rural populations in LMICs are similar (DESA, 2017). 
Each city will have different age distributions, but it would be 
unwise to discount the age- related risks.
Levels of hypertension, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and 
cancer are poorly documented in informal settlements, though 
they are increasing in LMICs and are sometimes higher than 
in HICs (WHO, 2011). Accurate evidence of disease burdens 
in informal settlements is limited by the residents’ reliance 
on private and informal health providers. Respiratory disease 
is a major concern due to high levels of indoor and outdoor 
air pollution, poor housing quality, occupational exposure 
and waste burning (Checkley et al, 2016). A reliance on 
precooked, often fried, street food in many settlements 
results in consumption patterns that can cause diabetes and 
heart disease (Tacoli, 2017). It is plausible that there are 
many relevant chronic conditions, often undetected and 
poorly managed, that put large numbers of people at risk. 
In addition to the high- risk comorbidities identified so far, 
there may be other diseases that lead to worse outcomes, and 
that are disproportionately prevalent in LMICs and informal 
settlements, for example HIV.
COVID-19 in Informal Urban Settlements 65
Transmission vulnerability
This encompasses vulnerability related to social mixing, 
housing and infrastructure, where conditions could foster 
increased transmission:
 • Density: Population and housing density is often 
high, which limits options for physical distancing. A 
modelling study of influenza in Delhi estimated contact 
rates based on density in slums and found they were 
associated with higher and quicker epidemic peaks 
(Chen et al, 2016). However, peri- urban settlements 
tend to have lower densities.
 • Household and social structures: Disease transmission 
often occurs within households, but composition 
can be flexible, with people moving between homes, 
sharing food or sleeping space. Control strategies and 
responses based on assumptions about household units 
may fail. Children are often cared for by grandparents 
or older family members and this poses an elevated risk 
of transmission.
 • Mobility: Mobility within and between cities is 
frequent. Residents in cities often maintain strong 
ties with home regions, sending revenue home and 
travelling between urban and rural settings frequently 
for work and social reasons. It is also common to 
travel when sick and, in some countries, to return the 
deceased to their natal home (Campbell, 2017). This 
could spread COVID- 19 to rural areas. The reasons for 
mobility and the implications of urban– rural linkages 
must be considered in control strategies.
 • Livelihood imperatives: People who live hand- to- 
mouth often cannot afford to be sick and may work 
despite illness. Given the mild onset of COVID- 19, 
infected people may follow established norms that 
prioritize work and daily survival.
 • Ventilation: Unventilated and confined spaces increase 
transmission risk due to the limited circulation of air. 
Home types and ventilation will vary by settlement but 
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should be taken into consideration when developing 
local plans.
 • Water: Access to water is inadequate in most informal 
settlements, and residents usually do not have their 
own supply. Instead, water is often bought from private 
providers at high cost, which can prohibit handwashing. 
Shared water points could undermine spatial distancing 
(for example, when queuing and collecting) and 
isolation (for example, the need to leave the house for 
collection).
 • Toilets: Toilets are usually outside people’s homes in 
shared facilities. Evidence is still emerging about how 
long the virus persists outside of the body and on which 
surfaces. Although there has been no evidence of faecal 
transmission, shared toilets conceivably pose risks.
 • Sanitation: Waste disposal is often inadequate, and 
contaminated waste in the street poses biohazard risks, 
especially to waste collectors.
Health system vulnerability
Availability of formal health providers (for example, 
government or NGO clinics) is low in most informal 
settlements. Instead there is a wide variety of informal, 
unregulated and private providers, including pharmacists, 
petty drug sellers, community health workers, and resident 
healthcare workers. For common symptoms such as cough 
and fever, self- medication is popular, with care sought at 
larger clinics or hospitals when severity increases (if costs 
allow). Barriers to access (for example, cost and distance) and 
aversion to hospital care suggest that sick people may remain 
in their community for some time, where they need advice 
on self- isolation and home or community- based care, with all 
the challenges this implies. Private providers may be key to 
detecting spread, but also to facilitating spread, and should 
be engaged in any response. These patterns of health- seeking 
behaviour make it likely that cases may go undetected, and 
efforts should be made to mitigate this.
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Direct vulnerability to control measures
Control measures considered here are those being widely 
implemented:  for example, quarantine, lockdowns, self- 
isolation, travel bans, and the closure of schools, markets, 
churches, mass gatherings, food outlets and social spaces. 
A major impact is on livelihoods as people live hand- to- 
mouth with very limited savings. Control measures which 
have limited people’s ability to travel for work, or demand 
for work, have had disastrous impacts. Action is needed to 
maintain people’s livelihoods, or provide protection if lost. 
This must include people working in the informal sector, 
which can be the majority in informal settlements. This is 
an area where evidence is lacking but where countries are 
developing emergency approaches. The Brazilian government 
took the step of paying a temporary monthly salary to informal 
workers (Ribeiro, 2020) and other governments used direct 
cash transfer (often digital) systems (Rutkoski et al, 2020). 
The success of these measures depends on the strength and 
coverage of existing government or NGO social protection 
systems, and the extent to which they include the informal 
sector.
Access to food is another consideration. In poor settlements, 
households generally have no capacity to store food, and 
source most of it from informal markets and street food 
vendors. Where movement was restricted, markets closed and 
street- food vendors banned, people’s ability to access food 
was severely reduced.
Systemic vulnerabilities
Risks in informal settlements are multidimensional, including 
overlapping issues of health (for example, both chronic 
and acute disease); social concerns (for example, violence, 
persecution, intimidation); natural factors (for example, 
floods, rain, heat); and technological and infrastructural 
problems (for example, accidents, fires, building collapse). 
COVID- 19 will be experienced alongside these risks and 
interact with them. Potential systemic risks include care 
networks, as older people often provide this (for example, to 
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grandchildren and orphans). If they are unable to do this it 
may contribute to vulnerability among those they care for, 
or restrict others’ capacities (for example, parents’ ability to 
work). People with disabilities rely on care from others, as 
do some people with chronic health conditions. They are 
exposed to contracting the virus (as they are less able to self- 
isolate) and to the threat of losing key relationships that allow 
them to perform basic day- to- day functions. An increasing 
number of displaced people live in informal settlements rather 
than camps. These populations may be less well connected to 
local support structures, and evidence suggests that they face 
challenges accessing services and information (Walnycki et al, 
2019). Gendered impacts include increased caring burdens 
for women and girls; uneven impacts on the earning potential 
of men and women; and increased rates of gender- based 
violence (GBV) (Wenham et al, 2020). Social tensions and 
security threats, linked to strained socioeconomic conditions, 
could be exacerbated. The precarious position of migrant 
workers has been highlighted acutely. Millions of people 
providing low- paid, insecure labour in cities far from their 
original homes have found themselves unemployed, without 
employer or state- provided safety nets. These people have 
been omitted from response plans, detained or forced to 
return home, treated inhumanely and stigmatized (Liem et 
al, 2020).
Enabling local action
Lessons from previous humanitarian and health crises 
(Satterthwaite, 2017) in informal urban settlements, as well 
as non- urban settings (Richards, 2016) highlight that locally 
led, co- produced and adaptive responses that take account of 
diversity and complexity in urban settings are key to reduction 
of harm.
Local organization and strategies for COVID- 19 control
Informal settlements can be highly organized, with a range 
of local groups and community structures providing and 
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advocating for services. Many settlements also have traditional 
leadership structures. It is crucial that responses to COVID- 19 
are organized through these groups and leaders with local 
legitimacy. They are particularly well- placed to consider 
options for decentralized forms of care, isolation, movement 
control and physical distancing. Each settlement has physical 
characteristics that make movement control more or less 
feasible (for example, the number of entry points, physical 
barriers, road networks, housing density), and strategies need 
to be determined by residents. In many cities, grassroots 
groups and networks have sprung up, providing food relief and 
support to vulnerable residents. Financial and non- financial 
resources (for example, information, equipment, supportive 
policy) are urgently needed to enable residents to develop and 
implement strategies that are feasible and effective.
Social media and radio are important tools for 
communication. Special efforts are required to communicate 
with vulnerable groups, including the elderly and people 
with disabilities who may be less well connected and to 
ensure opportunities for two- way dialogue. Specific guidance 
is needed for people who cannot stop working or provide 
essential services for the city (for example, garbage collectors). 
Protective equipment should be provided. Local unions 
(formal and informal) could be influential here.
As cases rise, urgent consideration of burials, including 
deaths occurring in the community and in hospitals 
potentially far from family, is needed. Plans should be made 
with communities about how to ensure there is either safe 
burial locally (if space allows) or respectful and timely burial 
elsewhere.
Data needed for planning epidemic response
A range of data is required for epidemic response planning, 
including for the modelling of disease impacts and control 
measures, and for delivery and monitoring of relief. This 
includes basic demographic data; health and health service 
data (for example, prevalence of relevant non- communicable 
diseases); economic data on livelihoods; spatial data and maps 
of areas and facilities; and social data and knowledge about 
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behaviour and culture, including kinship, mobility, social roles 
and status, social support structures, and how such factors 
may influence transmission.
Although much of the above is typically missing in 
informal settlements, there are locally led alternatives. 
Networked savings and community- based groups such as 
SDI (formerly Slum/ Shack Dwellers International) collect 
sociodemographic data about their settlements (for example, 
households, income, services, physical infrastructure and 
space). As these groups consist of residents, they also have in- 
depth social knowledge about their communities.
Partnerships and coordination
It is crucial to connect and support local efforts. The 
approaches of SDI have been used to engage with local 
community structures, leaders and authorities to provide 
support during emergencies. In some cities these relationships 
are well established, and groups have regular dialogue with 
authorities. Given the urgency of COVID- 19, the most 
impactful thing to do would be to engage these groups. Many 
international networks connect governments and agencies 
with local and community- based groups.
Access to basic services and implementation of public health 
interventions will depend on the involvement and capacity 
of city authorities and municipalities. There is variation 
in access to resources in different cities, and the extent to 
which authority has been decentralized. Nevertheless, mayors 
and local government have an important role to play in 
tailoring the response to their city contexts and connecting 
key stakeholders by building on experience in co- production 
for urban development issues such as water/ sanitation and 
citywide planning.
Long- term challenges: politics and inequality
Fundamentally, many of these considerations relate to poverty 
and inequality. Residents of informal settlements tend to 
be the poorest and most vulnerable, but there is variation, 
COVID-19 in Informal Urban Settlements 71
including pockets of wealth and pockets of marginalization. 
This means that there will be varied vulnerability profiles. 
When wealth and poverty are side- by- side (within informal 
settlements, and relative to the rest of the city), perceptions 
of injustice can be palpable and could hinder collective action. 
In settings where rationing and ill- equipped health services 
are the norm, people are not used to their health being 
considered a priority. Sudden interest in particular diseases or 
standards of public health can arouse suspicion or resentment. 
Historically, informal settlements and their residents have 
been stigmatized and blamed for problems they have little 
control over.
It is important to understand community power dynamics 
and political histories. In some urban settings, top- down 
control measures may be perceived as being used to oppress 
or marginalize residents or curtail political opposition. Many 
cities already impose unrealistically high regulatory standards 
– about public health, building standards, trading, and so on 
– which residents cannot meet. In practice, these rules are 
ignored and can become the focus of repressive enforcement 
by authorities. If COVID- 19 control regulations are 
impractical and out of sync with people’s realities, they risk 
repeating these patterns of avoidance and crackdowns.
Conclusion
Informal settlements face considerable challenges around 
the control of COVID- 19, but locally developed and co- 
produced strategies could go some way to mitigate the worst 
of the outbreak. Top- down and externally imposed strategies 
risk doing additional harm if they ignore the specific needs 
of informal settlements. Public health interventions must be 
balanced with social and economic interventions, especially 
in relation to the informal economy, on which most people 
depend.
72 COVID-19 in the Global South
Note
1. A longer version of this chapter has previously been published in 
Environment and Urbanization (Wilkinson, 2020).
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Policy Milieu for 
Combatting COVID- 19 and 




COVID- 19 has spread around the world, infecting millions of 
people (Li et al, 2020; UNCTAD, 2020). The socioeconomic 
impacts of the pandemic have become realities around the 
world and poor and developing countries in Africa have 
received a significant shock as a result. The unique context 
of Africa is due to the large population in poverty and the 
high burden of disease (principally, malaria). The burden of 
malaria in Africa is responsible for over 380,000 deaths per 
year, with the continent accounting for 93 per cent of global 
malaria cases (213 million cases out of 228 million cases), and 
94 per cent of 405,000 deaths globally from malaria in 2018 
(WHO, 2019). Furthermore, almost all of the 55 countries in 
Africa are classified as low- or middle- income, with only the 
Seychelles in the high- income category (World Bank, 2019). 
Worse still, the two largest economies (Nigeria and South 
Africa) are home to significant poverty and inequality.
The wide geographic spread of the coronavirus has 
necessitated policies and guidelines for containment 
(Medinilla et al, 2020; Olayide, 2020). The policy guidelines 
on containment of coronavirus have centred essentially 
on prevention and on social and hygiene practices, 
including: staying at home; regular washing of hands or use of 
sanitizer; social and physical distancing; wearing of protective 
mask and kits; limiting the number of people in public 
gatherings; restriction of human and vehicular movement or 
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curfew or travel ban; and total or partial lockdown (WHO, 
2020). It is instructive to note that the policy measures to 
contain the spread of coronavirus range from individual to 
international levels (Figure 7.1).
Similarly, one of the first policy measures taken by many 
African governments in curtailing the spread of the virus was 
placing a travel ban on their citizens and foreigners coming 
into the continent (World Bank, 2020a). Generally, lockdown 
was at the centre of containment measures, with Rwanda 
being the first African country to adopt this (Mugabi, 2020). 
This was followed by Egypt, Morocco and other countries 
like Malawi, Botswana and Nigeria banning public gatherings 
and closing down schools (Kondowe, 2020). At the 
subnational level, African governments placed restrictions on 
intra and inter- state movement of people and goods, allowing 
only food, health materials and other essential materials to 
be moved. Activities that were seen as non- essential to the 
wellbeing of the communities at large, including nightclubs 
and night movements, were also banned. There was a shutting 
Figure 7.1 Schematic representation of policy measures for containing 
coronavirus
(Source: the author)
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down of many establishments in both informal and formal 
sectors, including schools and learning centres.
It was also advocated that individuals should take 
responsibility for their actions. The use of facemasks and 
hand sanitizers was enforced in many countries, alongside 
regular washing of hands with soap under running water 
being recommended. Although handwashing is crucial 
to combatting the spread of coronavirus, it was doubtful 
if citizens could fully comply as African countries have the 
highest proportion of the population with no access to 
handwashing facilities and materials (Mirkuzie et al, 2020).
Implications of the policy measures on sustainability of African 
economies
Given the adverse secondary effects of lockdowns, the easing 
of these will have implications for different dimensions of 
sustainability in Africa, including economic, social, and 
environmental (through ecosystems services), as of course do 
the impacts of the pandemic itself.
Implications for economic sustainability
The following aspects of economic sustainability are 
impacted:  financial flows and remittances; technological 
adoption and innovation; physical infrastructure and housing; 
and employment, entrepreneurship and wealth creation. 
Migrant remittances are a very important source of financial 
flow into Africa, but this has declined drastically during 
COVID- 19 (WFP, 2020a, 2020b). Projections of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have been dramatically revised 
downwards. Tourism has also suffered through imposition 
of border closure, lockdown and travel bans. Cabo Verde 
lost 43.4 per cent of income that could have accrued from 
tourism inflows, the Gambia lost 19.9 per cent while Senegal 
lost 11.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2020 (WFP, 2020a, 
2020b), to mention but a few.
Overall, African economies are projected to contract as a 
result of the pandemic with the African Union predicting that 
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the continent’s economy will shrink between 0.8 per cent 
and 1.1 per cent in 2020. The contraction will affect over 20 
million African workers whose jobs are going to be at risk. The 
fall in the price of crude oil has particularly impacted mono- 
product economies like Nigeria, Libya and Angola dependent 
on it for export receipts. Hence, the need for diversification of 
sources of income for these economies is even more evident 
than it was previously. Worse still, most of the countries lack 
adequate infrastructures and social safety nets that could 
serve to cushion the impact. Physical infrastructures like low- 
cost housing schemes for low- income earners are grossly 
inadequate. Those Africans who are homeless and internally 
displaced are at a particular disadvantage during this period 
(Ozili, 2020). Those who have been displaced at one time 
or another due to natural hazards, environmental disasters or 
communal conflicts look to governments which often cannot, 
or do not, provide shelter for them. Many aged persons 
and those with underlying illnesses also suffer from lack of 
essential services.
Implications for social sustainability
The social sustainability aspects of the impacts of the 
pandemic are noticeable in education and schooling; health 
and sanitation; social protection and human rights; and 
gender, peace and security. Governments in Africa enforced 
the closure of schools and learning centres with the aim of 
containing the spread of the coronavirus. This action created 
disruption. Although UNESCO’s suggestion of distance/ 
online learning has been widely accepted, implementation 
in Africa is very slow. Schools, teachers and parents are at 
a disadvantage because the majority of them do not have 
internet- enabled phones and lack digital readiness. Some 
universities are now experimenting with on- campus and 
online blended teaching and learning system (see Figure 7.2).
It is expected that as the on- campus and online blended 
teaching and learning system becomes the new normal in 
the post- COVID- 19 era, some of the lingering challenges 
of access to and cost of higher education in Africa may be 
eased. However, there are concerns about the availability 
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of financial resources and teaching infrastructure to deliver 
online teaching in schools, especially in rural areas. Therefore, 
the new normal of online teaching may aggravate the existing 
inequality of access to education and compound the problem 
of social exclusion and out- of- school children.
Further, there were concerns about the effectiveness 
and uncertainties surrounding healthcare delivery systems 
and general sanitation of African countries as a result of 
slow investment in healthcare, wellbeing and welfare of the 
population. Prior to lockdown, the rich engaged in medical 
tourism outside the continent, leaving Africa’s healthcare 
delivery system in a sorry state. Also, the countries in the 
continent rank poorly in healthcare indicators, including 
hospital beds and physicians per 1,000 people (World Bank, 
2020b). However, the coronavirus pandemic has led to 
building of more healthcare facilities, which will remain even 
after the pandemic. Hence, the opportunity to restructure 
Figure 7.2 A university in Nigeria announces on- campus and online admission due 
to COVID- 19 pandemic
(Source: the author)
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and reform the health sector in Africa beckons. According to 
the United Nations (2019), Africa’s healthcare system is weak 
and short of equipment, but this situation could be reversed 
with a greater emphasis on fighting health threats specific to 
maternal health, child mortality, malaria, tuberculosis, Ebola 
and HIV/ AIDs in particular, and also now the coronavirus. 
However, with the poor financial status and poverty on the 
continent, there is apprehension that the pandemic might 
witness the coming of an even worse scenario (Dettmer, 
2020; NRC, 2020).
Similarly, the pandemic has affected major segments of the 
African populace, most especially through social interactions 
among people. Many Africans are still living below the human 
development index standard of an average income of US$2 
per day as a result of poorly functioning economies. With the 
introduction of this new disease, the majority of Africans may 
fall below this benchmark. Thus, there was a need for African 
leaders and governments to provide for their citizens while 
they were locked down in their homes, as has been practised 
in many developed countries of the world. However, the 
distribution of assistance was not properly and adequately 
implemented in many African countries. This was hampered 
due to fiscal constraints, and many African countries not 
having adequate data on actual populations, living areas and 
living standards (Olayide, 2020). Essentially, there was no 
adequate framework for social response and distribution of 
assistance. Thus, interventions from the government could 
not reach the poorest of the poor and most vulnerable in many 
instances. The mismanagement of distribution of palliatives 
and misappropriation of funds in some cases resulted in 
further hunger and poverty. There have also been increases 
in gender- based violence (see Guidorzi, this volume), and in 
some extreme cases a breakdown of law and order, including 
banditry.
Implications for environmental sustainability
The environmental sustainability aspects impacted include 
food and agriculture and waste management. The lockdown 
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impacted negatively on agricultural and rural activities and 
intra- African trade. Many coastal fishers could not bring their 
produce inland. Farmers who live in rural areas could often 
not bring their produce into the cities and bigger towns for 
sale, and those who were able to often did so at high transport 
costs due to the travel restrictions and the risk of being arrested 
or extorted by security agents. This situation, therefore, 
resulted in more farm produce being left on the farms 
unattended, poorly harvested or not properly stored. The 
overall implication of this in Africa was high cost of foods and 
scarcity of some commodities, such as perishables. Losses also 
accrued to farmers since harvesting and sales of farm produce 
could not be carried out due to inter- city lockdowns and 
curfews imposed by governments. The inter- state lockdowns 
and curfews also had implications for the environment. For 
instance, areas where people usually congregate for economic, 
social and religious events were vacated without activities due 
to restrictions imposed by COVID- 19 prevention protocols 
on public gatherings and social distancing. Hence, public 
places became overgrown with weeds and residential areas 
often accumulated municipal waste.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the different policy measures taken 
by African governments in the containment of the pandemic. 
The contextualization of the policy measures for the 
containment of the coronavirus pandemic underscored the 
challenges and opportunities posed, with a view to emerging 
economically stronger, to build back better and sustainably 
by considering the implications of the coronavirus pandemic 
on social, economic and environmental issues in Africa. 
Lockdown and other measures used have been found to be 
stringent and have not worked well in a continent that has 
poor data systems, insufficient social safety nets and palliatives 
for the most vulnerable in the society, and weak economic 
bases. Similarly, deficits in social and physical infrastructure 
(including, education, transportation, healthcare delivery 
systems, food and agriculture) have revealed areas of 
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opportunity for development. Despite all the measures put 
in place by African governments, there was still the ongoing 
reality of the unresolved high poverty rate, and high disease 
burden of malaria, coupled with and complicated by the 
COVID- 19 pandemic.
Concerted public action and investment can improve 
the proportion of the population with improved access to 
handwashing materials, hospital beds and physicians, and 
generate a reduction in the burden of disease, including malaria, 
on the continent. In the same vein, the post- COVID- 19 era 
could lead to the development of complementary vaccines for 
malaria since some of the frontline and earliest recommended 
drugs for the treatment of coronavirus have been linked to 
its treatment, although this is in need of further research 
and verification. These drugs include the pharmaceutical 
hydroxylchloroquine and herbal mixtures. The coronavirus 
disease pandemic could be a ‘blessing in disguise’ by drawing 
global attention to the burden of illnesses like malaria and the 
socioeconomic milieu in Africa.
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Africa and the Economic 
Pathologies of the 
COVID- 19 Pandemic
Howard Stein
In December 2019, news of yet another deadly respiratory 
disease arose – this time from Wuhan, China. Unlike recent 
zoonotic diseases like Ebola that suddenly and enigmatically 
emerged locally, African governments had time to prepare. 
On 27 January, after four Asian countries reported cases, the 
African Centre for Disease Control (CDC) initiated an emer-
gency operations centre to coordinate the response. The first 
case was not detected on the continent until 19 February. 
Within a few weeks, many governments began to impose 
travel restrictions and mandatory quarantine periods for peo-
ple arriving from Asia and Europe. In the following weeks, 
over 40 countries closed borders (Loembé et al, 2020).
On 28 April 2020, the US hit a million infected people with 
2,000 deaths per day. Africa had recorded only 32,000 cases 
and 1,400 total deaths to that point. Influential publications 
like the Financial Times suggested: ‘Maybe, just maybe, the 
continent could be spared the worst of the pandemic’ (Pilling, 
2020: 1). The article continued to point to all the positive 
factors including ‘early lockdown’, ‘less dense population’, 
‘the effect of ultraviolet’, ‘a climate that meant people spent 
more time outside’ and ‘Africa’s youthful population’.
The optimism has quickly faded. While Africa took 93 days 
to hit the first 100,000 cases, the number doubled only 16 
days later on 7 June. By the end of June, the numbers had 
roughly doubled again to nearly 400,000 cases and close to 
10,000 deaths. By the third week in July, they again doubled 
to almost 800,000 infections with nearly 17,000 deaths. On 
6 August, it surpassed the milestone of 1 million cases with 
22,000 people deceased, exceeding an estimated 15,000 
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deaths from all recorded Ebola cases (1976– 2000). However, 
the numbers in reality are significantly higher (Africa.news, 
2020; Africa CDC, 2020, WHO, 2020). On 29 June, 
the New York Times proclaimed in their headlines that the 
‘Coronavirus is Battering Africa’s Growing Middle Class’ 
(Dahir, 2020).
This chapter will argue that that the optimism followed by 
the growing realization of the severity of the impact on the 
continent is part of a false narrative that has become popular in 
orthodox circles. The narrative argues that African countries 
that followed the neoliberal dictates of the international 
financial institutions have been rewarded with growth and 
prosperity in their open integration into the global economy, 
as evidenced by their growing ‘middle classes’.1 In contrast, 
it will argue that it is precisely how Africa is situated in the 
global order that has left it more vulnerable to the pandemic’s 
health and economic impact. While African governments 
wisely put in place measures to mitigate the impact of the 
virus in the early stages of the pandemic, it is these underlying 
systemic conditions and the pathologies inherent in the 
economic strategies that have created these vulnerabilities 
that ultimately exacerbate the impact of the pandemic.
The concept of economic pathology
Pathology is generally associated with the scientific study of 
disease. The construct has also been used to describe an illness 
or sickness in a particular discipline or approach to a discipline.2 
Others have focused on the harm and even diseases generated 
by the specificities of socioeconomic structures.3 Drawing on 
both ideas, Swann (2019) argues that economic pathology 
should be conceived as a duality. There can be a pathological 
condition in the economy and one in the discipline of 
economics. The two are interconnected. Bad economic 
theory can drive public policy, which can create pathological 
effects on the economy. Moreover, if the economics discipline 
accepts a pathological condition in the economy as quite 
normal, then this can buttress the pathological tendencies of 
a field. It is possible to also take this concept a step further 
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to consider how the pathological nature of the economics 
profession in this duality leads to situations where it creates 
the structural conditions which contribute to the proliferation 
and vulnerability to diseases in the medical sense. Hence, 
we can think of how economic pathology intersects with 
disease- focused pathology and in turn how it feeds back into 
economic pathology. The remainder of the chapter will focus 
on illustrating the multiple interactions embedded in the 
economic pathology of the coronavirus pandemic in Africa.
The pathology of the economics discipline and its 
consequences: the rise of monoeconomics in Africa
Theorizing about the nature of African integration into 
global capitalism and the domestic policies needed to 
enhance development were once at the core of the economics 
curriculum of African universities. Debates on the types of 
government strategies to be used drew from a variety of 
theoretical traditions (such as institutionalists, Marxists, 
structuralists). As pointed out by Hirschman (1981), the very 
nature of development economics of the post- independence 
period directly challenged the ‘monoeconomics’, or 
orthodoxy, which dominated before the Great Depression. 
Orthodoxy in economics states that ‘in a market economy 
benefits flow to all participants whether they are individuals 
or countries, from all voluntary acts of economic intercourse’ 
(Hirschman, 1981: 4).
Stein (2021) traces how the crisis of African universities 
partly generated by the structural adjustment project of 
the World Bank created the opportunity to undermine 
development economics and to expand and institutionalize 
neoclassical economic orthodoxy on the continent. This 
created the economic pathology of bad economic theory 
driving policies that created the economic and health 
vulnerabilities to the coronavirus pandemic.
Economics education in the neoclassical economics 
tradition emphasizes models of pure competition, optimality, 
indifference curves with utility maximization, equilibrium and 
marginal analysis. The emphasis is on learning the language 
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of economists and getting students to think like economists. 
Education is largely drawn from textbooks that purportedly 
reflect the latest advances in the field but are typical variations 
on the same macro and microeconomic constructs embedded 
for years in the neoclassical economic doctrine. Promotion 
and recognition in the field are measured by publications in 
a set of neoclassical economic journals that draw on the same 
constructs.
During the structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 
1990s, the World Bank and other donors used the crisis in 
the universities to rebuild ‘weak’ economics departments 
in the image of the orthodoxy of Western countries. 
They understood this as a powerful mechanism to infuse 
policymakers and academics with a shared set of economic 
priorities and theories that justified the adjustment agenda.
As Mkandawire (2014) points out, donors carefully 
rigged both sides of the market to provide the incentives 
to participate. On the one hand, they provided stipends to 
retrain old faculty and supported a new generation of students 
in neoclassical economics through organizations like the 
African Economic Research Consortium. At the same time, 
they ensured that the ‘technical skills’ of these economists 
were demanded in aid packages that required the hiring of 
local experts to produce reports with lucrative contracts to 
supplement low academic wages. Local consultancies were 
organized to supply economists for projects requiring ‘local 
expertise’. This empowered what Mkandawire terms an 
‘epistemic community’ of local economists as the trusted 
purveyors of the international agenda.
There were profound pathological consequences in 
the economy. Adjustment with its focus on liberalization, 
privatization, macrostabilization and user fees in health and 
education was supposed to lead to prosperity from static 
efficiency gains as rational actors made improved decisions 
in reaction to undistorted prices. Unfortunately, the results 
were very different. Public expenditure cutbacks and the 
privatization of social services worsened healthcare and 
education. Sylla (2018) reminds us that the World Bank 
and IMF are still seen as ‘agencies of misery, poverty and 
social distress’ by Africans due to adjustment. There is little 
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doubt that countries’ health systems were put on the wrong 
trajectory relative to their ability to deal with the public health 
needs of a pandemic.
There were even more profound economic consequences. 
Adjustment led to the deindustrialization of the continent and 
returned African to its colonial- style extraction economy with 
its problematic boom and bust commodity cycles. In 1995, 
roughly 88 per cent of exports were in primary commodities 
and 12 per cent in manufactured goods. By 2008, the figure 
was 93 per cent and 6.5 per cent, respectively. Fuel- focused 
commodities dominated the growth and went from 40 per 
cent to 72 per cent of total commodity exports over that 
period. Little has changed since with primary commodities 
still at 91 per cent of the total in 2018. Deindustrialization 
was also evident from the GDP figures. The manufacturing 
share of GDP fell from an average of 22 per cent in the 1980s 
to 12 per cent in the 1990s to only 9 per cent in 2000– 06. In 
2008, if fell to only 7 per cent and was back to 9 per cent only 
in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2020).
Africa is at the bottom of the global value chain. 
Neoliberalism removed the restrictions on capital flows, 
privatized state enterprises and liberalized trade, which 
both increased the reliance of African countries on the 
export of unprocessed raw materials while encouraging the 
deindustrialization documented above. It also demobilized 
the ability of governments to alter the terms and conditions 
of international exchange. Value in production has 
increasingly shifted to developed countries and offshore tax 
havens buttressed by international institutional structures, 
like the World Trade Organization (WTO), which reinforce 
the financial and technological power of transnational 
corporations. Data from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) indicates that exports in 
the 2000s in Africa and other developing countries increased 
substantially without a comparable expansion in domestic 
value added (De Medeiros et al, 2017).
The tools at the disposal of mainstream economists today 
have delimited their capacity to comprehend the structural 
and institutional challenges underlying the dynamics of 
development; these challenges have become even more acute 
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as many African countries, while at the bottom of global 
supply chain, are subject to the vicissitudes of commodity 
markets. Orthodox economists see liberalized Africa as 
naturally following their comparative advantage. Here we 
have a prima facie example of a discipline that accepts a 
pathological condition as normal. How has this economic 
pathology intersected with the disease- focused pathology of 
the coronavirus in Africa?
Economic pathology and the pathology of the 
coronavirus: examples
In the absence of a vaccine, governments can undertake a 
number of measures to mitigate the health and economic 
impact of the disease. How do the economic pathologies 
discussed above affect the options available to African 
governments? To begin with, battling the disease requires 
significant financial resources not only for medical supplies 
and equipment for testing, treatment and the protection of 
medical workers, but to be able to support populations that 
are forced to isolate following stay at home orders or as the 
result of exposure determined through contact tracing.
The economic downturn exposes the financial fragility of 
African countries. Commodity prices have generally been 
falling since their peak in January 2011. In December 2019, 
the commodity price index was only 60 per cent of the 2011 
level. Since then, the decline has been precipitous with a fall 
of an additional 30 per cent to April 2020, before slightly 
recovering in May (Index Mundi, 2020). The more recent 
plummeting is evident in some of the price indexes of key 
African export commodity types. For example, the price of 
energy fell by 48 per cent between the last quarter of 2019 and 
the second quarter of 2020 and was nearly 60 per cent below 
the level of 2018. Base metal prices are down by nearly 25 per 
cent since 2018 and key agricultural export crops like cotton 
are down by nearly 30 per cent, leading to a plummeting of 
export revenues and access to vital foreign exchange (World 
Bank, 2020d).
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African countries have increasingly relied on remittances 
from millions of people that have left the continent in a 
desperate search of livelihoods. Between 2000 and 2018, 
remittances expanded ten- fold and are now as important as 
overseas development assistance (ODA), but are expected to 
fall by 23 per cent in 2020 (World Bank, 2020a, 2020b). 
The decline of financial flows and fall in prices and demand 
from commodities from the global depression are rapidly 
putting African governments into financial stress and another 
debt crisis. The pattern prior to the arrival of the virus was 
increasingly disturbing. The stock of total external debt went 
from US$301 billion in 2010 to US$580 billion in 2018. 
The external debt/ export ratio has climbed from 75 per cent 
to 135 per cent, with countries like Ethiopia now exceeding 
400 per cent. The reserves to external debt stock fell from 
52 per cent to only 28 per cent over the same period (World 
Bank, 2020c).
Since then the situation has deteriorated further, forcing 
most African countries to turn to the IMF for relief. As of the 
end of June 2020, 36 sub- Saharan African (SSA) countries 
have taken loans from the IMF under the General Resource 
Account, Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, or newly 
created rapid credit facilities for debt relief. This was up from 
23 countries at the end of 2019 and only 19 countries in 2018 
(IMF, various years). Hence, the majority of SSA countries are 
back in the grip of the IMF with the economic pathology of 
its neoliberal conditionality (Bretton Woods Project, 2020)
Economic pathology, including the relative absence of 
manufacturing, has affected the trajectory of the coronavirus 
in many ways. As the number of cases expanded in Africa, the 
absence of testing capacity and materials to undertake them 
became apparent. By the end of May, South Africa had tested 
655,000 people, but still had a backlog of 100,000 partly 
due to the shortage of reagents. Elsewhere the situation was 
far worse. Nigeria had only undertaken 58,000 tests in a 
population of 200 million. Chad had only been able to test 
105 per million people and Malawi 170 compared to 38,000/ 
million in the US – a total considered woefully inadequate 
by experts. In all, only 2 million tests were undertaken in 
Africa by the end of May. As one correspondent noted: ‘The 
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shortages, especially in testing materials, have jolted African 
authorities into facing uncomfortable truths: Richer countries 
are elbowing them out in the race to obtain crucial supplies, 
and the continent relies almost entirely on imports for drugs 
and other medical items’ (Anna, 2020). The director of the 
African CDC, John Nkengasong, warned: ‘We have to have 
made in Africa materials … We cannot keep importing basic 
things’ (Anna, 2020). This was partly in response to the 
restriction on the export of medical supplies by 80 different 
countries to the end of April (WEF, 2020).
Shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
oxygen put health workers and patients at risk. By 12 June, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) was reporting that 
almost 5,000 health workers in 47 African countries were 
infected, with many dying (Meldrum and Fox, 2020). Most 
African countries lacked the capacity to produce medical 
oxygen, which is vital for keeping patients alive. Oximeters 
are scarce. Alternatives like oxygen concentration machines 
with few exceptions are not produced in Africa, leading 
WHO and other organizations to frantically attempt to secure 
machines to send to the continent (McNeil, 2020; Zhu, 
2020). The incapacity of African countries to manufacture 
goods vital to the health and welfare of their population is a 
prima facie example of how economic pathology has affected 
the pathology of the disease on the continent.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to look more deeply at the 
structural conditions underlying the vulnerability of Africa 
to the coronavirus. The focus is on transcending a narrow 
biological understanding of the disease or a simple analysis 
of the influence on incomes and livelihoods to look at the 
more profound economic pathology of the disease. Economic 
pathology is linked to both the pathology of the economics 
that has come to dominate the discipline in Africa and the 
policies and domestic and economic structures that have 
arisen in its path. While African countries will recover from 
the virus, sadly the economic pathology that creates the 
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vulnerabilities that exacerbate the impact of these and other 
diseases will likely remain omnipresent.
Notes
1. For a critique of the concept of the middle class in Africa, see Melber 
(2016).
2. See for example the critique of the usage of rational choice theory by 
Green and Shapiro (1994).
3. A good example is the work of Paul Farmer and his ‘Pathologies 
of Power’, which focuses on the ‘structural violence’ against poor 
people created by how economies are organized.
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Ride- hailing Drivers Left 
Alone at the Wheel
Reflections from South Africa 
and Kenya
Elly Otieno, Malte Stein and 
Mohammad Amir Anwar
From Washington DC to New Delhi and from London 
to Cape Town, platforms like Uber and Bolt are connect-
ing drivers with customers for taxi rides. This is commonly 
referred to as ‘ride- hailing’ and has emerged as one of the 
main alternatives to public transport in the low- and mid-
dle- income regions or the Global South. Ride- hailing pro-
vides income- earning opportunities for workers who cannot 
find jobs elsewhere. Yet, this work is also fraught with risks. 
The current pandemic has shown that in commoditized and 
market- mediated employment relations, the risk is borne by 
labour who cannot work from home (Anwar, 2020). At the 
same time, ride- hailing companies such as Uber and Bolt 
misclassify drivers as self- employed, thus avoiding regulation 
(Kessler, 2018). Therefore, this chapter examines the liveli-
hood impacts of the pandemic and lockdown on ride- hailing 
drivers in Kenya and South Africa, two of the biggest markets 
in Africa for these services.
The ride- hailing sector has grown tremendously in the last 
few years in Africa. An estimated 81 ride- hailing platforms 
now enable movement of people from one place to another. 
While estimates on the number of people working in this 
sector are hard to come by, the 2018 figures suggest 216,000 
workers in the ride- hailing sector in just seven countries on 
the continent (Insight2impact, 2018). Alongside some of 
the big international companies (for example, Uber, Bolt, 
inDriver), several local platforms have emerged as well, for 
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example, Oga Taxi in Nigeria, Safe Boda in Kenya, and 
Yookoo Rides and Hailer in South Africa. Having said that, 
Uber and Bolt dominate the market with operations in most 
major economies of the continent: Uber currently operates in 
24 cities across nine countries, while Bolt has operations in 
64 cities across seven countries. These two companies (both 
foreign in origin) have become go- to platforms for drivers.
The growth of the ride- hailing sector is part of the wider 
trend in the gig economy across Africa which has emerged as 
an alternative to traditional employment (Anwar and Graham, 
2020). While various gig economy sectors (including ride- 
hailing) are equated with precarious employment in the Global 
North (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; Cant, 2019; Ravenelle, 
2019), it is often received with overly positive connotations 
in the Global South (see Rockefeller Foundation, 2014; Kuek 
et al, 2015). African governments have also enthusiastically 
supported the new gig economy jobs (for example, Ajira 
Digital Programme in Kenya and South Africa in Digital Age 
are two key examples). There is now a growing scholarly 
interest in the ride- hailing sector in Africa (Carmody and 
Fortuin, 2019; Giddy, 2019; Pollio, 2019). This chapter 
not only contributes to this emerging literature but also 
presents one of the first accounts of the pandemic’s impact 
on gig workers in Africa to highlight the unstable nature of 
livelihoods associated with it.
The pandemic is affecting the livelihoods and wellbeing 
of millions of workers around the world, especially in the 
Global South. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
estimates that around 1.6 billion jobs globally are at risk in the 
near future due to the pandemic (ILO, 2020). In the context 
of Africa, where 85.6 per cent of the employment is informal 
(the highest in the world) and welfare provisions are minimal, 
many will be pushed further into poverty. Our argument 
is that the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown will 
accelerate some of these trends (unemployment and poverty) 
with profound implications for workers in the Global South, 
particularly those in the informal sectors, including ride- 
hailing. The chapter draws on 26 in- depth interviews with 
Uber drivers in South Africa and Kenya conducted between 
April and June 2020, highlighting drivers’ loss of livelihoods 
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in the immediate aftermath of the lockdown and their deep 
discontent towards the ride- hailing companies and the state. 
There is a brief discussion of drivers’ mitigation strategies 
which show resilience and solidarities among workers in the 
gig economy. The conclusions outline the need for a better 
regulatory system that holds platform companies accountable 
and collective bargaining to improve the material conditions 
of workers in the Global South.
Lockdown effects in Kenya and South Africa.
Loss of livelihood
The pandemic- induced lockdown went into effect in Kenya on 
25 March 2020 and in South Africa on 27 March 2020. Most 
economic activities closed down and only essential services 
were allowed to function, but under restricted working 
hours. Ride- hailing drivers we spoke to told us that they 
were allowed to work during the lockdown but were getting 
fewer fares. As a result, we found evidence of a sharp decline 
in their incomes. A driver, Dumele, in South Africa told us 
that he would previously have ended the week with around 
R7,000 (US $414). On 8 April he returned home after nine 
hours searching for fares on the roads of Johannesburg and 
said, “Today, I earned nothing”. In the week of 30 March to 
6 April, Dumele worked for around 60 hours to earn ZAR 
3,500 (US$207), while in the first week of February he was 
earning well over ZAR 5,500 (US$325) for the same number 
of hours. Similarly, a driver, Dennis, in Kenya told us that his 
weekly earnings dropped from KES 15,000 (US$140) before 
the pandemic to KES 5,000 (USD$46) after the lockdown.
Due to the loss of income, drivers had a really hard time 
meeting their daily expenses. Ownership of cars remains low 
in Africa and drivers often rent cars from owners on a weekly 
basis (for example, Graham and Anwar, 2018), to whom they 
could now no longer afford to pay weekly rent and so they lost 
access to these cars. As a result, drivers experienced high levels 
of stress due to hunger, threats of eviction and being made 
homeless. Drivers who were unable to pay rent for housing 
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were (illegally) threatened with evictions by their landlords. 
One driver, Mohammad, in South Africa was able to use his 
security deposit to pay for his rent in April and May, but his 
landlord tried to force him out of his flat later. He told us, 
“there is no way for my wife and five children to be out of this 
house. Where must I go to? I cannot end up on the street”.
Lack of regular income also meant drivers had to change 
their food consumption habits. Bulk buying was one of 
the options available. In Nairobi, some drivers would go 
without breakfast and sometimes even lunch. For drivers 
with families and young children, this is a disturbing trend 
and may contribute to an unhealthy lifestyle. There is already 
evidence that though life- expectancy has improved in Africa 
over the last two decades, people’s health often remains poor 
(Wiysonge, 2018).
Mitigation strategies
Livelihoods derived from the gig economy are unstable and 
precarious because workers rarely have bargaining power or 
control over work activities (see Carmody and Fortuin, 2019; 
Anwar and Graham, 2020). After the lockdown, drivers have 
had to find alternative ways to earn a living. Ride- hailing 
drivers’ livelihood strategies and mitigation tactics (just 
like other informal workers in Africa) are built to diversify 
their income sources and find support in their interpersonal 
networks in the form of borrowing from friends or informal 
lending activities, such as stokvels or chamas (see Callebert, 
2017, Hutchison, 2020). A driver in Kenya has kept two 
cows whose milk he sells. Some drivers were branching out 
to try online work such as marketing and teaching. Others 
resorted to selling agricultural goods on the roadside, while 
a few depended on family members, for example partners or 
wives who run corner shops.
Drivers’ interpersonal networks run deep in the community 
and members often help each other in difficult times. 
Dumele’s landlord, from whom he also rents his car, waived 
the car rental fee during April and May and gave him one 
meal a day. He also sold some of his livestock for R2,400 
(US$125) to help him cover some of his daily expenses for 
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the car (for example, fuel, data, airtime, hand sanitizer). One 
driver from South Africa relied on donations from a friend 
that owned a tuckshop (also known as Spaza shop) and twice 
sent him groceries for his family. A local shop owner sold him 
basic supplies (flour, sugar, pasta and rice) on credit.
In several cases, drivers simply stopped working. Tsietsi, in 
South Africa, stopped driving around as it is not economical. 
He said the weekly rental costs for the car, paying for fuel and 
buying airtime and data to support the ride- hailing app – which 
can come to around R5,000 (US$260) a week – far outweigh 
the potential income from fares during the lockdown. In early 
April and mid- May, when we interviewed him several times, 
he was earning less than R200 (US$12) a day.
Discontent towards the state and the platform companies
Drivers are misclassified by ride- hailing companies (for 
example, Uber) as ‘independent contractors’ and not 
employees. This means that they are excluded from welfare 
provisions and other social protection measures that normally 
are available for regular workers in both countries. Most 
informal workers (and the unemployed) in Africa are without 
adequate social security measures (that is, social assistance 
[cash grants] and social insurance [health and unemployment 
insurance]) (ILO, 2017). Hence, informal workers find it 
hard to cope after a shock. The South African government 
introduced the Temporary Employer/ Employee Scheme 
which replaces some of the lost income due to COVID- 19, 
but this is only for registered businesses and workers. The 
government also introduced a COVID- 19 Social Relief of 
Distress grant to include individuals who are unemployed and 
do not receive any other form of social grant or Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) payment. Migrant workers, who 
form a substantial portion of the global gig economy, do 
not qualify for this because they do not have permanent 
residency or refugee status (Markham, 2018). Even South 
African citizens had problems applying because they could 
not provide documents, such as bank statements or proof of 
residential address. So far, the government has paid this grant 
to about 1.2 million claimants (South African Social Security 
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Agency (SASSA), 2020). The South African government also 
distributed food parcels but these only reached a handful of 
beneficiaries (Anciano et al, 2020). A driver in Cape Town 
had applied for food parcels when the lockdown began but 
was frustrated that he never received anything. He said, 
“Honestly, since my last food parcel application I lost faith 
with the government”. On the other hand, the Kenyan 
government introduced a raft of fiscal measures (for example, 
tax relief) and reportedly set aside KES 10 billion (US$92m) 
for cash transfer to the elderly, orphans, and other vulnerable 
members of the society. However, there was no support 
programme for informal workers or independent contractors 
such as ride- hailing drivers.
The drivers interviewed were particularly demoralized by 
the loss of livelihood and lack of alternatives for them. They 
expressed deep discontent towards the seeming absence and 
lack of commitment from the ride- hailing companies to help 
drivers. Drivers were particularly anxious about the risk of 
catching the coronavirus from passengers, yet ride- hailing 
companies are offering little. Despite Uber’s lacklustre efforts 
to offer mask and sanitizers to drivers, the respondents were 
of the opinion that it should provide basic financial support 
to survive. Some say that this would show that the company 
cares for its drivers. One driver in South Africa said, “We 
work for Uber. My source of income is Uber”. Another driver 
suggested the company should at least waive its 25 per cent 
commission from fares in places facing lockdowns.
Uber did release a financial assistance policy to support 
drivers during the pandemic, but with strict limitations. To be 
eligible, a person must have a confirmed case of COVID- 19 
or have been individually ordered by a doctor or public health 
official to self- quarantine. While this may be easier for drivers 
in parts of the world where testing is common (for example, 
Denmark), in Kenya the testing rate is around 3.45 per 1,000 
people and in South Africa is about 27 tests per 1,000 people 
(Our World in Data, n.d.).
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Conclusion
The pandemic affects the marginalized segments of our 
societies the most. People who are at most livelihood risk are 
informal workers (for example, ride- hailing drivers, delivery 
workers, waste collectors, street vendors), a majority of 
whom live in low- and middle- income countries. Ride- hailing 
drivers in Africa fall into this large swathe of informal workers 
struggling to make ends meet – for whom the pandemic and 
lockdowns are particularly hard to bear. They just cannot work 
from home. Because their already poorly paid jobs are not 
sufficiently formalized or lack social protection, they cannot 
survive for long without a daily source of income. In the face of 
these challenges, ride- hailing drivers in Africa are doing their 
best to adapt: borrowing from friends and family, appealing 
for support where possible and strategizing on possible ways 
to make ends meet. But under the conditions of lockdown 
and feeling abandoned by the ride- hailing companies and the 
state, their options are limited.
There have been numerous suggestions put forward to deal 
with the pandemic and support informal workers, through 
cash transfers (Strohm, 2020) and debt relief (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2020). 
While these measures can definitely help workers in the 
Global South, the pandemic has exposed broken employment 
relations and the brutal everyday reality of worker exploitation 
found within the wider informal economy sector. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for radical overhauling of the 
commodification of work, informalization and casualization 
of labour that characterize the global gig economy. One of 
the key elements is that effective regulatory systems need to 
be put in place that can hold platform companies accountable. 
Platform companies have shirked their responsibilities to 
workers for too long. Challenges to Uber’s business model 
and operations in the US and the UK provide hope that 
this is possible and that the states can rein in the advances 
of capital over labour. At the same time, effective regulation 
will require much- needed collective representation of workers 
in the global gig economy (Webster, 2020). There is some 
evidence of new forms of worker organization and solidarity 
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emerging already (for example, Anwar and Graham, 2019; 
Tassinari and Maccarrone, 2019). At the time of the writing 
this chapter, the App Drivers and Couriers Union have been 
listed as a registered trade union in the UK after years of 
struggle by drivers and delivery workers. This will open up 
doors for collective bargaining in the ride- hailing sector. For 
workers in the Global South (including Africa), this could 
help build wider political responses and social movements at 
the ground level for similar but distinct collective organization 
and mobilization strategies in the gig economy.
References
Anciano, F. Cooper- Knock, S.J., Dube, M., Majola, M. and Papane 
B.M. (2020). ‘Lockdown diaries: the politics of food parcels in Cape 
Town’. Daily Maverick, 13 May 2020. Available at: www.dailymav-
erick.co.za/ article/ 2020- 05- 13- lockdown- diaries- the- politics- of- 
food- parcels- in- cape- town/ #gsc.tab=0
Anwar, M.A. (2020). ‘We work for Uber:  South Africa’s gig driv-
ers left alone at the wheel’. African Arguments, 28 April 2020. 
Available at:  https:// africanarguments.org/ 2020/ 04/ 28/ 
we- work- for- uber- south- africa- covid- 19- gig- drivers- alone- wheel/ 
Anwar, M.A. and Graham, M. (2019). ‘Hidden transcripts in the gig 
economy: labour agency and the new art of resistance among plat-
form workers in Africa’. Environment and Planning A. Available 
at: https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0308518X19894584
Anwar, M.A. and Graham, M. (2020). ‘Between a rock and a hard 
place:  freedom, flexibility, precarity and vulnerability in the gig 
economy in Africa’. Competition and Change, Special Issue on 
Digitalisation and Labour. Available at: https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 
1024529420914473
Callebert, R. (2017). On Durban’s Docks: Zulu Workers, Rural Households, 
Global Labor. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Cant, C. (2019). Riding for Deliveroo: Resistance in the Gig Economy. 
London: Polity Press.
Carmody, P. and Fortuin, A. (2019). ‘“Ride- sharing”, virtual capital and 
impacts on labor in Cape Town, South Africa’. African Geographical 
Review, 38(3): 196– 208.
Giddy, J.K. (2019). The influence of e- hailing apps on urban mobili-
ties in South Africa. African Geographical Review, 38(3): 227– 239. 
https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 19376812.2019.1589732
Graham, M. and Anwar, M.A. (2018). ‘Two models for a fairer shar-
ing economy’, in N. Davidson, M. Finck and J. Infranca (eds) 
Cambridge Handbook on Law and Regulation of the Sharing Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 328– 340.
Ride-hailing Drivers Left Alone at the Wheel 103
Hutchison, A. (2020). ‘How South African stokvels manage their lend-
ing activities outside the courts’. The Conversation, 4 May 2020. 
Available at:  http:// theconversation.com/ how- south- african- 
stokvels- manage- their- lending- activities- outside- the- courts- 135449
Insight2impact. (2018). ‘African digital platforms and the future of 
digital financial services’. 20 December 2018. Available at: https:// 
i2ifacility.org/ insights/ articles/ african- digital- platforms- and- the- 
future- of- digital- financial- services?entity=news
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2017). World Social 
Protection Report 2017/ 19: Universal Social Protection to Achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Geneva: ILO.
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2020). ‘As job losses esca-
late, nearly half of global workforce at risk of losing livelihoods’. 29 
April 2020. Available at: www.ilo.org/ global/ about- the- ilo/ news-
room/ news/ WCMS_ 743036/ lang- - en/ index.htm
Kessler, S. (2018). Gigged: The End of the Job and the Future of Work. 
New York: Macmillan.
Kuek, S.C., Paradi- Guilford, C., Fayomi, T., Imaizumi, S. and 
Ipeirotis, P. (2015). The Global Opportunity in Online Outsourcing. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Markham, L. (2018). ‘The immigrants fueling the gig economy’. The 
Atlantic, 20 June 2018. Available at: www.theatlantic.com/ technol-
ogy/ archive/ 2018/ 06/ the- immigrants- fueling- the- gig- economy/ 
561107/ .
Our World in Data. (n.d). ‘Total COVID- 19 tests per 1,000 peo-
ple’. Available at:  https:// ourworldindata.org/ grapher/ 
full- list- cumulative- total- tests- per- thousand
Pollio, A. (2019). ‘Forefronts of the sharing economy: Uber in Cape 
Town’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
43: 760– 775.
Ravenelle, A.J. (2019). Hustle and Gig: Struggling and Surviving in the 
Sharing Economy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Rockefeller Foundation. (2014). ‘Online work:  a new frontier for 
Digital Jobs Africa’. Available at:  www.rockefellerfoundation.org/ 
blog/ online- work- new- frontier- digital- jobs/ .
Rosenblat, A. and Stark, L. (2016). ‘Algorithmic labor and information 
asymmetries: a case study of Uber’s drivers’. International Journal of 
Communication, 10: 3758– 3784.
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). (2020). ‘SASSA declines 
unqualifying COVID- 19 grant applications’. Available at: www.sassa.
gov.za/ newsroom/ articles/ Pages/ SASSA- Declines- Unqualifying- 
COVID- 19- Grant- Applications.aspx
Strohm, R. (2020). ‘Africa’s corona response rests on two things: mar-
kets and money transfers’. African Arguments, 2 April 2020. Available 
at: https:// africanarguments.org/ 2020/ 04/ 02/ africa- coronavirus- 
response- rests- on- two- things- markets- money- transfers/ 
Tassinari, A. and Maccarrone, V. (2019). ‘Riders on the storm: work-
place solidarity among gig economy couriers in Italy and the UK’. 
Work Employment and Society. Available at:  https:// doi.org/ 
10.1177/ 0950017019862954
104 COVID-19 in the Global South
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). (2020). 
‘African Finance Ministers call for coordinated COVID- 19 
response to mitigate adverse impact on economies and society’. 
Available at:  www.uneca.org/ stories/ african- finance- ministers- call- 
coordinated- covid- 19- response- mitigate- adverse- impact
Webster, E. (2020). ‘The Uberisation of work:  the challenge of reg-
ulating platform capitalism. A commentary’. International Review 
of Applied Economics, 34(4): 512– 521. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 
02692171.2020.1773647
Wiysonge, C.S. (2018). ‘People in Africa live longer. But their health 
is poor in those extra years’. The Conversation, 20 December 2018. 
Available at:  http:// theconversation.com/ people- in- africa- live- 
longer- but- their- health- is- poor- in- those- extra- years- 108691
105
10
COVID- 19 in Latin America
Uneven Responses, Uneven Impacts, 
Shared Challenges
Barry Cannon
The ongoing crisis created by the arrival of the COVID- 19 
virus (the Corona crisis as some have labelled it) has revealed 
and exacerbated pre- existing inequalities throughout the 
world in terms of income, gender and race. This is illustrated 
graphically in Latin America, considered by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) at the time of writing as an ‘intense 
zone’ for COVID- 19 transmission (UN News, 2020). 
According to Sánchez- Ancochea (2020):
80% of individuals in the bottom quintile of the population 
work in the informal sector. Almost one fourth of all Latin 
Americans have no access to potable water, a third has no 
access to the internet, and many live in low quality housing 
– with dramatic consequences not only for their income 
opportunities but also for their health during the pandemic.
This graphic situation of inequality presents difficult choices 
for Latin American governments in their policy responses to 
the pandemic, particularly with regard to the most severe 
of these ‘lockdowns’ – that is, national shutdowns of all but 
essential economic and social activity combined with stay at 
home orders for most of the population. On the one hand, 
not imposing lockdowns can risk the rapid spread of the virus; 
on the other, the stark context of inequality alongside poor- 
quality, sparse and badly equipped and funded health and 
public services make lockdowns difficult to implement in an 
effective manner, and may exacerbate poverty and inequality 
further. Additionally, their cost may add to existing state 
debt burdens already being repaid with great difficulty and 
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at a high social cost. All these issues have contributed to the 
uneven outcomes of virus management efforts in the region.
This chapter will briefly examine these issues in the context 
of Latin America in the following order: the political, social 
and economic background preceding the emergence of 
COVID- 19 in the region; the range of measures used to contain 
the virus, particularly lockdowns and any compensatory policy 
packages introduced to mitigate their negative socioeconomic 
impacts, assessing the impact and effectiveness of both; and, 
some policy responses being discussed for the medium to long 
term on how to address the inequalities made more urgent by 
the pandemic.
Context and background
The COVID- 19 pandemic hit the region in a period of 
‘economic weakness and macroeconomic vulnerability’ (The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, ECLAC, 2020a), with regional growth 
falling in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crash (GFC) 
from 6 per cent in 2010 to 0.2 per cent in 2019; average gross 
public debt increasing between 2011 and 2019 from 29.8 per 
cent of GDP to 44.8 per cent, with interest rate repayments 
negatively affecting health spending and public spending 
in general; and low tax takes compared to most developed 
countries (OECD, 2020). These factors, added to reductions 
in foreign direct investment, tourism and migrant remittances, 
leaves the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2020a: 2) to conclude 
that there is ‘little room to increase spending’ even though 
the ‘pandemic will lead to the most severe contraction in the 
region’s history’ (ECLAC, 2020a:7), the latter conclusion 
shared by the IMF (Werner, 2020) and the World Bank 
(2020).
This is bad news for a region with the highest level of 
socioeconomic inequality in the world, a situation which, 
in the months preceding the pandemic, led to widespread 
demonstrations (Ferreira and Schoch, 2020). Despite 
impressive reductions in inequality under the ‘pink tide’ 
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left- wing governments that ruled most of the region from 
2002 to 2016, average income inequality for 15 countries 
in 2018 stood at 0.465 on the Gini index (ECLAC, 2019), 
still well above the OECD average of 0.318 (ECLAC, 2019). 
Moreover, those whose income situation improved from 
2002 onwards, remained highly vulnerable ‘to falling back 
into poverty due to changes prompted by unemployment, a 
decline in their income, or other catastrophic events such as 
grave illness or disaster’ (ECLAC, 2020b: 4).
Emergence of coronavirus
The first case of coronavirus identified in Latin America was 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on 26 February 2020. By 5 July, 2.5 
million cases and more than 100,000 deaths due to the virus 
had been recorded in the region (BBC News, 2020), although 
this is probably an underestimate and the pandemic there 
had not reached its peak by then. The most badly affected 
countries were Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru and the least 
affected Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, with the 
rest somewhere in between. An important policy response by 
some Latin American governments was the use of lockdowns; 
however, as Levy Yeyati and Malamud (2020) point out, 
the benefits of this approach for ‘developing countries with 
prohibitively high financing costs and a low prevalence of 
a formal salaried workforce’ are not so clear as ‘the same 
containment strategy may yield drastically different results’ 
compared to wealthier contexts.
Jones et al (2020) identify five preconditions for a lockdown 
to be feasible in a developing country context:  household 
access to electricity, clean drinking water, adequate sanitation, 
a phone and the household head being employed. Without 
these in place, the authors warn, the most basic hygiene 
and social distancing regimes cannot be followed, and more 
importantly without adequate social safety nets and access to 
food, people simply won’t be able to remain at home, which 
may lead to hunger and social unrest. Moreover, the state 
must be able to provide both adequately provisioned and 
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staffed public health systems and the capacity to implement 
and coordinate lockdowns effectively (Piper, 2020). This 
chapter briefly and incompletely tests these assertions here by 
examining four individual cases in the Latin American context, 
with the use or not of nationwide lockdowns and the lowest 
and highest infection rates among these as the key selection 
criteria. In this scenario, the country opting for a nationwide 
lockdown with the lowest levels of infection rates per 100,000 
inhabitants is Cuba, while that with the highest infection 
rate is Peru. Similarly, the country not using a nationwide 
lockdown with the lowest infection rates is Uruguay and the 
highest, Chile (see Table 10.1).
In this exercise, Peru emerges as the most vulnerable 
of the four, with lower levels of rural electricity (83.7 per 
cent) and sanitation provision (74 per cent), higher average 
household sizes (3.8), higher poverty levels (20 per cent) and 
more people employed in vulnerable work (almost 50%).1 
Chile, Uruguay and Cuba have better and relatively similar 
situations in most categories. Reviewing these figures, it is 
not unreasonable to think that Chile’s outcomes would be 
similar to those of Uruguay’s, given that neither operated 
full lockdowns, and both score relatively similarly on most 
of Jones et al’s (2020) variables. Yet Uruguay’s low infection 
outcomes are closer to Cuba’s, while Chile’s high infection 
outcomes are even greater than Peru’s.
A possible explanation for these differing outcomes could 
be, as Piper (2020) indicates, state provision for health. The 
WHO recommends that middle to high- income countries 
should spend a minimum of 6 per cent of GDP on state health 
systems. Cuba and Uruguay surpassed this level in 2017 with 
Table 10.1 Lockdown use and COVID- 19 infection rates in Latin 
America: selected countries
Country Infection rate × 100,000
Chile (non- lockdown) 1561.8
Cuba (lockdown) 21.0
Peru (lockdown) 918.1
Uruguay (non- lockdown) 27.5
Sources: Author’s own elaboration based on data from WHO COVID- 19 
Dashboard.
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the Cuban state spending 10.475 per cent of GDP on health 
and Uruguay 6.585 per cent (World Bank Open Data). Chile 
and Peru, on the other hand, spend below the recommended 
level with 4.497 per cent and 3.165 per cent respectively for 
the same year (World Bank Open Data). Additionally, both 
Cuba and Uruguay have higher skilled medical personnel 
density with Cuba at almost 155 health personnel per 10,000 
population and Uruguay at 97.68 as opposed to Peru with 
26.09 and Chile 11.78 (WHO Global Health Observatory 
Data Repository). These high staffing levels in Cuba and 
Uruguay were crucial for the rigorous testing, tracing and 
treating regimes these states put in place, viewed as crucial to 
fighting COVID- 19.2 Investment in public health provision 
then could be a key explanatory variable for low infection 
outcomes, with or without a lockdown. Indeed, lockdowns 
may have been counterproductive in some cases, such as Peru, 
where tens of thousands of people fled Lima for their homes 
in the countryside when the lockdown was announced, hence 
increasing the possibilities of contagion rather than reducing 
it (Chávez Yacila and Turkewitz, 2020). This underlines 
Jones et al’s (2020) point that pandemic responses should 
be tailored to local realities on the ground, and not one- size- 
fits- all blueprints put forward by international organizations 
such as the WHO and often amplified uncritically by both 
international and local media (Ogola, 2020).
Range of social compensatory measures taken
A further policy element seen as necessary to counteract 
the restrictions brought in by governments to fight the 
virus is social compensation for loss of livelihood for both 
formal and informal workers. Measures for formal workers 
introduced in the region were the same as those in developed 
countries:  teleworking, furlough schemes, unemployment 
insurance, reduced working hours, etc. Measures for informal 
workers, the majority in many states, were more varied 
with ECLAC (2020b:  7) identifying 126 social protection 
measures applied in 29 countries, including increasing existing 
cash transfers, introducing new cash transfer programmes, 
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providing food and medicines, and postponing or paying 
utility bills. While these measures reached around 58 per cent 
of the region’s population (ECLAC, 2020b: 1), ‘the amount 
and coverage … [were] not generous and broad enough’, 
according to Blofield and Filguiera (2020:  1), despite 
acknowledging the speed with which they were implemented.
Proposals for the future
ECLAC (2020a: 1– 2) estimates that the impact of COVID- 19 
will lead to a rise in poverty of about 28.7 million people 
on top of the existing 214.7 million (34.7 per cent) of the 
region’s population. Both ECLAC (2020a: 1– 2) and Blofield 
and Filguiera (2020) recommend the institutionalization of a 
universal basic income in response to this. ECLAC (2020a: 19) 
also emphasizes the need to ensure the right to health, by 
‘resolving the current fragmentation, hierarchization and 
commodification of health systems [and] … address[ing] 
the social determinants of health and, in particular, food and 
nutritional health requirements’. We have already seen that 
demonstrations against inequality swept the region in the 
period immediately preceding the pandemic, and the actual 
experience of the pandemic may have increased popular support 
for stronger state action in that respect, even among business 
elites (Mellizo, 2020). With the market in commodities, which 
financed many of the social improvements during the ‘pink 
tide’ period, in the doldrums, Latin American governments 
have two possible means to enact such policies:  increasing 
taxes and/ or debt reduction or forgiveness, both of which 
may prove difficult to achieve. With regard to the first, left- 
wing parties and movements, throughout the region, have 
made proposals for taxes to be imposed on the rich to pay 
for this social provision but these calls are being resisted by 
dominant right wing governments, some of whom instead are 
implementing cuts to public sector workers’ salaries to pay for 
assistance measures (O’Boyle, 2020).
With regard to debt reduction or forgiveness, a profound 
change of heart among the multilateral institutions – that 
is, the IMF and the World Bank but also the G7 and the 
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G20 – would be necessary. However, geopolitical sparring 
between the US and China at the Spring IMF meeting led 
the US to stymie a massive increase of the Fund’s Special 
Drawing Rights (Tooze, 2020), a type of tradeable global 
currency, which would have allowed member states to free 
up their currency reserves to boost COVID- 19 related public 
spending. Moreover, the majority of Latin American countries 
are middle- income countries and therefore cannot avail of the 
12- month debt repayment suspension for Least Developed 
Countries agreed by the G20 (Tooze, 2020). Additionally, 
the IMF and the World Bank continue to recommend ‘fiscal 
consolidation’ measures in the medium term (Bretton Woods 
Project, 2020) despite urging developing countries to ‘spend, 
spend, spend’ in the shorter term (Georgeiva, 2020). The 
outcome of the COVID- 19 crisis could well be, the Bretton 
Woods Project (Bretton Woods Project, 2020) concludes: ‘a 
solidification of dominant powers and commercial interests, 
aided by the IFIs’ (international financial institutions) 
rather than fundamental reform to promote greater equity. 
Nevertheless, as Harvey (2020) notes, the outcome of this 
crisis will depend on how long it lasts, and, the longer that is, 
the greater the possibility that popular pressure will demand 
old orthodoxies to be discarded.
Notes
1. Based on figures from UNDP Global Human Development 
Indicators; Population Reference Bureau (PRB); World Bank Open 
Data; World Bank Poverty and Equity Data Portal.
2. See Boseley (2020) and Taylor (2020).
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Addressing Gender- based Violence 
(GBV) During COVID- 19
Brianna Guidorzi
As cases of COVID- 19 increased and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic, reports on the 
gendered impacts of the virus streamed in. While acknowl-
edging that there have been higher mortality rates among 
men, women’s rights organizations called for attention to 
other, less initially visible repercussions faced by women and 
girls. Due to their disproportionate representation within the 
healthcare sector, for example, women may be at higher risk of 
exposure to COVID- 19 (CARE, 2020). That women are still 
the primary caregivers within the home could also increase 
their likelihood of exposure, not to mention jeopardize wom-
en’s financial security or career progression as schools and 
paid care options close shop with unclear plans for reopening 
(Topping, 2020). These few examples are the beginning of a 
longer list of gendered repercussions that some say may set 
back gender equality progress by decades (Topping, 2020.).
In the wake of this reality, Simone de Beauvoir’s warning 
continuously comes to mind:  ‘Never forget that a political, 
economic or religious crisis will be enough to cast doubts on 
women’s rights. These rights will never be vested’. Barring 
the omission of ‘pandemic’ from de Beauvoir’s list of crises, 
her words unfortunately could not be truer, even a half a 
century since they were written.
Without a doubt, the most grievous violation of women’s 
rights during COVID- 19 is the rise of gender- based violence 
(GBV). GBV is any harmful act that is perpetrated against 
someone’s will and based on socially ascribed gender differences 
and can include acts of physical, sexual or mental harm, and 
threats or acts of coercion in public or private (Inter- Agency 
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Standing Committee, 2015: 5). The detrimental impacts of 
GBV should not be understated:  they can be life changing 
and long term, causing forced pregnancy, physical injuries, 
mental health issues and even death.
Although anyone can experience GBV, women and girls 
are at greater risk than men and boys (Inter- Agency Standing 
Committee, 2015: 5), and persons with intersecting identities 
– such as women and girls with disabilities, ethnic minorities, 
and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer 
(LGBTIQ) persons – may face higher rates of GBV (OutRight 
Action International, 2020). The commonly cited statistic 
from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women (UN Women) is that one in three 
girls and women will experience physical or sexual violence 
by an intimate partner or sexual violence by a non- partner 
within their lifetime. This figure is a static average, though, 
and therefore does not capture repetitions of violence that 
women and girls experience or geographical variances in GBV 
prevalence.
The shadow pandemic
Across the world, as shelter- in- place or lockdown orders came 
into effect, there were spikes in reports of GBV. In Bogota, 
Colombia, police saw a tripling of calls to its 24/ 7 domestic 
violence hotline, while all other crime reports were down 
(Janetsky, 2020); in Australia, Google searches on domestic 
violence went up by 75 per cent (Hegarty and Tarzia, 2020). 
Media pieces from countries across the globe highlighted 
increased reports of GBV, particularly domestic violence 
(RTÉ, 2020). The reality is that many people – women and 
girls in particular – are stuck in close quarters with an abusive 
partner, parent or family member and previously existing 
tensions and equalities are exacerbated.
It is important to note that changes in reported rates of 
GBV are difficult to interpret in the short term, as there 
may have already been a previous upward or downward 
trend depending on context. Much of the data are likely 
incomparable, coming from various locations, sources and 
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services, such as hotlines, hospitals or police data. Regardless, 
actual prevalence rates of GBV are difficult to obtain ethically 
in any context, and the initial statistics coming in are alarming. 
Reported cases are usually lower than the actual prevalence 
of GBV, because many survivors do not seek help or report 
due to shame, stigma or fear of retaliation (Peterman et al, 
2020:  1). As shocking as the increases in reported GBV 
may have been for newsreaders across the world, however, 
they were unfortunately not surprising. Already existing 
gender inequalities – as well as prejudice based on disability 
or ethnicity and race – worsen during crises due to added 
stresses and tensions, resulting in the perpetration of GBV at 
increased rates.
In the case of COVID- 19, the difficult irony is that the 
very measures meant to protect the vast majority of the 
population – shelter- in- place and lockdown orders – are 
the same that endanger women and girls at the hands of 
perpetrators. So globally universal is the increased risk of 
GBV during COVID- 19 that UN Women has called it the 
‘shadow pandemic’ (UN Women, n.d.). It is apparent now 
more than ever that no society is immune to GBV and that 
crises call into question the protection of women, girls, and 
others vulnerable to violence.
Impacts of the shadow pandemic in the Global South
While the shadow pandemic is affecting women and girls 
across all corners of the globe, its impacts are particularly 
concerning in the Global South. In many low- and middle- 
income contexts, data show a higher tolerance towards 
violence against women and girls in society – as measured 
via an indicator of percentage of women who agree that a 
husband/ partner is justified in beating his wife/ partner 
under certain circumstances – coupled with fewer legal 
protections around domestic violence and rape (OECD, 
n.d.). The anticipated global economic downturn may have a 
more acute impact on livelihoods and poverty in the Global 
South, especially in areas with weak social protection systems, 
leading to financial or personal stresses that could exacerbate 
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already violent interpersonal relationships. These contextual 
factors, coupled with relatively low availability of, or access 
to, health services and psychosocial supports for survivors of 
violence, suggest that women and girls in the Global South 
may not receive the help they need. Gaps in the availability 
of essential healthcare are highest in sub- Saharan Africa and 
Southern Asia (WHO, 2017).
In humanitarian contexts characterized by breakdown of 
social structures and impunity for perpetrators, women and 
girls were already at incredible risk of experiencing GBV prior 
to COVID- 19. In addition to high rates of intimate partner 
violence, displaced women and girls are at risk of trafficking 
(IRC, 2015; IOM, 2019). Additionally, sexual exploitation 
of women and girls – for example, requiring sexual favours in 
exchange for goods – by humanitarian personnel is pervasive 
across food, shelter, cash and water and sanitation distribution 
and yet remains largely unaddressed (Global Women’s 
Institute, 2020). If left unaddressed, these forms of violence 
could become worse during COVID- 19.
The pandemic will also have severe impacts on girls in 
the Global South. While children across the globe are facing 
school closures that are predicted to have adverse impacts 
for years to come, girls in settings where child marriage and 
female genital mutilation (FGM) are practised face the gravest 
consequences. As girls are out of school and financial pressures 
within families mount, the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) predicts that there will be 13 million additional child 
marriages, as families seek to reduce expenditures (UNFPA, 
2020). Equally worrisome for girls, due to humanitarian and 
development programme disruption as a result of COVID- 19, 
UNFPA has estimated that two million more girls than usual 
will undergo FGM over the next decade (for reference, 
normally it is estimated that approximately three million 
girls and women undergo FGM annually) (UNFPA, 2020; 
World Health Organization, n.d.). In the approximately 30 
countries where FGM is often practised – primarily across the 
Horn of African and East Africa, as well as parts of the Middle 
East – this would amount to reversing what has been decades 
of positive progress in reducing rates (UNICEF, 2016).
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Responses to previous health emergencies have neglected the 
needs of survivors of GBV
Not only are women and girls in crises more likely to 
experience GBV, but previous public health emergencies 
point to alarming shortcomings regarding addressing the 
needs of survivors. When an epidemic arrives, there is the 
tendency for governments and aid agencies to shift their focus 
and resources almost entirely to the primary health response 
to the virus or disease, which can impact negatively on other 
routine services such as pre- and post- natal care and sexual 
and reproductive healthcare, for which resource allocation is 
already scarce (CARE, 2020).
In the case of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, Davies and Bennett (2016) found that maternal 
mortality rates rose by 75 per cent within 18 months. The 
impact on women’s health during the Ebola epidemic was 
widespread. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
conducted research on the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and found that survivors of GBV were 
less likely to seek care at clinics if they were bleeding, out of 
fear that they would erroneously be channelled through an 
Ebola Treatment Centre and consequently be exposed to the 
disease (McKay et al, 2019: 18). During the Zika epidemic, 
as another example, Oxfam (2017) found that among the 
women they surveyed in the Dominican Republic who 
suspected that they had the virus, 73 per cent did not seek 
medical help. According to focus group discussions, it was 
suspected that this high figure was due not only to difficulties 
in paying medical fees but also testimonies by women of 
abuse experienced within hospitals and high levels of GBV 
experienced on public transport (Oxfam, 2017).
In the above instances, the needs of survivors of GBV or 
increased threats of violence faded to the background within 
the primary health response to the virus, offering a warning to 
humanitarians as they respond to the COVID- 19 pandemic. 
The discussion of the impact of violence on women’s 
rights and survivors of GBV is also relatively absent in the 
literature: Davies and Bennett (2016) conducted a search on 
Scopus and found that only 1 per cent of articles between 
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2014 and 2016 explored the human rights or gendered 
impacts of Ebola and Zika. In sum, past experience does 
not bode well for the health and rights of survivors of GBV 
during COVID- 19.
Global outcry in response to GBV: will it result in action?
Despite the shortcomings of previous health crises regarding 
the protection of those who are vulnerable to GBV, the 
rhetorical response to the shadow pandemic on the part of 
global and multilateral leaders has been swift. In early April, 
United Nations Secretary General António Guterres said that 
‘violence is not confined to the battlefield and that for many 
women and girls, the threat looms largest where they should 
be safest: in their own homes’. Although evoking war language 
that many feminists view as problematic during a health cris 
(Enloe, 2020), this speech was received positively by many 
women’s rights organizations and feminist humanitarians, 
particularly because it called for specific action. Guterres 
urged all governments to ‘make prevention and redress of 
violence against women a key part of their national response 
plans to COVID19’ (Guterres, 2020a).
Shortly after this, the Director- General of the WHO, 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, also made a press statement, 
stating that, ‘There is never any excuse for violence’ and calling 
on countries to ‘include services for addressing domestic 
violence as an essential service that must continue during 
the COVID19 response’. Of particular importance is that 
Ghebreyesus referred to domestic violence services as essential 
services, which is indeed how the WHO classes them, despite 
the fact that they are often sidelined. These essential health 
services include emergency contraception, post- exposure 
Prophylaxis (PEP) to prevent HIV for survivors of rape and 
sexual assault, as well as psychological first aid and referrals to 
additional supports if desired or necessary for survivors of any 
form of GBV (WHO, n.d.).
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Now is the time to act
If women, girls and vulnerable people are not considered 
throughout all aspects of the COVID- 19 response, evidence 
from previous health crises indicates that this pandemic will 
be the next story of who was left behind. Given that GBV 
services are an essential health service, action must be taken 
to ensure that life- saving services for GBV survivors do not 
fall by the wayside but rather are maintained or implemented 
during the COVID- 19 humanitarian response.
In the immediate term, it is important to maintain as 
many GBV- related services for women and girls as possible. 
In the first half of 2020, NGOs globally quickly closed in- 
person supports for women and girls and scrambled to scale 
up remote services such as hotlines or virtual meeting spaces. 
Since then, however, there has already been crucial learning 
on this challenge. The International Medical Corps (IMC), 
IRC and Norwegian Church Aid issued joint guidance 
indicating that, wherever possible, in- person, life- saving 
services such as women and girls safe spaces (WGSS) should 
not be closed at first sight of COVID- 19 but instead adapted 
with safety measures. This guidance has particular salience 
when considering that certain estimations – such as the 
aforementioned increases in child marriage and FGM – are 
calculated partially on the disruption or halting of existing 
programmes.
In the medium and long term, as the COVID- 19 response 
is scaled up, governments, NGOs and humanitarians must 
work together to apply a gender lens to all programmes. Given 
the heightened risk of GBV in crises, this issue should feature 
prominently in the global Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 
and accompanying indicators. Such high- level attention 
would promote donor funding of GBV programmes, which 
represented only 0.12 per cent of the $41.5 billion allocated 
to humanitarian response during 2016– 2018 (IRC, 2019). 
Furthermore, increased funding allocated to violence against 
women and girls at an international and institutional level 
would in turn push NGOs to more seriously implement GBV 
response, prevention, mitigation and mainstreaming plans.
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Finally, the shadow pandemic also serves as a reminder 
for aid agencies to look within. First, there is a need for aid 
organizations to ensure that their own personnel are not 
perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) against 
fellow staff members and beneficiaries (IASC, 2015:  8), a 
problem which seriously calls into question the effectiveness 
of international aid and commitment to the principle of 
‘do no harm’. Second, as global movement is reduced and 
Western- based organizations are not able to easily deploy 
their surge capacities, now is the time for aid agencies to 
take more seriously the commitments of the Grand Bargain 
on localization, which aims to get more of committed 
humanitarian resources directly to those in need. This 
includes working with local women as knowledge bearers and 
agents of change within their communities. Now is the time 
to move the rhetoric of the potential transformative nature of 
humanitarian response into action.
Crises should not cast doubt on women’s rights
COVID- 19 is not only a crisis but a test. Risk of GBV rises 
during health crises, and COVID- 19 has already proven 
no different – if anything, shelter- in- place and lockdown 
measures render these crises more dangerous to women and 
girls who are trapped in close quarters with an abuser. Women 
and girls living in the Global South may face disproportionate 
impacts due to relatively higher social tolerance of violence 
in many contexts as well as inadequate access to healthcare, 
including psychosocial supports.
Time will crucially tell whether the rhetorical ambitions of 
multilateral leaders are realized. Now and into the foreseeable 
future, there is a need for continued leadership – from 
multilaterals, governments, NGOs and communities – for 
the protection of women, girls and other vulnerable groups 
to remain at the fore of the global response to COVID- 19. 
Violence should never be accepted as an inevitable symptom 
of a pandemic, and no crisis should cast doubt on the rights 
of those who are vulnerable or marginalized. The needs of 
survivors of GBV during COVID- 19 must not be forgotten.
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COVID- 19 in Africa
Patrick Onyango Mangen and 
Angela Veale
In January 2020, the World Health Organization declared 
the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease, COVID- 19, 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. In 
Africa, COVID- 19 cases continue to rise rapidly across the 
entire continent. Implications of the COVID- 19 public 
health response have exposed families, including children and 
youth, to multiple vulnerabilities. In Phase 1, lockdown, the 
economic and health impact of the infection, control and pre-
vention (ICP) public health responses has been severe, and in 
the longer term may even be ‘catastrophic’ (The Lancet Global 
Health, 2020: 612). This chapter describes the psychosocial 
implications of COVID- 19 for African communities, drawing 
on case studies from Uganda and South Africa.
The Ugandan government in particular showed leadership 
by responding quickly and decisively to the impending threat 
of COVID- 19, drawing on preparedness responses developed 
in relation to other viral outbreaks such as during the Ebola 
crisis. In Uganda, lockdown restrictions were introduced on 
18 March 2020 just before the first case of COVID- 19 in the 
country was detected. Public and private transportation was 
banned, public gatherings were suspended, shopping malls 
were shut down and a 7 pm curfew was instigated. Anguyo 
and Storer (2020) noted that among the 80 per cent of 
‘hand to mouth’ workers employed in the ‘gig’ economy and 
informal sector, COVID- 19 responses significantly disrupted 
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people’s ability to earn money. South Africa also implemented 
tough public health measures. Citizens could only undertake 
essential trips to buy groceries or seek medical assistance, and 
in some cases lockdown was enforced by the use of rubber 
bullets (The Guardian, 2020). The social aspects of infection, 
control and prevention severely stressed collective coping 
responses through impact on trust and reciprocal support. An 
increase in social isolation and loneliness has also been a marked 
feature of the impact of COVID- 19 lockdown restrictions. A 
recent South African survey carried out between 13 April and 
14 May during lockdown by the University of Johannesburg 
and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found 
that 60 per cent of South Africans surveyed suffered from 
stress. The second most cited emotion was fear or feeling 
scared (45 per cent). Feeling depressed or irritable accounted 
for 29 per cent of responses, 18 per cent of respondents 
were angry and 12 per cent happy. Importantly, compared 
to those aged 25 year and older, 18– 24 year- olds were more 
likely to report loneliness, boredom, anger and irritability 
(Bohler- Muller, 2020).
Survey responses also captured the economic impact of 
the crisis on South Africans. Between 85 and 89 per cent of 
respondents reported they were very concerned about the 
economic impact of the lockdown on their circumstances, 
while 60 per cent strongly agreed with the statement that 
they had difficulty paying their expenses (University of 
Johannesburg & HSRC, 2020). Economic factors also affect 
ICP compliance. In African contexts, in the Ebola crisis, the 
ability to act upon correct knowledge often conflicted with 
having access to resources to do so (Abramowitz et al, 2017). 
In the South African survey, the percentage of respondents 
who ran out of soap or hand sanitizer in the time period of the 
survey increased from 31 per cent to 40 per cent (University 
of Johannesburg & HSRC, 2020).
One of the most important findings from this survey, 
however, was that hunger emerged as a key mediating factor 
with respect to psychosocial wellbeing. Over the time period 
of the survey, the proportion of respondents who reported 
having gone to bed hungry increased from 33 per cent to 
43 per cent (University of Johannesburg & HSRC, 2020). 
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Those individuals that reported that they or their families had 
gone hungry experienced more stress and depression. In early 
June 2020, calls to South African ‘Childline’ increased by 25 
per cent over the previous two weeks, reaching over 11,000 
calls (UNICEF, 2020a). Children reported being worried 
about high levels of physical and emotional abuse, with new 
complaints relating to parents’ substance abuse at home. 
Children were anxious about hunger, returning to school and 
a loss of livelihoods – all of which were compounded by safety 
concerns (Huijbregts, 2020; UNICEF, 2020a). According to 
Save the Children (2020: 24): ‘One of the biggest risks for 
children in Sub- Sahara Africa remains the risk of COVID- 19 
becoming a hunger and livelihood crisis ahead of a public 
health crisis’.
These factors are likely to place severe stress on African 
communities in response to the crisis, straining collective 
resilience. An African definition of community resilience 
put forward by Ebersöhn (2019) draws on the metaphor 
of ‘flocking’ – that is, a community identifies those that are 
vulnerable and manages the distribution of its social resources. 
Flocking mobilizes social capital (for example, psychosocial 
support), cultural resources (in good times when we celebrate, 
as well as bad when we mourn together), collective resources 
(for example, food, labour, a car to collect groceries for each 
other or to take someone to the hospital), and economic 
resources (for example, small loans to begin and sustain 
businesses). Wherever possible, flocking assists individuals 
and families to get up again, to recover from adversity and 
not to be dependent on others. However, the survey cited 
previously suggests that community resilience was challenged 
by lockdown. While 70 per cent of South Africans surveyed 
supported lockdown, in response to a question whether, in 
the immediate future, COVID- 19 will be more likely to make 
South Africans feel more united and supportive of each other 
or alternatively more suspicious and less trusting, less than 
half, 48 per cent, believed South Africans would be more 
united, 28 per cent responded ‘more suspicious’, while 16 per 
cent did not know and 8 per cent said neither. Furthermore, 
over half of respondents (53 per cent) believed the worst was 
yet to come.
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In summary, lockdown public health responses required 
to mitigate the impact of coronavirus have severely stressed 
collective and locally relevant resources and coping responses. 
Supporting community resilience is an overlooked strategy 
in efforts to mitigate public health emergencies (McKay 
and De Carbonnel, 2016), yet the learning from the earlier 
Ebola crisis in East and West Africa indicated the importance 
of engagement with communities ‘Efforts in the direction 
of awareness and community involvement could prove to 
be a better strategy to control the [Ebola] epidemic and 
root the response in social participation’ (Pellecchia et al, 
2015:  2) using existing community support networks and 
local government social services structures. A key priority 
therefore in developing an effective public health response 
to COVID- 19 is to understand the impact of ICP measures 
on community resources and how resilience can be built back 
through local support systems.
The case studies presented in the analysis below are based 
on two organizations with whom the first author works 
with. TPO Uganda engages with communities to improve 
mental health and socioeconomic wellbeing. The Regional 
Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPSSI,) based in South 
Africa, is a regional organization encompassing 14 countries 
whose mission is to mainstream psychosocial support into 
programming in East and Southern Africa. Both organizations 
are involved in leadership roles in developing psychosocial 
support for COVID- 19- affected communities.
Psychosocial impact of COVID- 19 on communities and 
programming responses
Families affected by HIV/ AIDS and impact on vaccine- preventable 
diseases
In a TPO Uganda project targeting children and families 
affected by HIV and AIDS in South- Western Uganda, persons 
living with HIV and AIDS have not been able to access routine 
services due to COVID- 19. The most affected are patients 
that need assisted support to meet clinic appointments. The 
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7 am to 7 pm curfew has restricted the number of activities 
field staff can implement. Since travel by public means 
is constrained, caregivers cannot find their way to health 
centres. The most affected are caregivers of children that are 
undergoing treatment. People have become scared of visiting 
health centres due to fear of infection1. Parental fears about 
potential exposure to COVID- 19 is also negatively impacting 
Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus (DPT3) vaccination rates. 
In South Africa, for example, April 2020 vaccination rates for 
DPT3 were 20 to 30 per cent below that of months preceding 
the implementation of ICP public health measures (UNICEF, 
2020a). Similarly, there has been a sharp decrease in measles 
coverage, sparking fears of an outbreak in the North West and 
Western Cape (UNICEF, 2020b).
Impact on sexual violence survivors
The public health system for mental health services is quite 
under- resourced in Uganda. In a TPO project supporting 
survivors of violence in northern Uganda they require, 
at a minimum, a three- point service delivery structure; a 
functional health structure to provide screening and post- 
event prophylaxis; a social worker to provide psychosocial 
support and trauma counselling; and legal aid support in 
addition to law enforcement. In a normal environment, 
TPO facilitates the coordination of a harmonized response. 
However, with COVID- 19, this service structure has been 
disrupted and rendered ineffective. Survivors of violence 
are taking longer to access the minimal service package as 
providers are unavailable, while need is increasing.
Impact on mental health and wellbeing of refugee youth
TPO Uganda undertook a study to assess the impacts of the 
COVID- 19 pandemic on the mental health and wellbeing 
of young people in Kiryandongo refugee settlement.2 Focus 
group discussions were carried out with the youth in July 
2020. A total of 25 youth (15 males and 10 females) ranging 
from 13 to 28 years participated. They were taken through a 
series of questions about young people’s experience of how the 
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pandemic has affected their mental health and their opinions 
on how best the government, NGOs and community could 
help them cope.
Alcoholism:  From the discussions, it was noted that the 
youth have resorted to taking alcohol because of the 
disease, as it has no cure, and they believe they have to 
enjoy their last days on earth.
Early marriage:  Closure of schools has left many young 
people idle and with no hope for the future. They are 
stressed and think reading books when they are not 
going to do exams is waste of time. In addition, they 
have been hearing rumours that they are likely to repeat 
their classes and they would rather drop out of school. 
Most girls now think the only option is to get married. 
One of the girls had this to say:  “Before coronavirus 
while at school we were given some necessities like 
sanitary towels, now schools are closed I don’t know 
what next. I even talk to myself a lot because of the 
many thoughts corona has brought and the only option 
I have is to get married and get such necessities”.
Early pregnancy:  Many young girls are getting pregnant 
and some have had abortions, putting their lives in 
danger. One of the girls said:
‘We are stressed by poverty and when some men promise 
to buy us some basic needs we may end up sleeping with 
them. In addition, you see churches were closed which 
were keeping us busy since we would spend time there 
singing and fellow- shipping. This has forced some young 
people to join bad company and end up having sex.’
Fear and phobia of police:  Young people have developed 
a fear of the police as a result of the COVID- 19 
preventative measures guidelines which they enforce. 
Most young people panic and run away when they 
see them.
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Separation between parents and children:  Some parents 
and children were separated in different counties and 
districts due to lockdown and border- crossing closures 
causing a lot of stress.
Poverty in homes has increased, which has led to 
misunderstandings among families and this in turn 
affects young people. The youth reported that they have 
become desperate due to lack of basic necessities. Some 
youth such as bodaboda (motor bike taxi) riders have 
resorted to stealing due to loss of employment.
Despite the adverse impacts of coronavirus on the mental 
health of young people, the focus group participants reported 
that the crisis has also had some positive impact. As they are not 
in school, children and youth are helping parents in gardens and 
this has increased crop production. Some youth reported that 
the crisis has brought them closer to their parents as they are 
getting to spend more time with them. They have been able to 
work with parents as ‘apprentices’ such as in the construction 
of houses and some young people feel they can use these skills 
in the future. The recommendations made by young people 
to address the challenges they experience included provision 
of initial start- up capital for small businesses to revive those 
lost since capital has been used to meet basic needs; to provide 
sanitary towels to girls even when they are not at school or 
training them on how to make them; to enforce laws that 
govern selling of alcohol, especially to persons below the age 
of 18; to enforce laws against early child marriages; provide 
them with radios to get clear communication and also help 
them learn during this period as schooling had moved to 
radios and online; devise all possible means how they can do 
their exams and avoid repeating their classes; give permits and 
transport assistance for people stranded in other districts to 
reunite with their families. The young people argued that the 
fact that the pandemic is new and has affected every sphere 
and aspect of life means it needs a collective effort from all 
community members. They themselves would welcome a 
chance to participate in or volunteer to support any project 
that would aim to support their mental health needs.
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Psychosocial responses
Rapid ethnographic research is central to appreciating local 
understandings related to COVID- 19. In the Ebola crisis, 
there was a failure to take sociocultural beliefs, narratives 
and practices seriously, which impeded infection prevention, 
compliance and control (Abramowitz et al, 2017; Manguvo & 
Mafuvadze, 2015; Wilkinson & Fairhead, 2017). Adherence 
responses to ICP public measures health across a range of 
disease outbreaks in Africa shows varied practices as a result 
of different understandings of quarantine protocols, social 
pressures and cultural factors (Webster et al, 2020).
In both Uganda and South Africa, TPO Uganda and 
REPSSI are seeking to maximize the use of radio and social 
media to enhance behaviour change and reduce stigma. Radio 
has a greater reach than social media as many households do 
not have internet access (UNESCO, 2020). Pre- recorded 
psycho- education messages, parenting and positive coping 
messages are being used to reach out to communities with 
ICP COVID- 19 information to address misconceptions and 
cultural risk practices (greeting by shaking of hands, hugging, 
coughing and spitting in public). This utilizes research from 
reliable sources (WHO, Ministry of Health) on common 
means of transmission, prevention measures, signs and 
symptoms, behaviours and practices that encourage the spread 
of the coronavirus disease, benefits of timely diagnosis, caring 
tips for a person who has recovered from COVID- 19 and 
emergency contact numbers. Radio messages are designed 
differently for women, youth and men (preferences regarding 
programming style, languages, theme music for programme 
signature tune, times of day) and use humour, drama and 
personal experiences to emphasize key points and messages. 
Given the demands of physical distancing in the context of 
increasing psychosocial stressors, TPO Uganda has responded 
with the development of telecounselling. This innovation 
grew exponentially from April to July 2020.
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Conclusion
COVID- 19 and public health mitigation efforts have had 
a devastating effect on the livelihoods and psychosocial 
wellbeing of Ugandans and South Africans. Although deaths 
are concentrated among older people, youth aged 18 to 25 
years – who make up over 60 per cent of the population of 
Uganda – have been significantly affected in ways that have 
been so far poorly understood. The analysis here indicates 
that school closures due to lockdown and containment 
strategies impact girls and boys differently. A key priority 
is mainstreaming psychosocial concerns in multi- sectorial 
responses so rapid ethnographic assessment can inform these 
in culturally appropriate, cost- effective ways.
Notes
1. Anti- retroviral Therapy Coordinator, Kabale Regional Referral 
Hospital, Uganda, June 18 2020.
2. TPO Uganda Report, Impact of COVID- 19 on Mental Health and 
Well Being of Youth, Kiryandongo District, 5 July 2020. Survey and 
report compiled by Kakai Bridget, Norah Nabwire, Twongyeirwe 
Amon and Rachael Atuheire, TPO, Uganda.
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The Economics of 
COVID- 19 in Italy and 
Lessons for Africa
Giovanni Farese
In early 2020, Italy was badly hit by coronavirus. For several 
weeks it was the epicentre of the pandemic in Europe. It was 
then the first liberal democracy to implement restrictive meas-
ures (the ‘lockdown’) to fight the spread of the virus, and 
also the first to see positive results from it. As the situation 
improved week after week, it became possible to draw some 
lessons from the Italian case for countries which are still suf-
fering spikes in cases. This chapter will look at the economic 
consequences of, and responses to, the virus, trying to shed a 
light on the analogies and differences with African countries 
in particular. By leveraging Italy’s case, the ultimate aim of 
this chapter is to provide a compass to navigate through the 
complexities of this multi- faceted crisis.
There is a general belief about a coronavirus trade- off 
between economics and health (livelihood or lives?). The 
truth is that the lockdown has different meanings and impacts 
in different contexts, and lockdown is not necessarily the only 
solution, nor the best – depending on available equipment, 
the spread of the virus, and other factors (the now famous 
three T’s:  testing, tracking, treatment). Equally, unlocking 
does not immediately nor necessarily spur economic recovery 
as social distancing measures and, in general, uncertainty 
over the future continue to limit spending and investment 
(Sorrentino, 2020). This is why the study of specific cases 
with their own specific conditions is so important.
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Dealing with it
To begin with, it would be useful to look at a chronology on 
how the virus spread in Italy. In January 2020 there were the 
first two cases in the country (two Chinese tourists, who were 
quickly isolated and treated). A six- month state of emergency 
was then declared by the government one day later (in May 
it was prolonged until the end of 2020). The Italian ‘patient 
zero’ was reported on 21 February in Codogno, Lombardy. 
The first so- called ‘red zones’, where quarantine was enforced, 
were established a few days later. The lockdown (so- called 
Phase 1) started 9 March 2020. It ended on 4 May (so- called 
Phase 2) when a partial unlocking started. On 1 May, most 
businesses were permitted to reopen. By the end of July 2020, 
the total number of cases was around 240,000, with around 
35,000 deaths. It is notable that more than two- thirds of the 
deaths were from the north of Italy (Italy’s best- equipped 
area in terms of health provision and its richest area) and 
about half of them from one region only, namely Lombardy. 
This geographical divide is one feature of Italy’s case. This of 
course affected responses, with some regions implementing 
stricter rules within the framework of national guidelines.
The Italian health system – one of Europe’s most advanced 
– was put under stress very quickly and after two decades of 
disinvestment in the sector, it struggled. Hospitals and other 
buildings were converted into dedicated coronavirus treatment 
centres. Doctors, nurses and volunteers unremittingly 
supported much of the effort and this saved many lives, but a 
key weakness was that the number of tests was insufficient and 
results took days to process. This took precious time away and 
many lives were lost as a result. This caused anger and grief, 
and some social unrest. All in all, Italy’s response in these 
early days of infection showed that an immediate lockdown 
is critical (even though we now know that the virus had been 
circulating in Italy from at least January). Furthermore, there 
is a lesson that adequate availability of medical equipment, 
particularly PPE, and preparedness are essential. International 
cooperation is also fundamental. Masks had to be imported 
from developing countries where production had been 
relocated previously due to globalization. Stocks were 
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sometimes confiscated by exporting countries trying to meet 
their own needs. The geopolitical implications of exporting 
medical equipment was also a part of the story, with China 
at the forefront through its so called ‘donation diplomacy’. 
Not surprisingly, the EU now aims at recovering what is 
termed a ‘strategic health sovereignty’ (French- German 
Initiative, 2020).
The public’s understanding of what was going on was 
an important factor. The flow of information from public 
authorities was, on the whole, regular and transparent. 
However, it was not always consistent from one region to 
another, nor always prudent, with leaking of the imminent 
lockdown causing massive flows of people from the north 
to the south of Italy. Overall, however, it was effective. 
Citizens responded well to the confinement and showed a 
sense of discipline. Information in general played a crucial 
role in shaping a positive response. But some sources, 
especially on the internet and on social networks, were 
deliberately inaccurate. This was not just an Italian feature. 
It is important to know that misinformation or ‘fake news’ 
quickly became part of a larger geopolitical battle around the 
nature, responsibilities and consequences of the virus aimed 
at weakening liberal democracy, its response capacity and its 
values. Tackling misinformation is thus an essential feature 
of the battle (European Commission, 2020). There is also 
a constitutional- legal and, in perspective, political issue not 
to be overlooked. This is not the topic of this paper, but it 
is worth noting that in many places, the pandemic provided 
an occasion to introduce various forms of restriction upon 
freedoms. In Italy, everything happened within the framework 
of the Constitution; but the fact that most of the measures 
were taken, for reasons of urgency, through prime ministerial 
decrees rather than law- decrees (by the government), or 
laws (passed by the Parliament), nurtured a debate on 
the effectiveness, role and limits of government in liberal 
democracies vis- à- visauthoritarian regimes. This can create a 
prospective problem, especially if the pandemic strikes back 
and if liberal democracies fail to face it, thus paving the way 
for forms of illiberal democracy.
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The economic and social impact
In Italy, the economic consequences will be severe. GDP 
was expected to fall by about 10– 12 per cent in 2020 (IMF, 
2020). Unemployment will rise from 10 per cent in 2019 to 
11.6 in 2020 and is expected to only partly reduce in 2021 
(to 11 per cent). Italy is anticipating losing half a million jobs. 
Note that after the Great Recession, one million jobs were 
lost between 2007 and 2013 and it took some four years to 
recover them. The economic consequences of the pandemic 
will thus remain for a long time. The crisis has precipitated a 
dual shock to demand and supply, due to the disruption in 
supply chains – including time- lags – and the lockdown. It 
seems to be common to all countries affected by the virus. 
The economies affected by it number 170 in 2020 (Gopinath, 
2020), but the shock is clearly asymmetric because the impact 
is different around the world. Three factors – apart from 
openness to trade – can make the impact different. They are 
relevant for Italy and – on a different scale – can be relevant 
for other countries, including African countries.
The first factor is the scale and dimensions of the informal 
sector. In Italy, it accounts for about 15 per cent of GDP (in 
Africa, 85 per cent of workers are in the informal sector [ILO, 
2018]).
To reduce the economic impact on workers not covered 
by automatic stabilizers, the Italian government introduced 
an ‘emergency income’. Moreover, in May 2020, at the end 
of the lockdown, it passed a law for the regularization of 
undocumented foreign workers, meant for farmhands (but 
also caregivers and domestic workers) needed for harvesting. 
It was also meant to deal with dangerous situations such as 
illegal tent camps in the countryside of Apulia and Calabria 
where migrants live in dire sanitary conditions in the midst of 
the coronavirus emergency – the vast majority of farmhands 
in Southern Italy come from Africa. The law has three 
goals: supporting the economy; promoting human rights; and 
improving health conditions and welfare. It was accompanied 
by a harsh debate within Italian public opinion and marked 
the first positive cultural shift in migrant policy in many years.
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The second factor is the share of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) in the total. In Italy, this share is particularly high (98 
per cent) in the European context (where the average is 90 per 
cent). In Italy, 95 per cent of them are micro- businesses with 
fewer than ten employees. This is one of the reasons why the 
impending economic crisis will be more severe in Italy than 
in other places, such as Germany (Doerr and Gambacorta, 
2020). SMEs are the backbone of African economies, too. 
Their survival is, therefore, absolutely vital. SMEs’ financial 
resilience is on the whole limited. Granting them access to 
credit is crucial not only to safeguard productive capacity, 
but also jobs, and, in the medium run, state fiscal capacity 
itself. On this front, the Italian government introduced a 
state guarantee on new loans for firms of all sizes affected 
by the crisis. The guarantee is 100 per cent for small loans 
up to 25,000 euros. Capital injection through the Loans and 
Deposits Fund (a public bank) in medium- sized enterprises 
was also allowed. This was possible under the new State aid 
Temporary Framework recently approved by the European 
Commission. These are ways in which the state can take 
action, but they all affect our third factor.
The third factor is fiscal space. The cost of this crisis will be 
mainly borne by the public sector (Draghi, 2020) in the long 
run, which is the opposite to what happened with the Great 
Recession, when the burden was, once the financial crisis was 
considered to be over, shifted to the private sector via austerity 
measures to reduce the public debt. Yet, Italy’s fiscal space is 
limited. This year, Italy’s deficit will bounce from 2 to 10 per 
cent of GDP, so public debt will rise from 135 to 155 per cent 
of GDP (DEF, 2020) as interest payments accumulate. These 
developments were possible thanks to the activation of the 
general ‘escape clause’ in the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact, 
which normally imposes strict constraints on public finances. 
The European Central Bank is also playing an active role in 
supporting state financing with its new pandemic emergency 
purchase programme. Future tensions in financial markets and 
over sovereign bond spreads must be watched closely. Italy 
will have to rely substantially on one or more of the European 
ad hoc funds and instruments available. The Recovery Plan, 
in particular, could sustain Italy’s much- needed investment in 
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infrastructure and other public goods. As with all countries 
caught in the wave of this pandemic, public spending needs to 
be qualified and reoriented properly. As a side point, the lack 
of health equipment perhaps exposed the toll of widespread 
tax evasion on public finances. Fiscal space is further limited in 
developing countries and many African countries in particular. 
At a time when governments’ budgets are under pressure to 
deal with the health crisis and its economic consequences, 
debt payments could be a serious diversion of scarce resources.
There is also a huge difference on this point between 
advanced countries, such as Italy, and developing countries. 
High levels of savings (and this is particularly true for Italy 
with 4 trillion euros of financial assets held by households), 
financial depth and low interest rates enable them to 
mobilize huge fiscal resources without raising interest rates 
too much or facing hyper- inflation. Notwithstanding the 
relative advantages of being an advanced country, Italy’s 
public finances will still need to be managed prudently to 
prevent future shocks. Furthermore, a lot is being done by 
non- state actors. In Italy, the Catholic Church and NGOs 
like the Sant’Egidio Community have been key in supporting 
the homeless, migrants and those in need in general. Private 
donors are playing their part with generosity. As we know, 
community solidarity is one of Italy’s strengths, also on the 
financial side. It is clear that Italy, as with countries across 
the Global South, will need much more, including substantial 
support from international governmental and financial 
organizations. This is clearly in the interest of the EU, for 
example, as a whole. If Southern Europe collapses, then 
Northern Europe may collapse too. This brings in a more 
general lesson. This is the first truly global crisis. The Great 
Depression of 1929 was not, and even the world wars were 
not. During the pandemic, Pope Francis said that “we are all 
on the same boat”. It is crucial to understand that ‘all’ means 
the human family, while the ‘boat’ is the entire planet.
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Looking forward
As said above, the consequences of the pandemic will stay with 
us for a long time and they will alter and shape in new ways 
economic and social developments for many years to come. 
There are of course many points of concern. Here, we will 
only mention a number of pressing ones. In keeping with the 
nature of this chapter, they primarily apply to Italy, but their 
lessons can be generalized and are presented for the Global 
South to consider. The first concern is the risk of an increasing 
economic and social divergence within the country, between 
regions (the economic gap between North and South Italy is 
rooted in its history), between productive sectors (tourism, 
for example, which represents 13 per cent of Italy’s GDP 
and was badly hit), and between workers, especially those in 
the informal sector or with short- term contracts and those in 
more secure employment. The impact on low- skill services 
from this crisis will be huge. They have historically played the 
role of an employment buffer in Italy (Viesti, 2020).
The second concern is the risk of weakening the long- term 
accumulation of human capital. School closures have been 
mandated by 143 countries with 130 countries imposing 
country- wide closures (Africa’s Pulse, 2020). Less than 20 
per cent of the African population has access to the internet, 
compared with 90 per cent in advanced countries. But socially 
and geographically differentiated access to the internet is 
everywhere. This is a problem for all, even though access to the 
internet does not necessarily equal human capital formation. 
It is just an example of how limited access to resources can 
limit human rights.
The third concern is the risk of a stronger populism taking 
control of national politics and, consequently, of international 
politics. The coronavirus has hit the world during a historical 
phase in which nationalist and populist leaders are already 
powerful in some countries and could strengthen in others, 
especially if and when economic and social conditions 
deteriorate. International cooperation is of the essence, but 
also economic solidarity to deal with the crisis, and a ‘me- first’ 
attitude will do nothing but exacerbate dangerous economic 
and political conditions. Few voices have been raised to 
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stress this point, or provide practical and viable solutions 
(Berglof et al, 2020). What we need is good information, 
good governance and good international relations (Savona, 
2020). Good governance, in particular, needs what in 
monetary policy is referred to as ‘forward guidance’. We 
need to distinguish again – as in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal – relief from recovery and recovery from reform, 
both at the national and the international level. Failure to 
do so will hinder reconstruction. Proper programming and 
sequencing of these different stages (these three R’s:  relief, 
recovery, reconstruction), which partly and inevitably 
overlap, will require different approaches and resources, and 
are essential to guide the public’s expectations, to manage 
new consumption patterns and to target investment in times 
of uncertainty. These lessons are pertinent to Italy and the 
countries of Africa alike.
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COVID- 19 Lockdowns 
in Africa
Their Effects and Challenges
Nazarius Mbona Tumwesigye, Claire 
Biribawa, Jackline Mosinya Nyaberi, 
Cissie Namanda, Glorious Atukunda 
and Lillian Ayebale
It is necessary for African leaders and policymakers to utilize 
the rare opportunity opened up by the COVID- 19 outbreak 
to unite behind a common purpose  and  strengthen public 
health systems and disease surveillance. Such a unity against 
the   pandemic will make it easier for the World Bank and 
other donor or lending institutions to mitigate its negative 
effects. Strengthening regional cooperation of all health insti-
tutions in Africa and activation of stricter policies at the ports 
of entry, such as screening, testing and isolation of confirmed 
cases, will go a long way to forestall unexpected outbreaks.
This chapter provides a general overview of how a few selected 
African countries have responded to COVID- 19 and a critical 
view of the effects of the responses in six countries (Uganda, 
Rwanda, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa). These 
countries were selected based on the intensity of the COVID- 
19 response, their alarming COVID- 19 situation and national 
events that could have affected the epidemic curve. By 30 
March 2020, Uganda, Rwanda and South African govern-
ment mitigation and response measures were rated above 90 
per cent stringency according to the University of Oxford 
COVID- 19 Government Response Tracker (University of 
Oxford, 2020). Kenya and Nigeria are among the top ten 
countries in Africa with the highest number of COVID- 19 
cases. Malawi was among the last African countries to confirm 
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COVID- 19 cases, and after it held its presidential elections on 
23 June 2020 there was a rise in the number of cases.
General COVID- 19 situation in selected countries
Figure 14.1 shows the cumulative curves for Covid- 19 cases 
in the selected countries. Most countries saw their first cases 
in March 2020. Cases were generally few in April, but grew 
most visibly in May 2020. In May and June, the growth in 
cases was exponential for South Africa and Kenya, but slowest 
for Uganda and Rwanda. The curve for Nigeria shows a steady 
and near- linear growth to place the country among those 
with the highest number of cases. Compared to other East 
African countries, Kenya had the highest rise in the number of 
cases. In Malawi the number of infections there has surpassed 
Uganda and Rwanda. In the paragraphs below we narrate 
possible explanations for the curves. This is followed by a 
subsection on possible ways forward for different countries.
South Africa relaxed the lockdown early but reinstated it, 
with a ban on the sale of alcohol later. The level of stringency 
of the measures did not correlate with the level of containment 
of the spread of COVID- 19, although statistics indicate that 
the number of recorded cases of the virus started to soar three 
weeks after the measures were eased (Brown, 2020). Over 
time these mitigation measures have been eased in various 
countries (Figure 14.2). Malawi’s intervention has remained 
lukewarm throughout the COVID- 19 pandemic so far.
Details on each country
Uganda
Uganda reported its first case of COVID- 19 on 21 March 
2020. According to the University of Oxford COVID- 19 
Government Response Tracker, Uganda rated above a 90 
per cent stringency level on measures instituted to tackle 
the COVID- 19 outbreak. The government instituted a 
partial lockdown by banning transport using public means 
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(14- seater taxis and commercial motorcyclists) on 25 March 
2020 and private vehicle transport on 31 March 2020. 
Only ambulances, vehicles driven by local authorities or 
people working in essential services were given permits 
to drive. People in need of emergency care had to request 
the permission of local authorities to travel, since driving 
anywhere without express permission could result in arrest 
and having the vehicle impounded. All businesses were closed 
except for food markets and essential services like healthcare. 
Private vehicles and businesses that do not attract crowds 
were allowed to operate from 26 May 2020.
As of 8 August 2020, six COVID- 19 related deaths had 
been reported out of 1,267 confirmed cases (MOH, 2020a). 
Most health resources have been redirected and committed 
to fight COVID- 19, with less attention to other services and 
continuity of care for other diseases (Kamulegeya et al, 2020). 
Figure 14.1 Cumulative Covid- 19 cases in selected countries
NB: Left- hand vertical axis is for Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Malawi while the right- hand vertical 
axis is for South Africa and Nigeria. Data in the graph were as of 11 July 2020.
Source of data: EU open data portal (EU, 2020).
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Lack of access to health services as a result of restriction/ ban 
on transport led to deterioration in the health of vulnerable 
populations (Bell et al, 2020). Now that the government has 
eased restrictions, it is expected that access to health services 
will improve, but the number of COVID- 19 cases are bound 
to increase because enforcement of COVID- 19 guidelines 
will be more difficult.
The national presidential, parliament and local election 
process that has started across the country with campaigns 
may escalate the COVID- 19 pandemic on the continent. 
Malawi is an example of this, where the number of reported 
cases rose sharply after the recent elections (MOH, 2020b).
Kenya
Kenya recorded its first case of COVID- 19 on 12 March 2020 
(John Hopkins University, 2020). In March 2020, all schools, 
institutions of learning and places of worship were closed and 
working from home was highly encouraged. The lockdown 
included closure of all borders for passenger traffic, a ban on 
Figure 14.2 Chronology of interventions
+The lockdown in Kenya and Nigeria affected hotspots and a few cities.
Colour codes: Red=Hard lockdown; Orange=lockdown with reduced stringency; Yellow=mild 
intervention; Yellow/ white- most restrictions lifted. Source: multiple online newspapers and reports.
(Source: the author)
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shaking hands and approval of a law requiring the wearing 
of masks in public. Anyone found in public without a face 
mask risked being jailed or having to pay a fine of Ksh 20,000 
(US$200). In April, there was partial lockdown in terms 
of restraining movements and a curfew from 7 pm to 5 am 
and a ban on inter- county movement instituted. Screening 
of truck drivers passing through the borders with Uganda 
and Tanzania was enforced. The majority of cases reported 
in counties close to borders were among long- distance lorry 
drivers. In addition, restaurants and eateries were closed but 
in late May reopened for takeaway services.
With 25,138 cases and 413 deaths as of 8 August 2020 
(John Hopkins University, 2020), Kenya is among the worst- 
affected countries in Africa and has continued recording high 
numbers of new cases (Hale et al, 2020). On 7 July 2020, 
the country relaxed most restrictions, except the curfew that 
runs from 9 pm to 4 am. COVID- 19 restrictions in Kenya did 
not yield similar effects on the epidemic curve as in Uganda 
and Rwanda largely because the extent of the restrictions 
and enforcement were different. Nevertheless, the country 
could have been worse affected without these restrictions. 
The country is now experiencing a concatenation of negative 
effects of COVID- 19, including increases in both morbidity 
and mortality. The health system is overwhelmed, resulting 
in adopting home- based care for the non- critical cases and 
the economic effects on businesses are enormous. There is 
a sharp rise in the unemployment level and mental health 
challenges, and social stigma associated with COVID- 19 and 
gender- based violence (GBV) has increased (GOK, 2020).
Kenya needs a paradigm shift to revamp its health system 
building blocks. Secondly, there is a need for context- specific 
information, education and communication and campaigns in 
order to demystify misconceptions about COVID- 19, such as 
it being the normal flu, for example. Thirdly, the government 
should lay out strategies to fight stigma associated with 
COVID- 19 and reduce GBV. Fourthly, the government in 
collaboration with other stakeholders should institutionalize 
a fund for responding to the most vulnerable household and 
individual needs, including food and medical care.
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Malawi
On 2 April 2020, Malawi confirmed its first three cases of 
COVID- 19 and had on 27 March closed all its international 
borders and banned air travel, except for essential health and 
other supplies and returning Malawian citizens or residents. 
Malawian residents and nationals arriving from severely 
COVID- 19- affected countries were subjected to mandatory 
self- or institutional quarantine. Schools and universities were 
closed. A ban on public gatherings of more than 100 people 
was imposed (UNECA, 2020). All offices were advised to 
work in shifts, except those working in essential services. On 
14 April, a 21- day lockdown was imposed but was shortly 
overturned by the courts with an argument that more 
consultation was needed to prevent harm to the poorest and 
most vulnerable. By 8 August 2020, the country had 4,624 
cases and 143 deaths (John Hopkins University, 2020).
The impact of the response is not yet evident on the 
epidemic curve. There are many factors to this but the holding 
of national elections and visible interaction of people without 
social distancing and use of face masks could have played a 
role in the increase of COVID- 19 cases in the country. The 
country’s healthcare system experienced several financial, 
infrastructural and human resource challenges. Healthcare 
financing is highly dependent on external support from 
international organizations and foreign governments and may 
face funding cuts from developed countries which have been 
critically affected by the pandemic (Gadabu, 2020:  413– 
429). The Malawi government has therefore instituted 
a COVID- 19 Emergency Response and Health Systems 
Preparedness project, which has received funding. The project 
will provide funding towards detection, surveillance, response 
and system strengthening, activities prioritized in the Malawi 
COVID- 19 preparedness and response plan. COVID- 19 is 
known to be particularly dangerous for those with underlying 
health conditions and, in Malawi, a significant proportion of 
the population falls into that vulnerable category having been 
infected by HIV/ AIDS (Gadabu, 2020). The way forward 
for Malawi will be more testing, intensified contact tracing 
and imposing targeted lockdowns, but with mitigation 
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measures to protect the most vulnerable populations (World 
Bank, 2020a). Needed measures include provision of food 
and basic necessities. Hopefully, the government will borrow 
or get more support grants from donors to support the 
COVID- 19 fight.
South Africa
With 553,000 cases and 10,210 deaths as of 8 August 2020 
(John Hopkins University, 2020), South Africa has the highest 
number of confirmed cases on the African continent and the 
fifth in the world. Without intervention, South Africa would 
likely follow the path of countries that delayed implementing 
measures designed to slow the pandemic (Arndt et al, 2020). 
The arrival of the virus in South Africa saw an increase in 
the dissemination of misinformation about the virus on 
social media, which delayed preventative actions against the 
disease (Davis, 2020). The first COVID- 19 case was reported 
on 1 March 2020 (Arndt et al, 2020). From 23 March, the 
country went under lockdown until 16 April; which was then 
extended for two weeks. The country instituted an alert system 
whereby levels of restriction could be imposed by the National 
Command Council. Under the system, different levels of alert 
could be declared in specific provinces and districts based on 
epidemiological trends. This started on 1 May 2020, and 
from 1 June the national restrictions were further eased. On 
12 July, the state of disaster was extended until 15 August 
2020 and the alcohol ban was reintroduced along with a new 
curfew from 9 pm until 4 am (Williams, 2020).
Stringent measures taken at the beginning worked well 
to reduce the daily number of cases. However, the cost of 
enforcement was heavy. There were widespread reports 
of shortages of pharmaceuticals, with many areas seeing 
panic buying of food and other essential grocery items, 
with consequent shortages. Business closures had direct 
and indirect economic effects during the lockdown, which 
continued after it ended. In informal settlements, people’s 
biggest fear was not being able to return to work and feed 
their families (Stiegler and Bouchard, 2020). The current rise 
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in infections could have come from people who moved back 
to their workplaces (Meldrum, 2020).
Lockdowns targeted at COVID- 19 hotspots and risky 
activities, keeping a ban on bars and other areas that attract 
crowds, will go a long way to tame the virus. The country has 
done it before and is able to do it again, while being mindful 
of the negative effect of the response on the most vulnerable. 
Provision of basic necessities to the vulnerable will minimize 
the risk of infection in markets and other places they go.
Nigeria
Nigeria offers another unique example in the COVID- 19 
pandemic fight in Africa. It has the largest population and 
largest economy on the continent. Responses to COVID- 19 
in Nigeria started in January 2020. The National Emergency 
Operation Centers were immediately activated to trace 
and test all contacts of those identified as infected, and the 
Presidential Task Force was inaugurated. Nigeria confirmed 
its first case on 27 February 2020 and the cumulative 
number of cases was 46,140 with 942 deaths by 9 August 
2020 (John Hopkins University, 2020). The lockdown 
has been eased as the number of cases continues to rise. 
The government has taken numerous health, social and 
economic measures to cushion the impact of COVID- 19. 
These measures include community engagement, heightened 
surveillance, field epidemiological investigations, rapid 
identification of suspected cases, isolation, diagnosis, contact 
tracing, monitoring and follow- up of persons of interests, 
and conditional cash transfers to poor households across the 
country (Tijjani and Ma, 2020: 1– 4).
Measures taken against COVID- 19 did not have visible 
effects on the epidemic curve, but the situation could have 
been worse without them. The country has a federal system 
of government and each state can impose or lift restrictions 
at any time they see fit. Varying timelines for mitigation 
measures across different states could have contributed to 
the high burden of COVID- 19 across the country. Complex 
humanitarian settings of displaced people in the north- east of 
the country, where there is an ongoing insurgency, will pose 
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a challenge. Guidelines for protection against COVID- 19 are 
difficult to enforce in such circumstances.
Nigeria needs more engagement with all states to 
establish a more coordinated COVID- 19 response. Delays in 
implementation by one state may put other states in danger. 
Within- state lockdowns targeted at COVID- 19 hotspots and 
other affected areas will go a long way to contain the epidemic. 
However, these measures should include safety nets for the 
vulnerable. More effort is needed to strengthen the country’s 
disease response and preparedness capability as raised by 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Joint External 
Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations (IHR) 
core capacities in 2017 (WHO, 2017). There is a need to 
strengthen the capacity of the public sector across the board. 
This may be done through continuous training.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s public health response to COVID- 19 has been 
impressive and that is why it is the first country in sub- 
Saharan Africa whose citizens are allowed to travel to the 
EU. The response was systematic and was backed by the 
President and security forces (IGC, 2020). Right before its 
first reported case on 14 March, Rwanda had mandatory 
rapid temperature screening at all its borders and airport. The 
country was among the first in sub- Saharan Africa to order a 
total shutdown, on the 21 March 2020 (DW, 14 July 2020). 
All non- essential travel outside homes was banned (IGC, 
2020). On 4 May, the government eased the lockdown, 
allowing public administration services and private businesses 
to reopen, but under strict health and safety regulations 
(FEWS NET, 2020). Despite these timely measures being 
implemented, the number of confirmed cases has continued 
to rise, although at a relatively slower pace compared to many 
other countries around the world. As of 8 August 2020, a 
total of 2,134 COVID- 19 cases had been registered (John 
Hopkins University, 2020).
Behind such an impressive performance against COVID- 19 
there has been great sacrifices. More than half of Rwanda’s 
population (56 per cent) live on less than $1.90 per day 
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and this segment has suffered disproportionately due to the 
COVID- 19 lockdown measures (World Bank, 2020b). Food 
prices rose and access to other health services was more difficult 
for the poor. The way forward for Rwanda will be to sustain 
its vigilance and its calculated moves against COVID- 19. 
Mitigation measures targeted to improve incomes and the 
health of the poor and vulnerable populations should allow 
the country to transcend the COVID- 19 crisis.
Conclusion
It is necessary for African leaders and policymakers to utilize 
the rare opportunity opened up by the COVID- 19 outbreak 
to begin strengthening public health systems and disease 
surveillance. This is where the World Bank and other donor 
or lending institutions can mitigate the negative effects of 
COVID- 19. Strengthening regional cooperation of all health 
institutions in Africa and activation of stricter policies at the 
ports of entry, such as screening, testing and isolation of 
confirmed cases, will go a long way to forestall unexpected 
outbreaks. Countries such as Mauritius and Vietnam have 
minimized infections through similar measures (Mauritius at 
344 and Vietnam at 789 cases as of 8 August 2020 [John 
Hopkins University, 2020]). The governments also need 
to strengthen their capacities to respond to epidemics as 
highlighted by WHO’s joint evaluation of International 
Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities.
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COVID- 19 and Global 
Inequality
Gerard McCann and Chrispin Matenga
The impact of the COVID- 19 pandemic on the Global South 
will be formidable and will take decades to recover from. 
Regions that have historically struggled with development 
issues have been caught highly exposed to the spread of this 
particular pathogen. Already straining from under- resourced 
health and medical provision, climate change and conflict, 
many of the world’s most vulnerable regions will be forced 
into a mitigation drain that will undermine decades of pos-
itive development while accelerating processes of socioeco-
nomic stress that – if not combated at an international level 
– will lead to further damaging levels of economic decline and 
deprivation. This chapter will survey the effects that COVID- 
19 will have on socioeconomic inequality and will highlight 
the scale of the need vis- à- vis strategies for mitigation.
The new context
COVID- 19 has brought forward a series of issues that will 
have both short- and long- term implications for international 
development. The various governmental attempts at 
mitigating the impact of this pandemic have served to highlight 
persistent systemic fault- lines in a global socioeconomic 
system where inequality has, yet again, come sharply into 
focus. The implications of this all too predictable pandemic 
have been manifest in various ways:  through transnational 
market competition, the scramble for basic medical supplies; 
the deliberate neglect of the most vulnerable members of 
society; the pharmaceutical companies’ race for a vaccine; 
an almost total lack of testing and medical intervention 
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in disadvantaged communities; fear of the virus being 
used as a cover for human rights abuses; and international 
organizational withdrawal when it comes to assisting regions 
of the world which do not have the health and public services 
to combat such desperate circumstances – this has been most 
notable in regions in conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2020).
Perhaps most notable in the confusion over mitigating 
actions has been the way in which governments, internationally, 
have sought to protect internal vested interests at the expense 
of confronting persistent, debilitating, global inequality. 
The pirating of global supplies of COVID- 19 relief drugs 
by rich countries is perhaps the most shocking example of 
a breakdown in what was an unsteady consensus on global 
interdependence. The rollout of this economy of privilege 
can be witnessed most vividly from what has been happening 
to the poorest individuals, families, communities and Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), and increasingly selective 
policies of development cooperation. Taken in the round, 
the economic scarring of this pandemic will take decades to 
recover from; the implications for human life experience will 
be generational.
Food shortages, caused by the global mismanagement of 
food security and climate change, and conflicts driven by the 
corporate privatization of war (the outsourcing of military 
markets and activities, for example, in Libya, Ukraine, Syria 
and Yemen), have been met through 2020 by a pandemic 
that, in particular, affects marginalized groups. Even the 
epidemiological mutation of COVID- 19 seems to be 
working against the Global South, where the virus – from 
initial research – seems to be most adversely affecting those of 
African or Asian descent and those who suffer illnesses linked 
to impoverishment (ONS, 2020a: 2– 4). The United Nations’ 
World Economic Situation and Prospects as of Mid- 2020 report 
commented on the challenges that the pandemic has created 
regarding global inequality and paints a stark picture:
The pandemic has unleashed a health and economic crisis 
unprecedented in scope and magnitude. Lockdowns and 
the closing of national borders enforced by governments 
have paralyzed economic activities across the board, laying 
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off millions of workers worldwide … The possibility of a 
slow recovery and prolonged economic slump— with rising 
poverty and inequality— looms large.
(United Nations, 2020: 1)
Arguably, the most challenging social issue that has arisen out 
of the crisis has been that the pandemic has acted as a catalyst 
for the accelerated divergence in life- preserving public sector 
interventions between the most and least privileged people 
around the world. Even within the Global North this divide 
registers, where the most excluded, the least able to cope 
– those with learning needs, the elderly in care homes and 
refugee populations – have become the most exposed to the 
virus and the least protected. In terms of mortality, one key 
fact from the United Kingdom’s Office of National Statistics 
is brutal – people suffering socioeconomic deprivation are 
twice as likely to die of COVID- 19 (ONS, 2020b).
Rolled out globally, the reactive model of mitigation, 
selective shielding (protect wealthier sections of society and 
siloing those who do not have the means to finance their way 
through the pandemic), will have significant consequences, 
with the real possibility of drawing back on years of hard- 
won development. It could also result in the unravelling 
of critical gains made through the United Nations (UN) 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – particularly SDG- 
1, which aims for an end to extreme poverty, and SDG- 10 on 
a reduction in global inequality. In the chaos of the pandemic 
these initiatives have lost substantial ground.
At the global level, the potential impact of COVID- 19 
poses a real challenge to the UN Sustainable Development 
Goal of ending poverty by 2030 because increases in the 
relative and absolute size of the number of poor … would 
be the first recorded since 1990 and they could represent a 
reversal of approximately a decade of progress in reducing 
poverty. In regions such as the Middle East and North 
Africa and SSA, the adverse impacts could result in poverty 
levels similar to those recorded 30 years ago.
(Sumner et al, 2020: 8)
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The response to the pandemic from the UN has been to 
call for additional financial support to help fragile regions 
struggle through, while addressing ongoing crises such as 
climate change and the sporadic conflicts afflicting many areas 
of the Global South. Under the cloud of the pandemic, a 
UN list of 50 ‘vulnerable nations in urgent need’ now has 
nine additional countries on it:  Benin, Djibouti, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Togo and 
Zimbabwe (Sumner et al, 2020). The reasons for this are 
multifold but have been a result particularly of fluctuations in 
global commodity prices; the withdrawal of investment and 
international financial transfers; mass job losses; protectionism; 
and the ongoing burden of foreign debt. Analysis of the 2020 
situation for the United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU- WIDER) 
has estimated that an additional 400 to 580 million people 
will be facing extreme poverty as a result of the pandemic. 
In this scenario, the multiplying effects of global economic 
contraction and the breakdown of social and health support 
systems would be unprecedented (Sumner et al, 2020: 2). On 
8 July, the UN Secretary- General António Guterres made an 
unprecedented call for governments to unite to confront the 
global issue which will reflect responses to this pandemic:
Inequality defines our time. More than 70 per cent of the 
world’s people are living with rising income and wealth 
inequality. The 26 richest people in the world hold as much 
wealth as half the global population. But income, pay and 
wealth are not the only measures of inequality. People’s 
chances in life depend on their gender, family and ethnic 
background, race, whether or not they have a disability, 
and other factors. Multiple inequalities intersect and 
reinforce each other across the generations. The lives and 
expectations of millions of people are largely determined 
by their circumstances at birth.
(Guterres, 2020b)
The World Bank (WB), not known for its sensitivities on 
equality, has also been alarmed by the turn of events. In 
an analysis of the impact of the pandemic by some of its 
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economists, the effects are sobering in every sense of the 
word: ‘With the new forecasts, global poverty— the share of 
the world’s population living on less than $1.90 per day— is 
projected to increase from 8.2 per cent in 2019 to 8.6 per cent 
in 2020, or from 632 million people to 665 million people’ 
(Mahler et al, 2020). At a conservative estimate, it means 
another 23 million people will need emergency humanitarian 
support. The hardest hit will be those regions that have been 
historically subject to economic volatility, colonialism and the 
systemic exploitation of human and natural resources. These 
regions are largely grouped within sub- Saharan Africa and 
Asia. They are also the regions least able to cope with any 
further pressures on under- resourced and under- staffed health 
and social care systems. What also must be noted here are the 
effects of the meltdown in public policy in many countries in 
Southern and Central America, where, by August 2020, some 
governments could simply no longer guarantee public health 
provision of any kind in many regions.
From the projections of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the pandemic could take up to two years to reach its 
breadth of contagion, taking millions of lives on its journey. 
The WHO Africa Region office portrays a difficult scenario 
for that continent, where: ‘Eighty- three thousand to 190,000 
people in Africa could die of COVID- 19 and 29 million to 
44 million could get infected in the first year of the pandemic 
if containment measures fail’ (WHO, 2020). In its survey 
of health services, based on self- reports by 47 countries to 
WHO, the situation is compounded by the statistic that 
there are on average only nine intensive care unit beds per 
one million people in the Africa region (WHO, 2020). In 
many countries the health system is non- existent, and the 
care system by and large remains the family and community 
network. The mortality rate and lack of capacity for public 
health services are only the start of the process that will spasm 
into what could be described as socioeconomic entropy.
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Lockdown and economic impacts
With half the population of the world going through varying 
degrees of lockdown, the outcome of this pandemic will 
naturally be incremental and sporadic, affecting different 
regions at different paces. The scale of the lockdown points 
to global depression, accentuating the well- tread path 
to underdevelopment in many peripheral regions; mere 
economic adversity in others. In a word, economies and 
economic sectors predictably will suffer high levels of stress 
as a result, the knock- on effects of protectionism and political 
tension generating further inequality and social dislocation. 
In its analysis of the possible economic impacts of the 
pandemic, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
estimated that in the region of 25 million jobs could go (ILO, 
2020). That was 1 March 2020. By 18 May, 32 million jobs 
had been lost in the US alone. Furthermore, the disparate 
models of lockdown, particularly in many LDCs, with food 
markets closed and labour movement restricted, has been 
most devastating for those who rely on these two basic things 
for life security. In communities tied to an economic base 
of migrant labour pools and street economies, such curfews 
– usually only limited to wartime – could result in hunger 
and intercommunity strife due to resource competition and 
supply shortages. The poor and the poorest will remain 
dispossessed in every sense of the word. James Thurlow, from 
the International Food Policy Research Institute, presented 
the situation in these terms: ‘Poor and rural households are 
also suffering substantial losses, and for them, even a small 
drop in income can have detrimental and lasting effects … 
Tighter restrictions on urban markets, for example, could shift 
more of the burden onto poor consumers and smallholder 
farmers’ (Thurlow, 2020: 1). In response, the global working 
poor should be factored in as highly susceptible to the 
economic impact of the pandemic and this should be a central 
consideration in international strategies for COVID- 19 
mitigation (ILO, 2020: 5).
Around the world, casual, unskilled, informal labour and 
those in precarious jobs (particularly women and migrant 
labour) are losing jobs, if lucky ‘furloughed’, or forced from 
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work. In some regions, migrants have again proved easy 
scapegoats to target blame, victimized for the pandemic and 
driven from host countries. In some countries, such as India 
and China, internal migrants have been forced from regions 
after sectarian and racist attacks. These are also exactly the 
individuals and their families who are most susceptible to 
homelessness, forced migration, trafficking and human rights 
abuses. Indeed, as the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) revealed, with anti- trafficking services 
unable to operate, the flow of people has not only continued 
unabated but has increased (UNODC, 2020).
Beyond the fragile nature of labour rights and forced 
migration, the most socioeconomically vulnerable are largely 
without secured healthcare or access to the appropriate 
medication to deal with the virus. In some regions, COVID- 19 
is only compounding the pressures already brought in dealing 
with a new global measles outbreak, the resurgence of Ebola, 
tuberculosis and malaria. Collectively, this unprecedented 
period in human history has left the medical health and care 
sectors across the Global South, as with many regions of the 
Global North, struggling to cope. When largely unregulated 
market forces come to bear on this, the situation will become 
ever- more volatile. The buy- up by the US of almost the entire 
global supply of the main drug known to relieve COVID- 19 
symptoms (Remdesivir) gives some indication of where some 
governments stand on COVID- 19 mitigation. The market 
scrum for PPE at the beginning of the pandemic was also 
a signifier of self- interest over international cooperation. 
Furthermore, unless controlled, corporate agents are set to 
become highly predatory as the pharmaceutical industries 
enter an East Indian Company- style scramble for public 
patronage, funds and patents. At the online World Health 
Assembly on 18 May 2020, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
– who responded immediately and heroically to COVID- 19 
in more than 70 countries – painted a cautionary picture, 
targeting patronage- based governmental relationships with 
the global pharmaceutical industry.
The current monopoly- based pharmaceutical research 
and development (R&D) system fails to develop, produce 
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and distribute lifesaving medical tools in the interest of 
public health … With control over the market as a result 
of patents or other exclusive rights, or even the way in 
which global production and supply chains are organised, 
pharmaceutical companies have the decision- making power 
to determine who ultimately has access … When global 
demand outstrips production and supply capacity, medical 
tools are often allocated not based on public health need, 
but on the ability to pay high prices.
(MSF, 2020)
Losing this battle over procurement, production and supply 
could cost millions of lives. With this pandemic, the glaring 
paradoxes of socioeconomic divergence and power vacuums 
can be seen with the quantifiably different mortality rates 
between those who have access to healthcare and medicine 
and the most excluded members of society (Neate, 2020; 
Riley, 2020). The responsibility for addressing the issues of 
inequality reside largely with political representatives with 
mandates to apply good practice in governance and propriety 
in public office. The problematic derogation from these 
principles has been that for many governments the protection 
of citizens has remained secondary to the causes of internal 
control (by quelling protest and curtailing rights), territorial 
security and power struggles. Across the globe this has led to 
further divergence between the powerless and powerful – the 
essential cause of inequality.
Shockingly skewed illness and mortality rates have 
tracked and exposed racial and class divides. In some of 
the world’s richest nations, health care systems have 
proven grossly inadequate, and race, gender, religious, 
and class discrimination have skewed access to housing, 
food, education, and technology in ways that have 
yielded radically different outcomes. Gaping North- South 
disparities have been exposed.
(United Nations Human Rights Council, 2020: 9)
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the dire situation humanity finds itself in 
demands concerted, targeted and humane interventions – 
interventions that have not been witnessed on a global scale 
since the end of the Second World War. Whether governments 
will rise to this challenge or not is core to COVID- 19 
mitigation. Oxfam labels the need for international action 
‘a plan for all’ (Oxfam, 2020:  1; UNHRC, 2020:  19), 
disciplining economies and markets with an underlying 
rights- based humanitarian model for mitigation. Drawing 
from calls from key international agencies, such as the UN 
(UNOCHA, 2020), the WHO and the ILO, any emergency 
rescue strategy will need:  the commitment of trillions of 
dollars in international development; the cancellation of 
debt repayments; international aid budgets being increased 
substantially; universal human rights being enforced at a 
transnational level; and health and social protection in place 
for all. This mitigation package could define primary goals 
for dealing with the scale of the crisis. However, inequality 
remains, in essence, a default political position and many 
will suffer because of this. A shift in the mentality of those in 
power would be a start.
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The Health Impact Fund
Learning from COVID- 19
Felicitas Holzer and Thomas Pogge
We are living in the shadow of the COVID- 19 pandemic – anx-
ious about our families, our friends and ourselves, depressed 
by worldwide suffering and anxiety, upset by knowing that 
once more the poor and marginalized are worse affected. 
Could the rules and practices organizing healthcare around 
the world have been better suited to this outbreak? Let us 
consider the Health Impact Fund as a plausible institutional 
reform of the current regime for developing and marketing 
new pharmaceuticals.1
The pharmaceuticals sector
Medicines are among humanity’s greatest achievements. They 
have helped realize dramatic gains in health and longevity 
as well as huge cost savings through reduced sick days and 
hospitalizations. The global market for pharmaceuticals is 
currently worth US$1,430 billion annually, 1.7 per cent of 
the gross world product (IFPMA, 2017: 5). Roughly US$800 
billion thereof is spent on brand- name products, which are 
typically under patent (IFPMA, 2017: 51).
Commercial pharmaceutical research and development 
(R&D) efforts are encouraged and rewarded through the 
earnings that innovators derive from sales of their branded 
products. These earnings largely depend on the 20- year 
product patents they are entitled to obtain in WTO member 
states. Such patents give them a temporary monopoly, enabling 
them to sell their new products without competition. Under 
the protection of their patents, they can raise a product’s 
price far above manufacture and distribution costs while still 
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maintaining a substantial sales volume. Such mark- ups yield 
large profits for commercial innovators and enable them to 
invest in new R&D, currently at a rate of US$189 billion a 
year (Mikulic, 2020).
While we should evidently want pharmaceutical R&D to 
be sustainable, it is worth asking whether our current way of 
funding is optimal. There are three main concerns.
Firstly, innovators motivated by the prospect of large mark- 
ups tend to neglect the – mostly communicable – diseases 
specific to poor people, who cannot afford expensive medicines. 
The 20 World Health Organization- listed neglected tropical 
diseases together afflict over a billion people (WHO, n.d.) but 
attract only 0.35 per cent of pharmaceutical industry R&D 
(IFPMA, 2017: 15 and 21). Another 0.12 per cent of this 
R&D spending goes to tuberculosis and malaria, which kill 
1.7 million people each year.2
Secondly, thanks to a large number of affluent or well- insured 
patients, the profit- maximizing price of a new medicine tends 
to be quite high. A typical example is the hepatitis- C drug 
Sovaldi. It was introduced in the US at a price of $84,000 
per 12- week course of treatment while the production cost 
was estimated at $68– 136 (Sachs, 2015) – a near- thousand 
fold (100,000 per cent) mark- up. In the poorer countries, 
where the upper classes are less affluent and less well- insured, 
the profit- maximizing price is lower – at least theoretically. 
In practice, matters are more complex as firms are well aware 
that a low price in a poorer country can trigger political 
pricing pressures in the far more lucrative affluent countries 
as well as efforts at international arbitrage (where medicines 
are purchased in one country for consumption in another). 
Moreover, even when patented pharmaceuticals are sold at 
lower prices (Sovaldi can now be bought in India for about 
US$500) they are still unaffordable with the also much lower 
ordinary incomes there. Sad but true:  most people around 
the world cannot afford advanced medicines – at least until 
their patents expire, which, with Sovaldi, will start happening 
in 2032. Every year, millions suffer and die from lack of access 
to medicines that could be mass- produced quite cheaply.
This exclusion of the poor entails another disaster, specific 
to communicable diseases:  those who avoidably remain 
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sick continue to spread the disease. In doing so, they often 
facilitate the emergence of more dangerous drug- resistant 
strains, whose rise is facilitated by patients who – desperate 
and short of money – take less than the full course of treatment 
or self- medicate with drugs in diluted dosage, often peddled 
by street vendors.3 Drug- resistant disease variants constitute a 
rising share of the disease burden and pose a grave danger to 
public health, as extensively drug- resistant tuberculosis (XDR 
TB) does in India.
Thirdly, rewards for developing and marketing 
pharmaceutical products are poorly correlated with health 
gains. Firms earn billions by developing duplicative drugs that 
add little to our pharmaceutical arsenal – and billions more 
by cleverly marketing their products to patients who won’t 
benefit. By contrast, there is no profit in developing new 
antimicrobials, or vaccines against diseases of poverty, nor in 
providing even life- saving treatments to the world’s poor.
The COVID- 19 pandemic brings out these grave flaws 
in how our pharmaceuticals sector is structured. We need 
better incentives for innovation and marketing to motivate 
coordinated global efforts to contain and eradicate diseases. 
Such efforts must include poor populations: we need good 
new treatments for the diseases of poverty and must ensure 
that all people everywhere have access to important medicines 
and can use them to optimal effect.
Adding new incentives through the Health Impact Fund
To address all these problems, we propose a complement 
to the present regime:  the Health Impact Fund. Each year, 
this Fund would disburse a fixed pool of reward money. 
Innovators would be invited to register any of their new 
pharmaceuticals for participation in ten consecutive annual 
pay- outs, each of which would be divided among registered 
products according to health gains achieved in the preceding 
year. In return, the innovator would agree to sell its registered 
product at or below manufacturing cost and to license it cost- 
free for generic production after the reward period expires. 
Quality- adjusted life years (QALYs), as widely employed and 
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refined in recent decades, could be used as a common metric 
for comparing and aggregating health gains across diverse 
diseases, pharmaceuticals, demographic groups, lifestyles and 
cultures. To reassure funders or innovators, a maximum or 
minimum reward per QALY could be stipulated.
With emerging epidemics like swine flu and COVID- 19, 
measurement of health impact is complicated by the fact 
that we lack here a well- established baseline representing the 
harm the disease would have done in the absence of the new 
pharmaceutical to be assessed. For malaria, such a baseline 
can be established on the basis of a stable disease trajectory 
observable over many years. In the case of a new epidemic, 
one must rely on a modelling exercise that estimates the 
baseline trajectory on the basis of obtainable data about the 
spread of the disease and its impact on infected patients. 
This surely is a challenging exercise, which cannot yield 
precise or uncontroversial results about what damage the 
epidemic would truly have done if the vaccine or medication 
in question had not appeared. Still, despite the roughness of 
such a modelled baseline, the Health Impact Fund would give 
innovators the right incentives.
The Health Impact Fund might start with annual pools 
of US$6 billion. This is below 1 per cent of the US$800 
billion per annum the world currently spends on branded 
pharmaceuticals. Because a healthy population and workforce 
is a common good, the Fund could plausibly be financed 
from public revenues – for instance, by countries representing 
one- third of gross world product contributing 0.02 per cent 
of their gross national incomes. Non- contributing affluent 
countries would lose the benefits:  the price ceiling on 
registered products would not apply in them. This exclusion 
would give innovators more reason to register (they could still 
sell their product with monopoly mark- up in some affluent 
countries) and affluent countries reason to join the funding 
coalition.
A commercial innovator would develop and register a 
product only if it expected to make a profit over and above 
recouping its R&D expenses. There is some controversy over 
the size of such R&D outlays per marketing approval. The 
Health Impact Fund would throw light on this question by 
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revealing at what level registrations settle. If the Fund hosted 
about 20 products, with two entering and two exiting in 
a typical year, this would show that the prospect of US$3 
billion over ten years is seen as satisfactory – neither windfall 
nor hardship. Actual results would vary, of course, depending 
on the product and on how well it is marketed: some products 
would earn more by having greater therapeutic value or by 
benefitting more people.
The Health Impact Fund would attract investment to 
specific R&D projects that are unprofitable under the current 
regime: ones expected to produce large health gains among 
mostly poor people. Most such projects would address 
communicable diseases, which continue to impose devastating 
disease burdens mainly upon the poor. In consequence, there 
would be much deeper and broader knowledge about such 
diseases, a richer arsenal of effective interventions and greater 
capacities for developing additional, more targeted responses 
quickly. Pharmaceutical innovators would thus be much 
better prepared to supply or develop medicines suitable for 
confronting emerging threats such as Ebola or the current 
COVID- 19 pandemic.
The Health Impact Fund would also transform how 
pharmaceutical companies tackle diseases. A firm rewarded 
for merely selling malaria drugs need not be distraught by the 
fact that malaria still, each year, infects over 200 million people 
(WHO, 2019: xii) and kills half a million. A firm rewarded for 
reducing the malaria burden, by contrast, would aim to stop 
the proliferation of malaria as rapidly and cost- effectively as 
possible. This aim will shape both its development and its 
marketing efforts.
For innovators seeking to profit from temporary 
monopolies, the ideal product typically is a maintenance 
drug, which extends patients’ lives or makes them feel and 
function better, without disturbing the proliferation of the 
disease. The innovator then sets the profit- maximizing price 
and tries to sell the drug to those who can afford it for as long 
as they shall live.
By contrast, innovators seeking health impact rewards 
would ideally want to develop a preventative product (vaccine) 
or cure, suitable for fighting the disease at the population level. 
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Collaborating with national health systems, international 
agencies and NGOs, such an innovator would seek to build 
a strong public- health strategy around its product, involving 
diagnostics and other factors relevant to treatment outcomes, 
bolstered by real- time monitoring to recognize and address 
possible impediments to uptake or therapeutic success. Such 
an innovator’s highest ambition would be to supply not many 
patients but – after eradicating the target disease – none at 
all. If it achieved eradication in year seven, it could enjoy the 
world’s gratitude while still collecting three large pay- outs 
towards its next R&D project.
The existing regime motivates pharmaceutical innovators 
to develop marketable products and then to achieve high 
sales at high mark- ups. We could also motivate innovators 
to develop effective products and then deploy them to help 
reduce the disease burden as efficiently as possible. The 
COVID- 19 pandemic makes evident that the decision to 
give pharmaceutical innovators only the former incentive 
is profoundly unwise. This bad decision helps explain why, 
with all our scientific sophistication, all the trillions spent 
on pharmaceuticals, we have managed to eradicate only one 
single disease: smallpox, over 40 years ago.
The Health Impact Fund is based on a compelling 
thought: if the purpose of the pharmaceuticals sector is to help 
reduce the burden of disease, then let us reward innovators 
for exactly that and not for something quite different.
Piloting the Health Impact Fund approach
The COVID- 19 pandemic offers a natural pilot opportunity. 
Governments could set aside a multi- billion amount to 
reward the creation of relevant new vaccines and therapies. 
This sum would be distributed among participating products 
according to their assessed impact on the pandemic over the 
subsequent two years, say, on condition that said products 
be sold without mark- up and licensed cost- free for generic 
manufacture and sale.
We have also advocated a much smaller US$100- million 
pilot that, like the Health Impact Fund itself, would not be 
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disease- specific.4Though too small to incentivize the entire 
development of even one new pharmaceutical, this pilot 
would substantiate our approach by pioneering measurement 
and reward of health gains. Innovators – including non- 
commercial ones like Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
or TB Alliance – would be asked to propose initiatives through 
which they could achieve additional health gains in poor 
countries or regions with an existing or new pharmaceutical, 
priced without mark- up. They might propose an affordable 
heat- stable or paediatric version of one of their medicines, 
perhaps, or a fixed- dose combination. The most promising 
four proposals would be chosen and given three years for 
implementation. Health gains achieved would then be 
assessed, and the reward pool divided accordingly. Any such 
pilot would bring real health gains to poor populations, who 
are especially under- served by existing healthcare systems, 
and would anticipate and prepare a permanent Health Impact 
Fund by showing that health gains can be reliably assessed 
and that pharmaceutical innovators are able and willing to 
deliver them quite cost- effectively.
With a pilot available for detailed study, potential funders 
could then make a well- grounded decision about the Health 
Impact Fund itself. Even a few major states and foundations 
would suffice to launch it; and, if successful, it could of 
course be expanded over time to include more funders and 
an increasing share of new medications. The Health Impact 
Fund would bring the world together for the creation of 
global public goods and would give real meaning to our 
noble commitment to leave no one behind.
The transformative power of the Health Impact Fund
Monopoly rewards turn innovators into jealous spies, 
scouring the earth to find possible patent infringers, who may 
be using their innovation without licence. The Health Impact 
Fund does the opposite:  it encourages innovators actively 
to promote widespread and effective deployment of their 
innovation so as to enlarge its impact. Wider deployment can 
be promoted by adding one’s innovation to a patent pool, 
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for instance, or by subsidizing its use among the poorest 
even below variable cost. More effective deployment can be 
promoted by various means that help users get the most out 
of their product.
In this regard, the Health Impact Fund is superior to 
compulsory licencing, which relies on generic manufacturers 
to drive down prices. Compulsory licencing remains caught 
in the tension between price and promotion: the cheaper the 
product, the less incentive there is to bring it, in top condition, 
to remote and impoverished places, with clear local- language 
instructions and adherence support for patients and medical 
staff. The Health Impact Fund avoids this tension by giving 
innovators an interest in both – affordability and widespread 
optimal use of their product. It does so by enabling innovators 
to earn more than the sales price from selling a product, 
by assigning more value to the health and survival of poor 
people than what they can afford to pay. Doing so is a moral 
imperative – and it is also collectively advantageous, especially 
with communicable diseases, which would be central to the 
Health Impact Fund. By containing and ideally eradicating 
such a disease among the poor, we protect everyone from the 
threat it poses, especially through the danger of new drug- 
resistant strains.
The Health Impact Fund is superior to compulsory 
licencing also in another respect – by not jeopardizing 
innovators’ recovery of their massive R&D outlays. It is not 
smart to put commercial innovators on notice that, if any of 
their innovations is really important, states may appropriate 
it with token compensation. Promoting access in a way 
that undermines innovation is no better than what we do 
now: promote innovation in a way that undermines access. 
Neither regime delivers what we want, abundant innovation 
and universal access. If we delink the price of pharmaceuticals 
from the fixed cost of R&D – as we should! – then we should 
also delink innovator earnings from the sales price. Innovation 
will flourish only if innovators can recover their R&D outlays 
and make a decent profit (Hollis and Busby, 2020).
Reducing disease with pharmaceuticals is complicated 
and involves many stages – from research on specific diseases 
and computer exploration of molecules, via clinical trials, to 
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motivating diverse medical staff and patients in many countries 
and cultures to use a medicine to optimal effect. All these stages 
and components of disease reduction are interdependent, 
posing a highly complex global logistics problem. Optimal 
progress requires not merely the solution of many disparate 
tasks but also harmony among these solutions. Early decisions 
about conceiving and pursuing R&D projects should already 
anticipate the challenges of successful deployment:  how 
to identify the patients who can benefit the most and, for 
infectious diseases, those whose timely treatment would do 
most to slow contagion? How to make the product reach and 
help patients in remote and impoverished locations? How to 
build a strong collaborative public- health strategy around the 
product? How to fashion the best plan towards eradicating 
the disease worldwide?
These great potential synergies suggest that the Health 
Impact Fund would give rise to actors who can optimally run 
an entire worldwide operation, R&D plus marketing, though 
perhaps outsourcing specific subtasks, such as manufacturing. 
Some pharmaceutical firms are well positioned to reconfigure 
themselves for this new role. Other existing actors may also 
be well positioned, for instance certain NGOs or product- 
development partnerships. Open to all, the Health Impact 
Fund would, over time, bring forth innovators that really 
excel at achieving cost- effective health gains through a well- 
coordinated global strategy of disease containment.
Notes
1. For elaboration and critical discussion of the Health Impact Fund 
proposal, see Incentives for Global Health, www.healthimpactfund.
org/ .
2. Annual R&D spending is just over US$900 million for tuberculosis 
(www.treatmentactiongroup.org/ resources/ tbrd- report/ tbrd- 
report- 2019) and US$252 million for malaria (www.who.int/ news- 
room/ feature- stories/ detail/ world- malaria- report- 2019), but only 
about one- fifth thereof is expended by the pharmaceutical industry 
(IFPMA, 2017: 21). Each year, tuberculosis kills 1.2 million people 
(https:// ourworldindata.org/ grapher/ the- number- of- deaths- due- 
to- tuberculosis- by- who- and- ihme- data), malaria 500,000 (https:// 
ourworldindata.org/ malaria).
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3. Important examples are drug- resistant tuberculosis (https:// tbfacts.
org/ drug- resistant- tb) and malaria (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ 
articles/ PMC3058555).
4. See Incentives for Global Health, www.healthimpactfund.org/ en/ 
publications.
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After the Immediate 
Coronavirus Crisis
Three Scenarios for Global 
Development
David Hulme and Rory Horner1
COVID- 19 is transforming national policies on an unimag-
inable scale:  ‘austerity’ has vanished and (hyper)Keynesian 
spending is back; neoliberal regimes are making unimagina-
ble welfare interventions; income support is favoured in some 
countries; and hyper- globalization policies are being reined 
in. Seemingly everything has changed. The initial pressures for 
these transformations focused on proximate problems: rapid 
responses to risks of premature death from a new disease and 
temporary support for employment, incomes, household 
food security and the economy. But, at a structural level, the 
coronavirus pandemic could help transform the institutions 
and norms that have underpinned global development in the 
early 21st century, for better or worse.
This may be a critical juncture (Green, 2020), where 
actions taken now could have legacies for decades to come. 
The pandemic could be a time for what Naomi Klein 
(2007) has called ‘shock doctrine’, where it is exploited for 
questionable purposes to create an unappealing future, or it 
could set the course for a better future. In this chapter, we 
explore three scenarios of ‘what’ the future might be like, 
1. An earlier version appeared in Global Policy in April 




We are grateful to Global Policy for permission to extend and update 
those ideas here.
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rather than predictions, as an aid for those thinking about 
how to shape global futures.
Scenario 1. Ugly: global meltdown
The proximate impacts of the coronavirus pandemic have 
been extremely negative: public fear, increased mortality, loss 
of jobs and reduced or cessation (for example, especially for 
informal- sector households) of income, collapsed businesses, 
strained public health services, a massive rise in public debt, 
loss of personal mobility and threats of social and political 
breakdown. These negative impacts create processes that 
could greatly increase the likelihood of structural changes 
that undermine the prospects for human development. At the 
extreme, they include apocalypse.
Potentially, such a scenario could develop from either 
the direct health threat of the coronavirus or the indirect 
impacts of the disease on economic, social and political life. 
COVID- 19 has increased mortality rates for some groups in 
some parts of the world (Our World in Data, 2020). Potential 
struggles in developing and making available a vaccine, 
difficulties of eradicating and potential mutations of the virus 
can increase such impacts. Yet, the new disease’s influence on 
overall mortality rates seems unlikely to approach those of 
the two world wars or the ‘Spanish flu’ (at least 50 million 
deaths). COVID- 19 is also different from HIV- AIDS, which 
led to South Africa’s average life expectancy falling by almost 
ten years from the mid- 1990s to mid- 2000s (Low and 
MacDonell, 2019). This observation does not create grounds 
for complacency (hundreds of thousands of people dying from 
a new disease and potentially many more is horrendous), but 
the likelihood of the direct impact of COVID- 19 producing 
a total societal collapse seems low.
However, when the indirect effects of COVID- 19 are 
explored then catastrophic scenarios can be more readily 
generated. There are several potential pathways (financial 
collapse, social breakdown, political paralysis, international 
warfare) that could theoretically create an apocalypse but, 
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in most scenarios multiple, interacting pathways would be 
envisioned.
Financial meltdown is perhaps the most likely of the ugly 
scenario initiators. The contagion effects of a bank run would 
knock on throughout the sector and one would have to be 
very naïve or very well- informed to be absolutely sure that a 
non- sustainable asset or product, like sub- prime mortgages 
and derivatives, has not already been built into our global 
financial system.
Putting financial contagion aside, previously unthinkable 
financial packages of support have been announced in recent 
months, particularly in higher- income countries, but also on a 
smaller scale in low and middle- income countries. This could 
lead to a huge strain on public finances for years or decades to 
come, which could precipitate a return to austerity, sowing the 
seeds of further societal decay through poor health coverage, 
unequal education and failure to combat climate change.
That oft- found crisis tendency of ‘socialism for the rich 
and capitalism for the poor’ has been manifest for some 
very wealthy individuals and companies benefitting from 
government support, while those most in need struggle for 
assistance. Moreover, the lack of conditions for recipient 
businesses, such as the absence of climate change mitigation 
in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act in the US, are a missed opportunity. At the 
same time, regressive conditionality such as the World Bank’s 
offer for fast- track assistance, ‘conditional on structural 
adjustment policies mandating deregulation (for example, by 
promoting private markets in health) or trade liberalisation’ 
(as commented on by Kentikelenis et al, 2020), has dark 
echoes of the 1980s and 1990s.
The social breakdown scenario has many possible origins, 
but prime among these is that ill- effects from COVID- 19 
management policies (especially policies that create food 
insecurity or stop and/ or reduce informal- sector workers’ 
daily earnings) lead to mass unemployment, riots, raids on 
food stocks, police/ military over- reaction and an expanding 
cycle of violence. Political paralysis or breakdown could 
evolve in democratic situations through the introduction of 
‘suspended democracy’, as with Hungary, when elections 
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are suspended or altered and/ or leaders seek to retain power 
through policies that undermine state capacity. With a muted 
civil society, authoritarianism could deepen.
Internationally, existing cooperation could break down and, 
at its worst, involve a descent into warfare. Rather than the 
problems exposed by the pandemic leading to strengthened 
international cooperation, nationalistic governments could 
blame the ‘global’ and retreat inwards. President Donald 
Trump added to his earlier withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Agreement, a disregard for the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) with withdrawal of US funding from the WHO; 
relatively unthinkable a few weeks previous, it could spread to 
other organizations (for example, even further disregard for 
the World WTO). A more severe breakdown of international 
cooperation could even take the world into some form of 
‘third’ World War, leading to an apocalypse when one or 
more players decide to use nuclear or biological weapons. 
Such an international conflict could develop by conventional 
military confrontation but, perhaps more likely, would be a 
digital attack – undermining a country’s banking system, its 
health system, electricity supply, access to potable water – and 
a response that escalates the conflict digitally and then into 
actual military activity. Would any country be so ‘foolish’? 
With North Korea and Russia around, and the US under 
Trump, the answer must be ‘yes’.
The most likely multi- factor, interacting scenario would 
see a set of these factors operating simultaneously and 
cumulatively. The world would see increased mortalities, 
more rapid economic/ employment/ food security collapse, 
social breakdown, confrontational international relations and 
possibly even apocalypse.
Scenario 2. Bad: unsustainable and unequal world
The ‘bad scenario’ envisages a future that returns humanity 
to something like its pre- coronavirus status, something which 
at this moment seems a ‘good scenario’. While this would 
mean historically ‘high’ levels of human development and 
relatively ‘low’ levels of absolute poverty, a return to this 
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situation is ‘bad’ as it means that climate crisis, and stark and 
rising within- country inequality, continue (Deaton, 2013). 
Human progress is unlikely when faced with these twin 
threats of environmental unsustainability and the human 
and political consequences of inequality (unfair societies 
and elite- captured policy processes). The ‘critical juncture’, 
provided by COVID- 19, to transition to a low carbon and 
more egalitarian world will have been wasted. If the end 
of the Cold War (1989/ 90), being within a hair’s breadth 
of global financial meltdown (2008) and a global health 
pandemic (2020), cannot foster the social transformation 
(or the plutocrats actually working towards a system change) 
to sustainability and equity, then it looks like only a genuine 
World War Three has the potential to move humanity beyond 
‘business as usual’.
This scenario assumes a recovery (in terms of health, 
economic growth, stock market valuations and the performance 
of public institutions) from the current coronavirus situation. 
These are the standard assumptions that have underpinned 
private investment for the last two centuries:  that in the 
medium to long term, economic growth will continue as 
capitalism ensures technological and organizational advances 
that create products and services that are commercially viable. 
Within countries, the national policy interventions in the 
immediate crisis – such as increases in social protection – 
could be short- lived.
Richard Haass (2020), President of the United States’ 
Council on Foreign Relations, has argued that: ‘The pandemic 
will accelerate history rather than reshape it’. The trends 
which he sees as already in motion and likely to accelerate 
are declining US leadership as its hegemonic power recedes, 
faltering global cooperation and discord among the great 
powers. For Dani Rodrik (2020), the pandemic brings out 
‘confirmation bias’, solidifying the views we already had. He 
has argued that:
The crisis seems to have thrown the dominant characteristics 
of each country’s politics into sharper relief. Countries 
have in effect become exaggerated versions of themselves. 
This suggests that the crisis may turn out to be less of a 
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watershed in global politics and economics than many have 
argued. Rather than putting the world on a significantly 
different trajectory, it is likely to intensify and entrench 
already- existing trends.
(Rodrik, 2020)
In this scenario, tackling climate change continues to drift as 
a priority for the international community (see, for example, 
Anderson et al, 2020) and the climate crisis accelerates.
Scenario 3. Good: global sustainable development
This scenario envisages the negative proximate impacts of 
COVID- 19 as fostering (or having the potential to foster) 
positive structural transformations in economic, social 
and political institutions and norms. There are historical 
precedents for such optimism. The Black Death of the 14th 
century (a much more severe pandemic that reduced Europe’s 
population by 30 to 60 per cent) is credited (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012) with causing a labour shortage in the UK 
that led to the strengthening of peasant/ worker voice and 
interests, and the initiation of political processes fostering the 
evolution of more democratic political institutions and norms 
over later centuries.
The world wars of the 20th century fostered forms of 
capitalism that shared the growing wealth of industrialized 
countries more equitably across their societies than in the 
pre- 1919 world (Piketty, 2014: chapter 3). This led to raised 
incomes and improved levels of human development across 
Europe and North America as greater public investment in 
education, health, social housing and welfare improved the 
lives of tens of millions of people. This idea of a negative ‘event’ 
creating longer- term positive effects has become a rallying 
call for progressive policy change or sociopolitical structural 
transformation. The case of COVID- 19 demonstrates that we 
live in an era of global development challenges (Oldekop et 
al, 2020), and must address collective action problems across 
North and South, such as global public health, global climate 
change and inequality.
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A strengthening of global governance is possible. The IMF, 
World Bank and United Nations were created at the end of 
World War Two, although arguably assisted by the context of 
a unipolar, US- led world. Global governance initiatives this 
century have struggled to deal with a more multi- polar world, 
but this crisis could act as a catalyst to re- energize international 
cooperation (not just in health) without US leadership.
Strong calls have already been made for international 
cooperation to assist lower- income countries to deal with the 
current COVID- 19 economic crisis. Oxfam (2020) have called 
for a moratorium by G20 and other creditors on debt interest 
payments for poor countries. The G20 have temporarily 
agreed to suspend repayments on loans from 76 of the world’s 
low and middle- income countries. Considerable private 
sector debt still exists (Bolton et al, 2020), however, while 
public debt looms large in the future. Sustained debt relief 
would permit these financially constrained countries to invest 
in improved health services, social protection, climate change 
adaptation and support for small businesses. If a moratorium 
could run alongside the IMF issuing Special Drawing Rights 
(without 1980s- style regressive conditionalities), then access 
to development finance for the poorest countries could be 
transformed. Such cooperation could not just assist lower- 
income countries to deal with the immediate crisis, but also 
remove some constraints on, and act as a positive stimulus to, 
their future development possibilities.
Strengthened international action to address the pandemic 
could lead to stronger cooperation not just in health 
(Kickbusch and Piselli, 2020), but also in tackling climate 
change and inequality (for example, tax coordination). This 
would involve much greater commitment to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The crises of climate change 
and COVID- 19 need to be harnessed together (Oldekop et 
al, 2020) to raise the prospects for multilateral action that 
recognizes that national goals (minimizing the effects of new 
diseases or negative climate change impacts and operating 
in a stable economic environment) can only be achieved 
by effective multilateral action (to develop and distribute 
vaccines, reduce rates of disease transmission, reduce carbon 
emissions, ensure financial stability, and so on).
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Domestically, commitment to greater inclusion could 
emerge. The pandemic has demonstrated that our public 
health depends on the least healthy among us, strengthening 
the case for universal health coverage. As Amartya Sen 
(2020) has noted, post World War Two, the positive effects 
of attention to the disadvantaged led to the National Health 
Service in the UK. Without international support for anti- 
COVID- 19 efforts, then the disease and its effects (beyond 
health) may linger on and have knock- on effects on trade, 
mobility and security.
Mariana Mazzucato and Antonio Andreoni (2020) have 
argued for the need to bail out firms responsibly, rather than 
the austerity that followed the global financial crisis. This 
means that firms that are bailed out would retain workers, 
reduce dividends, prevent share buybacks, and encourage 
investment in sustainable growth with a reduced carbon 
footprint (see also Hepburn et al, 2020). Positive signs have 
emerged in Austria, where airline- industry bailouts are linked 
to meeting climate targets, and in Denmark, which (like 
France and Poland) has stated that it will not bail out firms 
which are registered in tax havens.
But turning crisis into opportunity for global sustainable 
development through multilateralism is ambitious and 
complex in a multi- polar world. Back in 2008– 2009, it looked 
as though the G20 (with members representing around 80 
per cent of the world population and economic output) might 
be the new institution that could mobilize global action, but 
that hope faded quickly and the financial institutions that had 
created the global financial crisis were allowed to continue. 
The G20 has virtually met on the COVID- 19 crisis but has 
not taken leadership of an international or global response.
Conclusion
This chapter has briefly explored the good, the bad and 
the ugly scenarios that could emerge from the coronavirus 
pandemic. While the negative proximate effects of the 
disease might encourage many to believe that ugly or bad 
longer- term outcomes might be expected (such as weakened 
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international financial systems, high levels of public debt, 
damaged multilateralism), the counter- argument that it 
creates an opportunity for progressive transformation has 
some historical support.
Our gut feeling, fuelled by political and economic 
precedent, is that the world will ‘recover’ from COVID- 19 
but back to the bad scenario. This recovery could take some 
time, as immediate prospects for a quicker return to the world 
of 2019 through a ‘V- shaped’ recovery have diminished. 
That is better than the world remaining in crisis (and it may 
look attractive at the present moment), but it would leave 
humanity on an unsustainable and socially unjust trajectory.
For social scientists, the challenge is to think through 
‘how’ the prospects of ‘not wasting the crisis’ can be raised. 
One of the ways is clearly by helping the wider population 
realize that global problems, now and in the future, will 
require effective multilateral action if we wish to reduce 
their proximate effects. But, to improve the likelihood of a 
shift to the good scenario, progressive analysts will need to 
create a popular narrative that mobilizes national and global 
constituencies to demand institutions and norms that will lead 
to transformation. This may entail new forms of capitalism 
and/ or new and more coherent forms of socialism, but it 
will need an easy to follow and easy to repeat narrative. Anti- 
neoliberalism and anti- populism tracts may be applauded by 
the progressive cognoscenti, but they will not energize popular 
support for the social transformation that an unsustainable 
and unjust world needs.
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Pádraig Carmody and Gerard McCann
The COVID- 19 pandemic is rapidly evolving. Its impacts 
have ranged from taking lives to geopolitics with govern-
ments engaging in a bitter war of words (and actions) around 
mitigation and other issues. This disunity is causing concern 
across the world, not least in the UN system, although it is 
better that this is being played out in public spats rather than 
in violent conflict (Steiner, 2020). As Florini and Sharma 
(2020) argue, the 21st century is set to be one of ‘massive dis-
ruptions’ posing serious threats to society. These range from 
potential political turmoil to financial fragilities, coupled with 
climate disruption. COVID- 19 has demonstrated the imper-
ative of effective, financed international cooperation to solve 
or remediate these global challenges. However, the prospects 
for enhanced international cooperation seem to have dimin-
ished in recent years as a result of dialectics of globalization.
The spatial dynamics of liberalization,1 offshoring and 
corporate greed have generated reactionary backlashes in 
some developed economies, such as the US and UK. The 
rise of right- wing populism globally has been associated with 
the politics of anti- globalization and protectionism (Gereffi, 
2018; Kiely, 2020), and Baldwin (2019) predicts that these 
tendencies will intensify as middle- class professions are gutted 
by the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
(4IR), generating further pressure towards ‘shelterism’ and 
‘me first’ economic policies. These developments could then 
be further securitized in relation to climate change impacts 
– an already extant trend (Andersson, 2019; Buxton and 
Hayes, 2016). To avoid this dystopian, climate- altered and 
unequal future, we need to both rethink and reinvigorate 
institutions of global governance to effectively address the 
challenge of sustainable development, including pandemic 
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prevention and preparedness. This systemic redesign must be 
both values- based and outcome focused. Simply returning 
to the ‘old normal’ scenario will not be enough to enhance 
human welfare into the future. Because ‘we know that 
pandemics, economic crises, and environmental instability 
will hit hard, but we cannot predict exactly where or when, we 
need to give resilience’ of systems more importance (Florini 
and Sharma, 2020: 50– 51). We also need to reorient them 
so that they serve to achieve desirable outcomes – such as 
sustainability, equality and human development. How might 
this developmental ‘new normal’ be achieved?
After the cataclysm of World War Two, the United Nations 
was founded. Since that time, it has prevented a recurrence 
of world wars, albeit aided by the threat of mutually assured 
destruction by nuclear powers. It has also made numerous 
other contributions to human wellbeing through its peace- 
keeping, humanitarian and development interventions. It 
is sometimes criticized for being too heavily influenced by 
the ‘great’ powers and on occasion specialized agencies have 
foisted inappropriate development policies on the Global 
South which have exacerbated conflict and inequality in 
order to revive the economies of the countries in which they 
operate. The current multi- vector crisis facing humanity – of 
inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and disease – 
is arguably an outcome of such policies (Wallace et al, 2020). 
Mentalities and systems need to change and consequently 
there is an urgent need to reform global governance to 
reinvigorate global development policy and practice.
Note
1. Indeed, some argue that the under- regulation of markets generally, 
including the ‘wet’ wildlife market in Wuhan where the transfer of 
the virus to humans is thought to have occurred, is a major reason for 
the pandemic outbreak (Wallace et al, 2020).
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